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PREFACE 
Saudi Arabia is basically an oil based economy. It possesses more 
than a quarter of the global oil reserves and has been the largest oil 
producer for over half a century. Main source of revenue for the nation 
has always been the exports of its single commodity i.e. oil. And all its 
development expenditure was undertaken by this revenue. But lately 
Saudi Arabia has recognized that the objective of long term economic 
development can not be attained by depending on the single source of 
revenue. Therefore, Saudi Arabia embarked on a long term economic 
development planning to reduce this explosive dependence of the 
economy on a single export commodity and to accelerate structural 
diversification. The structural diversification is one of the dominant 
objective of all the eight development plans (1970 - 2009). In its 
industrialization plans, petrochemical industry has been identified as the 
lead sector. The logic behind the development of petrochemical industry 
was to utilize the non-renewable associated natural gas as an industrial 
feed stock, capable of giving a higher rate of return per unit of oil or 
natural gas consumed than the simple export of the basic raw material. 
For this purpose Saudi Arabia established large scale export oriented 
and labour saving gas based petrochemical industry. In pursuit of 
diversification Saudi Arabia joined the WTO in December 2005, and 
opened its economy for increased inflow of Foreign Direct Investment. 
It also accelerated the privatization in its industrialization process. 
This thesis has been written to analyse strategy of Saudi 
government to diversify its economy away from the export of oil. It also 
makes attempt to show the extent of diversification which Saudi Arabia 
has succeeded in achieving till now. The thesis consists of six chapters. 
The First Chapter deals with the introduction and basic economic 
structure of Saudi Arabia. It gives the first hand information about the 
existence and discovery of the basic resources of Saudi Arabia. It 
describes in detail how the Saudi economy has been transformed from a 
pastoral economy into a modern economy as a result of discovery of oil 
and later boom in oil prices in 1970s. Second chapter deals with various 
types of petrochemicals and other industry (ARAMCO, PETROMIN), 
which were established in the early stage of industrialization process. 
This chapter also gives the information about various components of 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Saudi Arabia. Third Chapter 
describes the objectives and achievement of different plans periods from 
1970 - 74 to 2005-2009. Chapter Four describes the function of SABIC, 
which is the main petrochemical company of Saudi Arabia. Chapter five 
gives the details of various measures such as privatization, inflow of 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) development of other sectors such as 
tourism and mining etc., undertaken by Saudi government in order to 
diversify its economy. Lastly the Conclusion is given in Chapter Six. 
Introduction 
Saudi ^ \rabia is the largest member of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). 
Saudi economy is also the largest economy as compared to any other GCC 
countries. Prior to discovery of oil in 1938, there was no existence of integrated 
national economy. Economic activity outside Hejaz was confined to live stock 
raising, primitive agriculture and production of simple tools by craftsmen. The 
annual haj pilgrimage provided an opportunity for business activity in the 
Hejaz region. The development of Petroleum industries in Saudi Arabia was 
introduced with the out-breaJ: of Second World War. However, as the war 
ended Saudi petroleum industry grew. Saudi Arabia has vast oil resources that 
have shaped the kingdom's development. The country also has large natural 
gas reserves, as well as deposits of Bauxite, Coal, Copper, Gold, Iron, 
Phosphates, Platmum, Silver, Uranium and Zinc. Non mineral resources 
include limestone, glassland and stone. Oil reserves in Saudi Arabia constitute 
more than 2.5 percent of the global oil reserves. Saudi Arabia as is an important 
member of Organization of P(itroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) as well as 
organization of Arab petroleum exporting countries (OAPEC). The enormous 
oil reserves and vast oil production capacity in Saudi Arabia provides it with a 
significant influential power in the global oil market. The inflow of massive oil 
reserves in Saudi Arabia has resulted in unprecedented development and 
prosperity that Saudi Arabia presently enjoys. As far as agriculture is 
concerned Saudi Arabia does not have much fertile land. Most of the land 
areas are covered with desert ;md hills. So, agricultural activity required heavy 
investment for making her self sufficient in the food grain requirement. Saudi 
Arabia is a tropical region and as a result it receives temperature in summer at 
about 50"C and it is too cold in winter and more variation of temperature is 
found m hilly areas. 
Saudi Basic Industries Corporation was established in 1976 as Saudi 
Aiabia's main non oil industrial enterprise. It includes among its holding major 
gas utilization projects, chief among them petrochemical development at 
Jubail, Jeddah and Yanbu. This Saudi company started working in 
collaboration with United Kingdom, Italy and European Union etc. This 
benefited Saudi Economy in two ways; it firstly accelerated the efficiency in 
the production and secondly it was to create the market. After the exploration 
of petroleum, Saudi Economy became substantially dependent on its export. 
Saudi Planjier realized that petroleum reserves were limited in long run and for 
strengthening the economy they needed, the development of other sectors as 
well. So, Saudi Arabia started the five year plan for development and 
diversification of all sectors of the economy. So far as the economy of Saudi 
Arabia is concerned, it is predominantly oil based economy. Its structure and 
orientation are in the process of change. It is expanding and diversifying 
horizontally as well as vertically, and is becoming more complex with the 
passage of time. Earlier Saudi economy was characterized by a highly tradition 
based century old value system. The chief economic activities were nomadic 
pastoralism, trade, agricultural activity and pilgrimage which had been one of 
the highest source of revenues. The emergence and consohdation of Saudi 
Arabia in 1930s synchronized with the discovery and exploration of petroleum 
oil and other natural resources. The process of unification and integration of the 
country socially, politically as well as economically started together and helped 
each other in the further development process and programs. This cultivated in 
the emergence of the process of transformation and modernization of the 
society as a whole. The Saudi government adopted the doctrine of "growth 
through ideology". Accordingly they selected neither the capitahst economy 
based on the doctrine of laissez-faire and individual enterprises, nor the 
socialist system based on the philosophy of centralized planning and firm 
government control for its economic developments. On the contrary they 
adopted a mixed system (a system which the Saudis term as Islamic Economy 
and joint enterprises). Its main objective was to create a dynamic and modem 
economic system without diluting its religious, puritanical, traditional and 
historical legacies. 
It is generally believed that Saudi economic system is constituted of 
single item i.e. petroleum and! its by-products. It is not true at all. Some other 
ingredients of its economy are gaining ground and getting consolidated over 
time due to the economic integration and diversification strategy launched by 
the Saudi government. And the second point is that the government is also 
trying to liberate the country from the syndrome of dominance and dependence 
of oil in the economy. This has been necessitated by the inter play of both 
domestic as well as international factors. The economy in Saudi Arabia may be 
divided into two parts. (1) The oil sector (2) The non-oil sector: Which are 
century old but now getting modernized day by day, and which comprise of 
agriculture, petroleum/hydrocarbon based industries, construction, non-
hydrocarbon manufacturing and services etc. 
First of all petroleum was struck in Saudi Arabia in 1938 and was 
exploited and exported in 1939, but its exploitation and exports got momentum 
only after world war II. The sudden increase in national assets due to export of 
petroleum and its by-products influenced the system as a whole. Which 
motivated imd guaranteed forces of changes and transformation. The vast 
increase in national assets due to export of petroleum and its by-products 
helped in the process of application of modem technology in economic 
development. But unfortunately the religio-cultural value compatible with the 
modem development philosophy did not generate at the same time and at the 
same rate due to many weaknesses and shortcomings both fiscal as well as 
social which were inherent in the system. 
The economies of oil exporting Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries 
are entirely distinct from other developing countries in many ways and degrees. 
Hence their strategy of industrialization and development could not be 
identical. Their GNP and GDP are very high in comparison to other developing 
countries. They are not debt ridden countries (oil based countries). They have 
been also credit lender countries. But where as the degree of development of 
human resources are concerned, they are still behind many developing 
countries. Unlike other developing countries, they are entirely dependent on 
foreign countries for minor consumer items to the hi-tech machineries and 
weapons, and also for sophisticated and well trained human powers for 
implementation of their development strategies. 
Literature Review 
Saudi Arabia has vast oil resources to develop itself .So, Saudi Arabia 
embarked upon a long term economic development planning to reduce the 
exclusive dependence of the economy on a single export commodity i.e. crude 
oil. For this purpose Saudi /yabia started five year development plan. The 
development of petro chemical industries in Saudi Arabia plays a leading role 
in diversifying the economic structure, negates the continuum of rentier 
economy and making for self sustained economic growth. So Saudi Arabia 
plans to reduce overwhehning dependency on oil exports. It was expected tiiat 
the export: oriented hydrocarbon based petrochemical industries would 
diversify the economic structure, and also believed that the industriahzation 
process would involve full utilization of indigenous productive resources and it 
can generate forward and backv/ard linkages. 
There has been a lot of work done by different academician on the 
various aspects of diversification of Saudi Arabian economy. Important among 
them are mentioned as foUows-
1. The study conducted on this issue by Rashid Masood in his book 
Economic Diversification & Development in Saudi Arabia^, reveals that till 
1973-74, Saudi Arabia had not recognized its importance in the international 
market and exported petroleum products at nominal cost which even did not 
recover the cost of production. But the 1973 oil boom helped confidence 
building in Saudi Arabia, and they realized that they were the main source of 
energy supply to the world. Their export earning increased. Now they were not 
short of capital resources for diversifying their economic structure. When Saudi 
Arabia realized that developed countries were heavily dependent over it for 
their energy resources, the country got the confidence to embark on 
diversification of its economy. In its first step towards diversification Saudi 
Arabia moved to plan for huge gas based petrochemical complexes. Since these 
mdustries were highly technology intensive, Saudi Arabia rejected the 
commercial criteria of investment and took mto consideration the social criteria 
i.e. requisition of technical know how, increase in employment opportunities 
1 . Rashid Masood, "Economic Diversification and Development in Saudi Arabia", Popular 
Prakashan, Bombay, 1989 
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and enhancement of foreign (Exchange earnings. To diversify the economy 
Saudi Arabia not only improved the infrastructural facilities like construction 
of ports but also invested in human resource development. However, the study 
of Rashid Masood does not explain how the petrochemical industry in the 
country has been providing base for agriculture and other industries, chemical 
and related products? 
2. Reconstructing the Saudi Economy and Privatization Development, 
was the special report issued by SAMA.^  According to this report first step of 
diversification of Saudi Arabia economy was setting up of industries which use 
hydrocarbon(oil, gas) as raw material to convert the hydrocarbon in to value 
added products. This has created a number of new industries in the country 
which is accompanied by creation of infrastructural facilities, requisitions of 
technical know how. The large reserves of hydrocarbon and availability of 
capital provide the strength to Saudi Arabia in attracting foreign companies. It 
paved the way for improvement m the infrastructural facilities, skills of local 
workers. In the wave of developing capabilities for the production of tools and 
machinery Saudi Arabia started assembling the imported machinery and 
equipment. With the development of necessary skills and fabrications 
capability, indigenization takes place progressively. The study reveals that the 
diversification of the economy reduced the flaring of the associated gas and the 
dependency of the economy on oil sector. The gas flared as a percentage of 
2 . Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency, Annual Report, 2003, Research and Statistic Department, 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
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total gas production declined to 60.6 % in 1983 as compared to 71.9 in 
1970.The share of oil sector has also declined in the gross domestic product of 
country. This sector accounted 55 percent of GDP in 1969 -70 which came 
down to 24.3 percent in 1984-85 and became 42.42% in 2003. The Saudi 
Arabia monetary agency study on economic diversification has focused on the 
importance of petroleum products and natural gas. However, the report does 
not pay much attention towards the plarmed development and diversification of 
the country. 
3. In his study "Saudi Arabia moves towards diversification''^ Neil 
Ford found that due to lower prices of oil during late 1990s,the per capita GDP 
of Saudi Arabia declined by 40 percent. This has provided the enthusiasm for 
the diversification of the economy and the country moved towards 
diversification. As a result the number of industrial complex reached to 2,557 
with an investment of $43.3bilHon in 1999 from 470 industrial plants with an 
investment of $2.7binion in 1975. To meet the growing demand of the 
economy the importance of infrastructure was realized since power is an 
important in/gredient of infrastmctural facilities. It has also been expanded over 
time. Power sector generating capacity grew from just 1,173 mw in 1975 to 
25000 mw in 2002.Accepting power generation as industrial activity, Saudi 
government is enabling foreign companies to invest in this sector by providing 
many facilities like 10 year tax holiday and concessionary fmance up to 50 
3 . Neilford, '^ Saudi Arabia Moves Towards Diversification", The Middle East, September 2002, p. 16, 
Issue No. 326. 
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percent of the capital cost of the project. Agriculture sector is another area of 
diversification in Saudi Arabia. The study found that the area under cultivation 
has increased drastically to 14 million acres by 1998 while it was 3,70,000 
acres in 1975.About 85 percent of the total vegetables demand is met by the 
domestic producers along with 60 percent of fruit supply. However, Neil Ford 
has highlighted the attention of government towards agriculture. He also 
focused on the increasing capacity of power and infrastructural development 
which are base for economic development. The problem with his study is that 
though broad development took place ,but it does not sufficiently study the low 
development in human resources. 
4. According to Al, Shaikh. Said A., The Saudi Development plan aimed 
at achieving high economic growth."^ The government's focus on employment 
scheme for Saudis created a situation that encouraged nationals to seek pubhc 
sector employment.Consequently, this resulted in a heavy reliance on foreign 
labour for almost all types cf work except for specific administrative and 
managerial jobs. But finding appropriate employment opportunities for new 
comers to llie labour force ha:> become difficult ,with the labour market facing 
a growing over supply of unskilled workers and increasing more college 
graduates unable to find productive employment opportunities. 
4 . Al-Sheikh Said A, "Demographic Transition in Saudi Arabia and their Impact on Economic 
Growth and the Labour Market", Middle East Economic Survey, 22 May 2000, p. D1-D8 
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5. According to The Economic Bureau, Saudi Arabia's Economic offset 
programme: Achievements, Emerging Tends and Recen Developments. The 
performance of Saudi economy during 1998 reflected the adverse impact of the 
sharp decline in oil prices caused by slow down in the world economy mainly 
due to financial crisis in Asia& Russia. There were also some notable positive 
developments. The price situation continued to remarkably stable. The banking 
system performance continued to improve. The process of privatization made 
notable progress with the establishment of Saudi telecommunication followed 
by restricting of the electricity sector through merger of five electricity 
companies in to single holding company. But he did not give more emphasis on 
development of social sector and the reduction of development of oil sector. 
6. The study conducted by Robert E. Looney in his book, ''Economic 
Development in Saudi Arabia: Consequences of Oil Prices Decline''^ states that 
conventional wisdom had maintained that capital scarcity is one of the most 
serious consliaints on development. The oil price spiral of the 1970s, however 
created a v^hole new phenomena. The sharp increase in oil income found 
governments, as well as development economists, unprepared to deal with the 
consequences of the new conditions. The response of the Saudi economy to the 
boom conditions of the 1970s and the bust condition of the 1980s is the subject 
of this important addition to the economic studies of oil based economies. 
5 . Sohail Partawi and Blichard Ryan, "Saudi Arabia's Economic offset programme: Achievements, 
Emerging Tends and Recent Developments", The Economic Bureau, MEER 22(1), Jan 99, p. 18-22 
^. Robert E. Looney, Economic Dex'elopment in Saudi Arabia: Consequences of Oil Price Decline, 
Greenwich CT: JAI Press, 1990 
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The exact structure of Saudi economy its reliance on oil, the small size 
of the market and the near absence of the goods producing sectors persuaded 
policy makers to embark on })olicies that infused funds in to the economy 
through welfare programs, massive military spending, subsidies to the private 
sector, an accelerated program of infrastructural development and heavy 
imports of goods and labour. The two five year development programs of the 
1970s concentrated on infrastaicture, while the 1980-85 program ventured in to 
industrial development, especially hydrocarbon based industry such as 
petrochemicals. 
Given the low absorptiA e^ capacity of the economy and the near absence 
of a private sector interested in non-mercantile, non speculative or non 
financial ventures despite the massive investment of funds in infrastructure 
failed to stimulate the much hoped for private sector led economic 
diversification. Dr. Looney points out that there were a few success stories in 
agriculture £ind manufacturing. However, we find that such success was only 
made possible by the heavy programs of gross subsidization. Indeed, without 
such government subsidies, Dr. Loony fears that about one half of the farms 
and nearly two third of the mimufacturing industries would die. As if this were 
not enough, the plans failed massively the lessening the Saudi economy's 
reliance on foreign labour or raising in productivity. The growth of die Saudi 
oil sector m 1970's and its subsequent collapse in the 1980s forced the 
government to adopt austerity/ budgets and to attempt to lower its subsidies to 
13 
the private sector. This book was authored in the period of declining oil 
revenues about two decades ago. At present the situation has changed and oil 
sector again plays an important role in Saudi economy. 
7. Hobday's study on Saudi Arabia provides the reader with an 
interpretation of the background and tradition of the people who make up the 
oil rich kingdom. It also sets out the ambitious economic goals they have set 
for themselves. Saudi Arabia's efforts to transform its economy is not 
constrained by lack of financial resources. Oil revenues and earnings from 
overseas holdings are ample to finance the desert kingdom's development. 
The pace of Saudi ^o^abia's economic development is tempered, 
however, by a strong sense of tradition and the teaching of Islam. Saudis wish 
to maintain their religious and cultural values. Hobday points out that day by 
day, the Saudi system undergoes the slight attack of western values, either 
through imported technolog^^  and manpower or through the increased 
opportunities for Saudis to travel and study abroad. 
Unfortunately, much of the economic data are out dated. New 
development since the book was written, such as OPEC oil price increase, and 
growing conservatism are additional factors that should be looked at in 
determining the speed and dire;ction in which Saudi Arabia will allow herself to 
go. 
' . Peter Hobday, Saudi Arabia Today: An Introduction to the Richest Oil Power, St. Martin's Press, 
New York, 1978. 
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8. Saudi Arabia : Rush to Development by Ragaei El Mallakh^ is based on 
seven years of research, data collection and interviews with leaders in the 
public and private sectors in Saudi Arabia. It was carried out during numerous 
visits to that country. More tlian 120 statistical tables of varying degrees of 
usefulness and accuracy are offered to describe the dramatic structural 
transformation of the Saudi economy. 
Professor El Mallakh's approach is to look at the distribution of GNP, 
according to economic activities. The five year plans of 1970-75 and 1975-80 
are thus examined and the outcomes as compared to the stated goals below are 
evaluated favourably. 
1. To increase the gro\^ ^h rate of GDP and enhance the conditions for a 
sustained growth. 
2. To diversify the economy and diminish dependence on oil. 
3. To develop the physical infrastructure and human sources and 
increase the well-being of all groups. 
The mling elite is also very sensitive to the declared or undeclared 
demands of the ruled, especially demands that are economic. But in spite of all 
these qualifications and the actual political stability that prevails in Saudi 
Arabia. The Saudization of economy may prove more challenging than it 
appears. Professor Mallakh does not make the question of political 
development: an important issue and object of his inquuy. Income distribution 
. Ragaei El Mallakh, Saudi Arabia: Rush to Development, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
Baltimore & London, 1982 
15 
as an important aspect of welfare is not handled with the same care as 
economic growth. Perhaps lack of statistical data on the issue has prevailed. 
The twin problems of extreme inequality in income distribution and the lack of 
provision for political development point to a deeper problem and give rise to a 
new question of who is the proprietor of the oil wealth in Saudi Arabia? This 
book does not raise those fundamental questions of normative economic that 
appear most appropriate. 
9. Saudi Arabia : Energy, Development Planning and Industrialization by 
Ragaei El Mallakh and Dorothea H. El Mallakli/ (eds.), is a book moving from 
the general to the particular. Ali Johany provides and excellent over view of the 
Saudi economy in the first chapter. He sets the stage for further essays on 
varied topics related to Saudi economic development. Such as Saudi industrial 
development, philosophy ad aspirations, technical transfer, manpower 
resources, oil, gas, the petrochemical industry, inflation and Saudi international 
economic relations. 
The weakness in the bi3ok are those endemic to multi authored volumes: 
an unevenness in presentation and level of analysis. The level of analysis of 
some of the essays, while appropriate for oral presentation, occasionally 
appears some what superficial in written fonn. An example of unevenness is 
the inclusion of two chapters on the transition from tribal society to nation 
state. In a book that is essential about economic development, it would seem to 
' . Ragaei El Mallakh and Dorothea H. EI Mallakh, eds. Saudi Arabia: Energy Developmental 
Planning & Industrialisation, Lexington Book, Lexington & Toronto, 1982 
16 
this reviewer that one such chapter would have been sufficient and that it 
should focus less on cultural anthropology and social change than on 
developing manpower resources. Another endemic problem is topicality and 
timeliness. The papers were presented just before the full brunt of the world 
recession and the oil glut of the early 1980s. Thus, a number of the operating 
assumptions about oil revenues and production policies, industrialization goals 
appear is some what outdated. Given the cyclical nature of world oil market in 
particular, however, some of these operating assumptions are bound to come 
back into vogue before too ver^ ^ long. 
10. Saudi Arabia's economy: Oil and Search for Economic Development by 
Hossein Askari and Babak Dastmalschi,'° covers the period of the massive 
growth in oil revenues during the 1970s and early 1980s, followed by the steep 
decline. Askari emphasizes that 'The underlying basis of Saudi Arabia's GDP 
is the depletion of a non-renewable resource. If the proceeds of the sale of this 
resources are not prudently spent or invested, they are, in essence, wasted and 
unrecoverable. The sale of this resource fuels the entire economy. In other 
words, Saudi Arabia should be saving a large proportion of its oil revenues for 
investment and the development of alternative sources of revenue as oil 
resources are steadily exhausted. Askari's discussion of Saudi economic 
policies are detailed. He briefly alludes to the differences between Saudi and 
Kuwaiti policies in so far as the latter put the greatest emphasis on foreign 
'° . Hossein Askari and Babak Dastmalschi, Saudi Arabia's Economy: Oil and Search for economic 
Development, CT: JAI Press, 1990 
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rather than domestic investment. The Kuwaiti rate of return on foreign 
investment is far higher than what is realized by Saudi Arabia on its domestic 
investment, which in many cases had a negative rate of return. Because of the 
elaborate system of producer subsidies in industries and especially in 
agriculture. In those years Saudi Arabia had been exporting wheat at the 
international price, usually a fiaction of the real cost of production. Moreover, 
this policy was rapidly depleting the country''s non-renewable underground 
water supply. Looney quotes the US Secretary of Agriculture who during a 
visit to that country rather undiplomatically called the Saudi wheat program 
'Crazy'. But the Saudi official position was that it has been 'a thrilling story of 
real success.' 
Askgtii's study, while detailed in many other respects, is rather less than 
necessary in its analysis of the labour force and productivity. Looney's study 
fills in some of the gap. He notes that labour productivity growth was negative 
during the period of third five year plan. However, he offers little explanation 
for this phenomenon, and might also have elaborated on its policy imphcation. 
11. Economic development in Saudi Arabia: Consequences of the oil price 
decline by Robert E. Looney,^^ states that lower military expenditure might 
adversely affect Saudi Arabia's rate of economic growth. But he was not sure 
that these were relevant for Saudi Arabia. In most developing countries 
unemployment was a major problem. Saudi Arabia imported a large number of 
. Robert E. Looney, Economic Development in Saudi Arabia: Consequences of the Oil Price 
Dec/me, CT:JAI Press, 1990 
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labour force. Of particular interest is the Looney's analysis of the power of 
OPEC and of the Saudi role in the cartel. He states that the rise of tenfold crude 
oil prices during the 1970s, can be explained by major changes in market 
forces, not by the power of OPEC. 
12. Mohammad A Bakr, A Model in Privatization Successful Changes 
Management in the Ports of Saudi Arabia, states that privatization is an 
important issue that has been tackled by many researchers both in developed 
and developing countries. A surge of literature of privatization suggests that it 
promotes economic growth, stimulates productive efficiency, expands the role 
of private sector, reduces the size of the government sector, attracts foreign 
investment, and helps in the development of capital market programs especially 
in the developing countries. The book under review presents a case study of 
privatization and economic; transformation in Saudi Arabia. The author 
combines both theoretical analysis and personal experience to describe the 
privatization of ports in Saudi Arabia. 
From reading this Ijook, it seems that the author considers the 
privatization of the Saudi ports to have been a successful experience that ought 
to be encouraged and emulated in other places. However, privatization is a 
complex process involving a host of political and economic factors that needs 
to be addressed and empirically tasted. Assessing the economic and social 
impact of privatization is not always straight forward. 
'^  . Mohammad A Bakr, A Model in Privatization: Successful Change Management in the Ports of 
Saudi Arabia, Centre of Arab Studies, London, 2001 
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13. "Oil and Power: Political Dynamics" in the Middle East, by Sheikh R. 
Ali,'^  attempts to cover too much ground in a relatively short book, as well as 
trying to address both the general readers and the specialists. The structural 
problems jire compounded by simpHstic assertions, speculative assertions and 
blatantly v^rong assertion (The oil exporting Arab countries are the most 
militant, posing a serious threats to the flow of oil to other nation). 
In addition to these difficulties the books suffers from two fundamental 
shortcomings. First, it fails to deal with some of the more serious historical 
changes, which have taken place in recent years, as for example, the 
implications of rising economy and political power of Saudi Arabia, the 
consequences of the Iraq-Iran war for regional and global configurations of 
power, and the significance of the formation of oil based gulf cooperation 
council. 
14. Regime and Elites, Conflict and Collaboration by Mordechai Abir.''* 
discovers the formation of Saudi elites. According to him two important 
sources of change brought about the formation of elite groups in Saudi Arabia 
i.e. education and oil. After consohdated position of power Ibn Saud realized 
that a centralized system of government was necessary to retain his power. He 
needed a system of education to train bureaucrats. By the time oil began to play 
a role in the life of the kiQgdom in the 1930s, the ruling oligarchy was 
" . Sheikh R. Ah, Oil and Power: Political Dynamics in the Middle East, St. Martin's Press, New 
York, 1987. 
'" . Mordechai Abir, Saudi Arabia in the Oil Era: Regime & Elites, Conflicts & Collaboration, West 
view Press, Boulder, 1988 
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composed of three groups i.e. the royal family, the religious establishment and 
the tribal sheikhs. The creation of Israel and its relation with the Arab world, 
growing dependency of the west on Arab oil, and the increase of oil revenues 
and the emergence of United States have forced the Saudi ruling class to deal 
with the perceived threat of the forces of Arab nationalism and to tackle 
demands of modem military and civilian bureaucracies and technocracies. To 
deal with these complex issues the royal family balanced the interest of those 
who wanted to modernize the kingdom and those who opposed the change. 
Dr. Abir divides the period after Faisal's assassination in 1975 into two 
stages i.e. im economic boom up to 1982 and a period of economic recession 
thereafter. Heavy development spending characterized the fost phase whereas 
the drastic cutbacks, the second. The ruling class however has sufficient arm 
forces and intelligence network to help the house of Saud withstand the 
consequences of the economic decline. The author also fails to analyze the role 
of US influence on all aspects of Saudi life. 
15. Arab Nationalism, Oil, and the Political Economy of Dependency, by 
Abbas Alnasrawi,^ ^ discusses the dependency of Arab states on others and sees 
oil interests in conflict with /y-ab nationalism and Arab nationahsm in conflict 
with state nationalism. Arab dependence, first imposed by the ottomans and 
then by western powers, has resulted from oil mterest and revenues. It has also 
been sirengthened by reactionary Arab regiraes and by forces of the world 
. Abbas Alnasrawi, Arab Nationalism, Oil and the Political Economy of Dependency, Greenwood 
Press, New York, 1991. 
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market in which the Arab countries have been presumably integrated. 
Dependency on oil, however, has exposed the "myth" of Arab oil power. 
Which is clear from the failure to resolve the Arab-Israel conflict. The future of 
middle east countries is not promising, according to the author, because the 
conditions leading to dependency still include dependence on oil, large external 
debts and intra regional conflicts that undermine Arab nationalism. It is 
suggested that privatization jmd restructuring may influence the future of these 
countries, but is not clear that how a change in the economic system would 
affect the degree of dependence. According to the author, by virtue of its oil, 
Saudi Arabia has influence, little power, but certainly no leadership. The Arab 
countries are young as independent nation state. A certain degree of maturity is 
necessary before, they are able or willing to surrender some of their 
sovereignty to a federal fo;iin of Arab unity. The reasons for the lack of 
motivation to Arab unity and the continued dependency lie also in the poverty 
and economic underdevelopment of the region, and in the fateful impression of 
wealth in the oil countries. In Saudi Arabia per capita income is lower than that 
of Israel, which is not a ricii country by modem standard. Finally, the study 
would have been richer had it addressed the basic cause of underdevelopment 
and dependency i.e. explosive population growth, relatively low quality 
education, confessionalism and absence of rational analytical policy making, 
poor infrastructure and segmented market. 
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16. Jahangir Amuzegar, ''Managing the oil Wealth: OP EC's windfalls and 
Pitfalls "^^ Examines the success of the member comitries in the organizations 
of petroleum exporting countries in managing their oil wealth. It provides an 
insightful review of the development, pitfalls and structural changes that OPEC 
member countries have faced since the mid 1970s. The book provides tools to 
understand the process better. As OPEC nations accumulated their large, new 
foreign exchange receipts, both the world community and OPEC itself 
expected a different outcome. The world community saw the transfer of petro-
dollars from the developed nations and many poor countries to a group of oil 
rich countries as a destabilizing influence that would change the balance of 
economic power and cause Avorldwide recession. OPEC nations saw their new 
wealth not only as the engine of development and growth, but also as a tool of 
social welfare. Amuzegar points out that things turned out very different from 
expectations. The oil importers did quite well, and oil exporters did poorly. 
Once the initial shocks was observed, the oil importers used fiscal and 
monetary poHcy tools to protect themselves. The massive inflation of the early 
1980s ate tJirough OPEC nations revenues and reduced their purchasing power 
at a time that they had become addicted to waste and inefficiency. Amuzegar 
uses both theoretical tools and detailed information from country studies to 
measure the success and faihire of the different oil exporting countries, hi all 
'^. Jahangir /Vjnuzegar, Managing the oil Wealth: OPEC's windfalls and Pitfalls, LB. Tauris London, 
2001 
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cases the oil money cracked the fabric of the society, changed government 
behaviour and brought about social change. 
The cases examined in this study offered the author an opportunity to 
test several development hypothesis. These include impact of the resource 
based wealth and the validity^  of Dutch disease syndrome. The results indicated 
that non of the group members enjoyed all the positive elements. All OPEC 
members were engaged in hasty and ill-conceived spending of their boom 
earnings. One of OPEC's stated goals was to diversify the member country's, 
economy away from oil. Maitiy OPEC members ended up as dependent or even 
more dependent on oil revenues than they were before the increase in oil prices 
and oil revenues. 
In the late 1990s, OPEC was still alive and well. Indeed, it staged a 
recovery in early 1999 as it moved to re-establish itself through cooperation 
with member states. By 2001, OPEC had the best run of its history i.e. about 
thirty months of high prices;, controlled cheating on quotas, and a spirit of 
cooperation never seen before in OPEC's history. Indeed the pain and fear of 
the 1998 price crash made for a very united OPEC. When oil revenues rose, 
there was no rush to increase subsidies or to spend the money quickly on 
projects. Some OPEC members opened their doors to foreign investment and 
introduced reforms in their economics. OPEC seemed ready to enter yet 
another dov/n phase. Weak global economic performance and exceptionally 
weak demand was exerting downward pressure on prices. The turbulent story 
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of OPEC may continue for many more years. The complexities require careful 
and continued analysis. This book helps the students understand and categorize 
the factors that affect this important organization and its members. 
17. "The new Economy of Oil : Impacts on Business, Geopolitics and 
Society" by John V. Mitchell with Koji Morita, Norman Selley and Jonathan 
Stem/^ does an excellent overview of the fundamentals of energy market and 
the issues that need to be considered in developing sensible energy policies. 
The authors approach is not only comprehensive but remarkably free from bias 
in the world. Where ideolog>^ often overcomes analysis. The role and power of 
the free mairket throughout the history of the industry is emphasized properly. 
But the areas where markets may occasionally fail are recognized as well. To 
give emphasis on oil, the book provides an overview of all energy markets and 
defines the challenges facing natural gas. The authors properly warned that the 
continued growth in market share of natural gas is contingent on competitive 
pricing versus competing fiiels, which in no way is guaranteed. The author in 
his book emphasized on two changes that will dominate energy pricmg over the 
next era. First, the author argues that competition from other fuel and 
technology in transportation and power generation would set an upper limit on 
prices in the long run but that long run rapidly became shorter. Second, the 
author asserts that massive structural surpluses of oil production capacity have 
been reduced and this would simplify the task of maintaining prices at 
" . John V. Mitchell with Koji Morita, Norman Selley and Jonathan Stem, The new Economy of Oil: 
Impacts on Business, Geopolitics and Society, Earthscan Publications Ltd., London, 2001 
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minimum level. There is no doubt that inter fuel competition will limit oil 
prices. But their limits may be no tighter in the future than they have been in 
the past. Oil has been losing market share in power generation for many years. 
Power generation is an increasingly less relevant market for oil products. 
Unless gas price rises sharply relative to oil, most of the future competition will 
be between gas and coal. Several years ago, when the book was authored, it 
appeared tliat in the long period spare capacity was about to be over. While the 
authors analysis is insightJiul. The question remains how many of their 
conclusions truly represents a break from long standing energy market trends. 
18. ShfU'if Sabri, 'The House of Sand in Commerce: A Study of Royal 
Entrepreneurship in Saudi Arabid"^^ The study of Sharif Sabri's Role of the 
House of Saud in Commerce is contemporary. It has involved equally 
painstaking and focused research. Sabri has provided detail data for analysis 
that has hitherto not been compiled systematically. It provides long lists of 
members of different branches of Al Saud family, giving details of their equity 
investment m Saudi Arabian companies. It also gives the details of the capital 
stmcture of the companies as well as investment stakes of the royal family 
members, most of these busmesses being in private sector. The market value of 
these shareholdings can not be estimated. 
Sabri provides a general analysis that shows that it is the third 
generation of the house of the Saud, who are actively involved in business both 
18 
. Sharaf Sabri, The House of Saud in Commerce: A Study of Royal Entrepreneurship in Saudi 
Arabia, I.S. Publication, New Dellii, 2001 
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as investors and as active owners. Other merchants do not appear to have been 
adversely affected by the business aspirations of royal family members. Indeed 
Sabri suggests they have benefited, both directly being involved as partners to 
princes. Sabri suggests that there is a general positive attitude to economic 
liberalization and reform l3y royal entrepreneurs, including World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) membership. But some caution that then own domestic 
business interest should not be undermined by globalization. The increasing oil 
wealth presented the opportunities to the younger Princes with money to invest. 
It is almost a religious imperative given the tradition of profit sharing, that was 
seen as being more legitimate than simply making money from money through 
interest. Sabri refers to some of the concept of Islamic economics and finance, 
but does not discuss them in detail. 
19. Paul Rivlin, ''Economic Policy and Performance in the Arab World.''^'^ 
This book is much less specifically focused than the other studies, being an 
assessment of the recent economic performance of a member of Arab countries. 
The author compares the earlier import substitution policies with the economic 
stabilization and structural adjustment policy introduced at the order of IMF. 
This book introduces contemporary Arab economic issues. There are 
interesting contrasts drawn between the Arab and East Asia development 
experience, but the treatment lacks depth, largely because the range is so wide. 
19 Paul Rivlin, Economic Policy and Performance in the Arab World, CO: Lynne Rienner Boulder 
2001 
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Paul Rivlin follows the world bank Washington consensus in prescription for 
policy makers. 
20, ".4 Structural Econometric Model of the Saudi Arabian Economy" by 
Faisal Safooq al Bashir. presents a quantitative analysis of the Saudi 
economy's sixucture. Which should be studied in order to understand the recent 
events of the country into world financial and monetary attention. Al-Bashir 
informs in this book that there has been substantial economic changes 
compared to the 1960s, specially in the oil price increases. Which fame during 
the Arab oil embargo of 1973-74, and resulted in accumulation of capital 
surplus. In his book the author finds large standard errors in one instance, the 
coefficients of government revenues and personal income in the consumption 
function. Moreover, he warns that the forecastmg ability of the model is 
restricted, as variables were not included to capture economic changes over 
time. This is a technical econometric work and not for general consultation. 
The social factors impeding ultimate development of Saudi economy have not 
been taken sufficiently into account. 
21. ''Demand for oil products in Developing Countries''' by Dermot Gately 
and Shane S. Streifel, points out that growtli in demand for oil products has 
been more concentrated m the developing countries, than in the industrial 
world since 1971. The authors of this book consider the changes that have 
^^  . Faisal Scifboq al Bashir , A Structural Econometric Model of the Saudi Arabian Economy, John 
Wiley & Sons Inc. New York, 1977 
'^ . Dermot Gately and Shane S. Streifel , Demand for oil products in Developing Countries, The 
World Biuik, Washington DC, 1997 
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occurred in the developing world and use their analysis to project what will 
happen in the coming decades. They include in their definition as developing 
all non-member countries of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) except those of former Soviet block. In a qualitative 
discussion of the factors affecting oil demand they conclude that income and 
population are more important factors than price. While indigenous energy 
supply, energy policy and traditional fuel use are relevant. They use a variety 
of specifications that includes income and crude oil prices, static and dynamic 
formulation. They fmd that results are satisfactory for gasoline, diesel, LPG 
and other oil products, are variable for jet fuel and kerosene, are unsatisfactory 
for naphtha and kerosene. Income elasticities are larger in absolute value than 
price elasticities and are more often significant. Asymmetries in income and 
price response were found in some countries but not in others. This analysis 
was quite an ambitious task and it is a pity that separate product prices were not 
available by country. Given the variable tax regimes and changing exchange 
rates, it is not clear how highly correlated world crude oil is to domestic 
product prices. 
22. "The paradox of plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-states" by Terry Lynn 
99 
Karl, presents a model of the political and economic development of 'petro 
states' across regions. That model is sitrongly path-dependent. If the 
development of the petroleum industry is contemporaneous with the building of 
. Teny LjTin Karl , The paradox of plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-states, University of California 
Press, Berkeley, 1987 
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the modem state, a countr> '^s political economic trajectory is largely 
predetermined. The petro-state is characterized by government control over oil 
resources, leading to a broadly politicized economy in a state. Patron-client ties 
will dominate the political field. Boom times will lead to a vast expansion of 
the size of government. When the boom ends, hard choices will be differed as 
leaders use oil money, and ability to borrow internationally against oil reserves. 
Even though Karl's path dependency argument differs from the more 
contingent conclusion about rentier states. The author emphasized the fact that 
oil revenues lead to weaker states. Without the need to tax, 'Petro-state elites 
will allow extractive and information gathering capacities. When the boom 
ends the state will be unable to tax or regulate effectively its economy. While 
oil might contribute to state strength in other areas. Karl's comparative cases 
are not developed extensively but they generally support her conclusion. The 
book is not vdthout flaws. The most serious one is methodological. Not a single 
non-oil case is considered. 
23. Girijesh Pant in his article '"Saudi Arabia: From Oil Kingdom to 
Market'" marks out the Saudi accession to the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) in December 2005. According to him this accession is marking a new 
phase in the country's economic management. From this entry the state will 
have to reheat and the market will have to step m. The social settlement 
between the state and the society will have to be revised. And the interference 
23 . Girijesh Pant, "Saudi Arabia: From Oil Kingdom to Market" in Grijesh Pant & Others, (ed), 
Contemporary Saudi Arabia and the emerging Indo-Saudi Relation, Shipra publication, Delhi, 2007 
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between the domestic and global market will have to be made transparent. This 
leap forward is not an absolute benefit. The market led boom has increased the 
price of land, especially as watering the land is costUer. The food security in 
the circumstances, as an obvious casualty. The issues of subsidized services 
and infrastnicture support are acquiring added urgency in view of the growing 
demand and aspiration. In spite of rent-derived resources, the contradiction 
between the regional global interface will be sharp. The Saudi Arabia initiated 
a political and social agenda to correspond with the economic transformation 
but the threshold where the state would be expected to make leap forward to 
able to the needs of market economy still remains a matter of conjecture. It 
critically depends upon how Saudi state is going to pursue the delicate act of 
revising the social contract of the rentier economy without jeopardisng the 
legitimacy. 
24. ''Political economy of Saudi Arabia" by Tim Niblock with Monica 
Malik,^ "^  focused on the internal dynamics of the Saudi economy and the 
changing role of the state. The ultimate criteria of success is whether the 
kingdom can advance or at least maintain, its position in the global economic 
order. For the author the picture is mixed. The development strategy of Saudi 
Arabia is coherent and sounii, but implementation poses major challenges. 
Saudi Arabia was of course long classified as a rentier state. However, Niblock 
points out the short comings of this categorization specially because Saudi 
24. Tim Niblock with Monica Malik , Political economy of Saudi Arabia, Routledge, London, UK, 
2007 
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Arabia has developed a significant industrial sector. Furthermore, Niblock 
points out that the private sector has played a significant role in the kingdom's 
development. Niblock provides some new insights, notably on the articulation 
of development strategy and economic policy. It would have been helpful. The 
book ends on an optimistic note with the legal reforms resulting from WTO 
membership bringing considerable benefits and the creation of the Saudi 
Arabia General Investment Authority resulting in significant Foreign Direct 
Investment inflows. Some of the negative factors also identified by Tim 
Niblock i.e. mass education in the kingdom leaves much scope for 
improvement. Employment remains an issue linked to the low productivity of 
some Saudi workers. Privatization is also proceeding after many years of delay. 
Although the stock market suffered a major correction. But the crisis was 
contained and investor confidence soon restored. 
25. Adne Cappelen and Robin Choudhury in their article ''The Future of 
Saudi Arabian Economy: Possible effects on the Oil Market."' This article 
focuses on alternative economic and political developments that could reshape 
the future of Saudi Arabia. In the article the authors start with a brief summary 
of the historical, political and economic background followed by description of 
two scenarios for the Saudi economy. First we outline a future based upon the 
continuance of the current policies for another decades. The first alternative 
scenario explores possible effects from pohcy reforms in taxation and 
25 . Adne Cappelen and Robin Choudhuiy, "The Future of Saudi Arabian Economy: Possible effects 
on tlie Oil Market" in Daniel Heradstveil & Helge Hveen, (edsj, Oil in the Gulf, Ashgate, 
Aldershot (UK), 2004. 
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privatization. The second explores possible effects from changing oil pohcies. 
And finally discusses what these domestic scenarios might imply for the 
relations betvs^ een Saudi Arabia and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC). Although it is not likely that Saudi Arabia will act on its 
own within OPEC. There are both economic and political arguments that lead 
us to conclude that Saudi Arabia is likely to maintain its support for OPEC. 
The Conceptual Framework : 
The issue of diversification became prominent in the world since 
the discovery of gas in Netherlands and it consequent over dependence 
on the export of this primary commodity. In economic literature this 
phenomenon is also referred as the Dutch Disease. The Dutch Disease 
refers to demdustrialization of a nation's economy that occurs, when the 
discovery of a natural resource raises the value of that nation's currency, 
making manufactured goods less competitive with other nations, 
increasing imports and decreasing exports. The term originated in 
Holland after the discovery of North Sea Gas. 
Dutch Disease is an economic concept that tries to explain the 
seeming relationship between the exploration of natural resources and 
decline in the manufacturing sector. The theory explaining that an 
increase in revenues from natural resources will deindustrialize a 
^^  . "Back to Basics: Dutch Disease: Too much wealth managed unwisely", Finance & 
Development, Vol. 40, Number 1, March 2003, 
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nation's economy by raising the exchange rate. Which makes the 
manufacturing sector less competitive. However, it is difficult to 
definitively say that Dutch Disease is the lone cause of the decreasing 
manufacturing sector, since there are many other factors at play in the 
economy. While it refers to natural resource discovery. It can also refer 
to "any development that results in a large inflow of foreign currency, 
including a sharp flow in natural resource prices, foreign assistance, and 
foreign direct investment. Further, it is said that Dutch Disease is an 
economic phenomenon that effects countries upon the discovery, 
extraction and exportation of large amount of natural resources. It 
specifically tends to effect countries that find large amount of oil and 
gas. The finding of large amount of oil would have both positive and 
negative consequences for a country. The term Dutch Disease refers to 
the impact of those consequences that was noticed in the Netherlands 
during the period after the Dutch started to sell their natural gas. The 
manufacturing exports were no longer marketable given an increase in 
the exchange rate and this marked an economic crisis. At present 
Netherlands is not the only country associated with Dutch Disease.^^ 
Nearly every country that find natural gas, oil or valuable amount of a 
tradable natural resources should concern itself with the possibility of 
"Dutch Disease" and the impact that extraction of that resource will 
^ .^ "The Dutch Disease", The Economist, (Nov 26, 1977), pp.82-83 
^ .^ August, Ray, International Business Law: Text, Cases and Readings, Chapter-5, Foreign 
Investment, pp.244-295, Pearson Education Inc., Fourth Edition, 2004 
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have on their economy. An examination of Dutch Disease and how 
different countries have dealt with this influx of revenue from oil 
resources is presented to illustrate the impact on a country of large oil 
resources like Saudi Arabia. 
The discovery and exportation of a natural resource causes an 
increase in income of a country, both to the government through 
royalties and to the people who live through their employment in the 
new industry. The increase in income and the exchange rate due to 
production of a large amount of natural resource can quickly cause the 
domestic economy of resource exporting country to slow down. This is 
some what complex since both the large value of the currency and 
increase in income are very positive occurrences. Thus a close 
examination is required to explain why the combination of these two 
. . . 29 
events can result in negative consequences. 
Three important sectors of the economy need to be examined in 
this analysis; traded resources, traded manufacturing and non-traded 
services. Manufacturing is important to employment in any country and 
it is also important to the development of human capital. Human capital 
refers to the skills accumulated in the workers of a country. The net 
human capital of a country is the combined knowledge of workers in 
^'. Corden, M, "The Dutch Disease", The Economist, London, Nov 26, 1977 
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that country. As workers experience new task, gain new skills and 
innovate while on the job, human capital increases. 
This is ultimate expression of how a country and the capitalist 
world moves forward over time; human capital in constantly growing 
and pushing industries and innovation ahead. Thus unemployment is 
detrimental to a country's total development of wealth as well as to 
individuals that are unemployed. 
Essentially what occurs during Dutch Disease is that the discovery 
and export of natural resource, most commonly oil, causes an initial 
increase in income to the workers in a country. However, this increase 
in employment has been noted to be minimum as oil sector is very 
capital intensive industry. The skills required for the oil industry can 
also be unavailable from within the country, thereby encouraging the use 
of foreign workers and limiting the growth of human capital through yet 
another means. Given these circumstances consumers spend their 
income in two ways; on non traded services, which suffer no loss from 
this increase in income and on imports. 
The applicability of Dutch Disease is therefore limited. Some 
countries may experience situations very similar to this explanation and 
some countries may differ from the model extensively. The period in 
which OPEC countries including Saudi Arabia experienced the largest 
influx of oil revenue was during the price increase in the seventies and 
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early eighties. So this period will be explored whether Saudi Arabia 
found itself vulnerable to the negative impact of Dutch Disease or not. 
This discussion is currently relative because of the high price of oil in 
present times. A better understanding of how large increase in the price 
of oil affected countries in the past may shed some light on how a 
country may protect itself. 
The discovery of oil in 1938 came only six years after the 
emergence of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (United States Library of 
Congress online). This is significant for a number of reasons, not to 
mention that a kingdom is quite different from a democracy. It is also 
said that many Saudis believe in their king being ultimate authority 
while politics, political parties and labour unions were not allowed. 
Saudi Arabia was relatively poor prior to the increase in the price of oil 
during the seventies which substantially increased its oil revenues 
inflow. The revenues from oil jumped from US$ 4.3 billion in 1973 to 
US$ 101.8 billion in 1980.^' In 1974 the government attempted to only 
extract oil at moderate pace in order to ensure a steady, lasting income 
but the ever increasing international demand and the high price forced 
Saudis to formulate a new strategy.^^ Industrial development, with an 
emphasis on processing of hydrocarbon was the revised plan. Saudi 
^°. Jean Paul Clerom, ''Saudi Arabia 2000" A Strategy for Growth New York St Martins 
Press, 1978, p. 168 
^^. Pike, David, "Special Report, Saudi Arabia", MEED, 34(46); 23 Nov 1990, pp.18 & 19 
.http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=8819945&fsrc=rss 
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Arabia by using oil revenue would establish valuable industry and 
stimulate the growth of its economy. Several foreign international 
companies wer« invited to joint venture with the government to develop 
these plants. Infrastructure was also developed during 1980s mainly to 
support oil industries. 
During the same period the government doled huge subsidies, the 
purpose of which were three fold; encourage non-oil development, 
distribute income and meet social goals. While these subsidies supported 
Saudi population they became increasingly difficult to maintain and 
justify cost of many programs were greater than the overall benefits. 
When the price of oil began to fall in 1982 Saudi Arabia was forced to 
change its focus from managing budget surplus to dealing with deficit. 
Due to this, Saudi Arabia's enormous share of oil fell mainly to reduce 
the oil supply in order to reconcile with OPEC's production quota. Saudi 
Arabia faced two economic challenges: 
1. The reduction in the price of oil. 
2. The reduction in the production. 
In response to the declining oil revenues Saudi Arabia increased 
oil production which led to a second price crash for oil in 1986. Saudi 
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Arabia mitigated these damages through the proceeds of the earlier oil 
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revenues. 
In Saudi Arabia traded manufacturing industries is very limited. 
The rate of imports is very closely tied to the rate of income from oil. 
Saudi Arabia's entire economy is dependent on this resource. While 
attempts were made to develop industry outside of oil but cost were 
unjustifiably high. Also the massive quantities of oil in Saudi Arabia 
ensure that an economy based on oil is more viable in Saudi Arabia than 
anywhere in the world. The government made several successful 
attempts to work with foreign business in developing the oil sector. The 
true challenges for the Saudi government will be for it to develop a non-
oil traded sector before oil resources are depleted. Quite simply, Dutch 
Disease has not been a factor in this nation due to a general lack of 
manufacturing before the dependence on oil. The development of 
refineries in Saudi Arabia and other value added-steps involving 
hydrocarbons has been an effective means through which Saudi Arabia 
has increased the value of its industry. The increase in revenue in the 
seventies was managed relatively wisely and did not lead to the same 
kind of deficit that were created in Mexico and Venezuela. In Mexico 
the effect of Dutch Disease were immediate and no solution was 
^^  . Michael G. Nchme, "Saudi Development Plan between Capitalist & Islamic Value", 
Middle Eastern Studies, London, 30(3), July 1994, p.284. 
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attempted. In Venezuela protectionism and subsidies stalled the effect 
but the eventuality of market prices prevailed. 
In Saudi Arabia there is so much oil that the concerns represented 
by Dutch Disease were not always relevant. The reflections presented 
here are pertinent to the situation in the world today because of the 
current spike in oil prices. An inflow of revenue will grace oil producing 
nations. The most viable solution to the negative consequences of a 
large inflow of revenue is the creation of value. Thus the question 
becomes not one of Dutch Disease and how to avoid the adjustment 
period, but how to manage inflow of wealth, so as to create industries 
capable of creating lasting value.^ '^  This is the situation faced by all 
developing countries. The reason that they flounder is because there are 
no viable industries. The transitional effect that Dutch Disease describes 
let to structural problems that through mismanagement sent Mexico & 
Venezuela into recession. The question of what proper management 
would be is a matter of investigation. 
Nonetheless, the framework of the concept of the Dutch Disease is 
most suited to analyse the policy of diversification in Saudi Arabia. 
'^' . "Survey of Economic & Social Development in the ESCWA Region", United Nations, 
New York, 1997, p.53 
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Hypothesis: 
The research study would proceed with the following hypothesis. 
1. Has the structure of economy changed? 
2. Has policy of diversification paved the way for the development of 
Petiochemical industries? 
3. Is there any improvement realized in the development of communication 
and Infrastructural facilities? 
4. Has the process of reforms diversified the economy? 
5. Has the process of diversification of Saudi economy made it less 
dependent on oil. 
Objectives;; 
1. The study aims to analyze the diversification of Saudi economy. For a 
diversified economy would provide her with reduced dependence on the 
oil revenues, which in turn would further strengthen its bargaining space 
in the global oil market. 
2. The diversification involves restructuring of the economic structure. It's 
necessary to know the changing trends in Saudi economy. 
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3. Changing economic structure would result in changing economic 
relations for Saudi Arabia. The study aims to study this for assessing 
any future impact of this diversification. 
4. The study also aims to study the possible impact of reducing the direct 
role of the public sector as an agent of economic growth by promoting 
the private sector. 
5. It also aims to study the policy of encouragement to Foreign Direct 
Investment by creating an attractive investment climate. 
Methodology: 
The research work would mostly be based on secondary data obtained 
from various sources, published work including plan documents. The review of 
available published work on the subject has also been undertaken for the 
purpose of the study. The study has used data collection mainly from annual 
reports of the Ministry of Commerce, Economic Survey of the Goverrunent of 
Saudi Arabia, Census Reports of different years, Commission Reports and 
other Aimual FLeports, which are published by government of Saudi Arabai. 
Data available from international sources like United Nations, OPEC, OAPEC, 
Middle East Economic Survey (MEES), Middle East Economic Digest 
(MEED), Middle East Eastern Study, Journal of Energy and Development, 
Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency and other agencies have also been used. 
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The methodology used in simple, analytical and involves calculation of 
percentages, arithmetical averages etc. Contacts and discussions with experts 
and scholars who are engaged in similar work was also performed. For the 
depth of analysis simple statistical tools have been used. 
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The Economic Structure of Saudi Arabia 
Before the discovery of oil, the economic structure in Saudi 
Arabia was based on traditional economic activities. But since 1970's 
the economy in Saudi Arabia has been dominated primarily by the 
production and export of oil. This study would explore all the aspects of 
Saudi Arabia's oil industry from the discovery of oil in commercial 
quantities to the present day oil market. Oil has been playing a central 
role in the development of Saudi Arabia through its place in government 
finance, exports and gross domestic products. At present the Kingdom 
which holds the world's largest resources of oil, is the main force for 
stability in the oil market, and always trying to balance the needs of the 
oil producers with the demand of the oil consumers. The size of 
recoverable oil resources in Saudi Arabia, its production capacity and 
the degree of development of industry, coupled with an outlook for 
growing oil demand will ensure a role for oil sector in the Saudi 
economy for years to come. So the role of oil sector is essential in the 
development drive and in addressing the challenges facing the economy 
of Saudi Arabia. We discuss economic structure in this chapter through 
various sub-chapters that are follows — 
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Pre Oil Era 
The Saudi Arab Economic Structure in pre oil era had been based 
on traditional economic activities. This included raising of live stock by 
bedouins, primitive agriculture & production of simple tools by 
craftsmen. These craftsmen lived in smiall towns which concentrate 
around sources of water. Opportunity for economic development existed 
only in Hejaz because of the yearly arrival of pilgrims, visiting the holy 
places in Mecca and Madina.' But this was not enough for the 
satisfactory growth of economy due to various factors including security 
risk and inhospitable weather. Most of the population was engaged in 
agriculture as people used to live near wells and oases. There were large 
number of nomads who raised live stock, by moving their animals to the 
limited forage produced by infrequent rains. In the settled areas local 
craftmen produced a few items needed by those living near by sources of 
water. Production was undertaken to serve the very small market and it 
existed on a subsistence level. The trade was limited to camel, caravans 
and the annual influx of pilgrims. In some cities like Jeddah and Mecca 
there were several large merchant families settled there. These 
merchants also benefited from the growth in international trade 
associated with European colonial expansion. The change in the 
1 . El Mallakh, Ragaei and El Mallakh Dororothea (eds.), Saudi Arabia: Energy 
Developmental Planning and Industrialization, Lexington, Lexington Books, 1982, 
p.204. 
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economy of Saudi Arabia came with the discovery of huge resources of 
oil. The oil was discovered in commercial quantities in March 1938. But 
the petroleum industries could not be developed due to world war II. 
After the end of war petroleum industries started to develop. In this way 
Saudi Arabia entered into the new era of development. Today Saudi 
Arabia is one of the fastest growing nation of the world. It has become a 
global power through its petroleum exports. Actually in pre oil era local 
craftsmen produced a few items needed by those living near or visiting 
the scattered sources of water. In the principal cities such as Jeddah & 
Mecca, several large merchant families settled permanently. Colonial 
expansion also benefited these merchants, and attracted numerous 
families from as far away as the eastern province of Arabia, Iran, the 
Levant & Turkey. 
1. Oil Era 
Before an indepth analysis of Saudi oil policies, it is worthwhile 
to examine the structure of Saudi economy so as to understand its 
petroleum policies in a proper perspective. Saudi Arabian economy is 
dominated by oil. 
"The oil sector plays the pivotal role and has been engine of 
growth for the over all development of the economy."^ At the current 
2 . Johany Ali D, The Saudi Arabia Economy, London, Croom Helm, 1986, p. 189. 
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prices, its GDP demonstrated an upward trend from 1972 to 1982 when it 
increased from a mere Saudi Riyals 17,153 million to Saudi Riyals 52,217 
million registering an annual compound growth rate of 30.1 percent. However, 
from 1983 onwards it witnessed a declining tendency recording Saudi Riyals 
264,074 million in 1987. During 1983-87 it recorded a negative growth rate of 
8.5 percent annually.^  Both the positive and negative growths in GDP has been 
influenced by the varying oil prices. 
The history of oil in Saudi Arabia and the neighbouring countries 
goes back to many centuries during which seepages of oil and tar were 
used for a multitude of purposes. A mission of Geneva export in 1871 
visited Iraq and reported plentiful resource of oil."^  In 1907 another 
mission said Iraq was a vertible lake of petroleum. In Iraq oil was found 
in substantial quantity in 1908. The major Iraqi field at Kirkuk was 
discovered in 1927. And began producing oil in commercial quantities 
and soon after oil was exported abroad in 1934.^  In 1932 petroleum was 
discovered in Bahrain. 
"In 1923 a New Zealander, Major Frank Holmes, acting on behalf 
of a British syndicate, the "Eastern and General" obtained the fist Saudi 
oil concession from king Abdul Aziz, an exclusive concession to explore 
3 . Ibid. 
4 . Agreement between Saudi Arab Government and the Arabian American Oil Company, 2'"' 
Edition (Makkah, Government Press 1383 AH), 1964, p.9 
5. Ibid. 
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oil and other minerals in an area more then 30,000 square miles in the 
eastern region." 
The Eastern and General Syndicate were unable to pursuade any 
oil company to invest sufficient funds for exploration. After paying the 
£-2,000 for two years, they ceased to fulfill their part of the agreement. 
The king waited for three years and then revoked the concession in 
1928. According to major Frank Holmes and his London based 
syndicate, this episode represented one of the world's greatest lost 
opportunity. King Abdul Aziz was faced with a substantial fall in 
revenues in 1930 resulting from a drop in number of pilgrims caused by 
world wide recession. After that king Abdul Aziz invited wealthy 
American businessmen & philanthropists to visit the kingdom. Initial 
exploration produced disappointing results but in 1935 a well drilled in 
Dhahran found oil in commercial quantities. The production of oil began 
in 1938 and at that time the vast size of the oil reserve was becoming 
apparent. Because of the commercial viability of the oil resources, 
another supplementary agreement was signed on 3V^ May 1939. This 
agreement was known as the supplemental agreement. It also included 
the Saudi Government's rights in the two natural zones shared with Iraq 
& Kuvk^ait.'' 
6 . George Lenczowski, The Middle East in the World Affairs, 3"^  edition, Ithaka, NY, 
Cornell University Press, 1962, p.223 
7. Ibid. 
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"It is noteworthy that in 1937, Ibn Saud had received a very 
advantageous offer from Japan but, believing it to be motivated by 
political consideration, he rejected it. Germany also had designs on 
Saudi oil, and in the same year. Dr. Fritz Grobba, German representative 
to Iraq & Saudi Arabia, who was stationed in Baghdad also visited 
Jeddah. Nevertheless Ibn Saud preferred to continue his association with 
the Americans. It had the advantage of assuring the economic 
development of the country without incurring political liabilitites."^ 
In 1944 the California Arabian Standard Oil Company was 
renamed the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco). In 1948 
(1367/68AH) Aramco invoked an article of the supplemented agreement 
of 1939 (1357)/58AH) by selling a 30% interest to Standard Oil of New 
Jersey and a 10% interest to Socony vacuum. The redistributed 
ownership of Aramco was then Standard Oil of California 30%, Texas 
Oil Company (known as Texaco) - 30%, Standard oil of New Jersey 
(later known as Exxon) - 30%), and Socony Vaccum (later known as 
Mobile Oil) the remaining \0%.^ 
It was inconceivable in the political and economic context of the 
second half of the twentieth century that so important a national 
resources as oil contributing most of the country's national income 
8 . Johny A.D, The Myth of the OPEC Cartel: The Role of Saudi Arabia, Chichester, UK: 
Wiley, 1980 
9 . Based on date in OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin, Veinna, 2002, p. 114 
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should have remained under the ownership of foreign companies. 
However, the nationalization of Aramco took place in a phased manner. 
In 1973, Saudi Arabia government took 25% stake in Aramco, in 
1974 this share was increased to 60% and in 1980 it was amicably 
agreed that Aramco should become 100% Saudi owned, with the date of 
ownership back dated to 1976. 
On 6"' April 1989, the New York Times reported "At a quiet 
dinner a few days ago, the last American to preside over the world's 
largest oil company handed over power to its first Saudi boss. The 
Saudi, a man who started working there more than 40 years ago as an 
office boy, earned engineering and management degrees as he climbed 
up the ladder". 
"The transfer of the Arabian American Oil Company from the 
American John J. Kelberer, to Saudi Ali Naimi, took place at Hamilton 
House, named after an American Lawyer who negotiated the first 
agreement that opened the kingdom to American oil companies 56 years 
ago and led to the formation of Aramco as the company is known to the 
world."'° While the formal transfer of power was low key, in the 
Aramco tradition, the event was one of great moment Saudi Arabia. 
Thus the oil of the kingdom which had remained for so long 
beneath Saudi Arabia's desert and which then for decades had been 
10 ,Ibid. 
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exploited by foreign interest became at last a national resource, 
controlled and managed by Saudis themselves. 
Oil Resources : 
Before dealing the issue in detail, the discovery of oil in the 
kingdom and the early efforts to exploit it is discussed. In the Arab 
world and Middle East the history of oil goes back many centuries 
during which seepages of oil and tar were used for a multitude of 
purposes. A German delegation of experts visited Iraq in 1871 and 
reported abundant availability of oil. In 1907 another delegate visited 
Iraq and observed that Iraq was veritable "lake of petroleum". The major 
Iraqi field was discovered at Kirkuk in 1927 and began producing oil in 
commercial quantities. In 1932 petroleum was discovered in Bahrain. 
Oil exploration activity in Saudi Arabia began in 1923. When a British 
Company, Eastern and General Syndicate Ltd. obtained a concession in 
the eastern region, but since the company did not exercise its rights, the 
agreement was nullified in 1927. A New Zealander, Major Frank 
Holmes, acting on behalf of a British Syndicate had obtained the first 
Saudi Arabian oil concession from king Abdul Aziz bin Saud, an 
exclusive concession to explore for oil and other minerals in area of 
more than 30,000 square miles in the Al Hasa region. The Eastern and 
General Syndicate was unable to convince any oil company to invest 
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sufficient funds for exploration. After paying f-2,000 for two years, 
they ceased to fulfill their part of the agreement. The king waited for 
three years and then in 1928, revoked the concession. From the view 
point of Major Frank Holmes and his London based syndicate, this 
episode represents one of the world's greatest lost opportunities. 
During the period of king Abdul Aziz, a substantial fall in revenue 
started because of drop in the number of pilgrims caused by world-wide 
recession. The king invited a businessman and philanthropist, Charles R 
Crane to visit the kingdom. Crane had already shown eagerness to meet 
the engineers and conduct a survey regarding minerals and oil resources 
of Saudi Arabia. For this purpose, engineer Karl Twitchell arrived in 
Jeddah in 1931. He was a civil and mining engineer. After an extensive 
survey of many months, Twitchell submitted his report to Saudi king. 
The key findings of the report was that the geological formation in 
eastern province around Dhahran strongly indicated the presence of oil. 
In 1933, the Standard Oil Company of California (SOCAL) signed 
a concession agreement with government of Saudi Arabia allowing them 
to explore for oil. Standard Oil Company of California passed this 
concession to a wholly owned subsidiary called California Arabian 
Standard Oil Company. In 1936 with the company having no success at 
locating oil, the Texas Oil Company purchased a 50% stake of the 
11. The New York Times, New York, 6"* April 1989. 
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concession. After a long search for oil that lasted around four years, the 
first success came with the seventh drill site in Dammam, an area 
10 
located few miles north of Dhahran in 1938. The discovery of this well 
which immediately produced 1500 barrels per day, gave the company 
the hope to continue and flourish. The company's name was changed in 
1944 from California Standard Oil Company to Arabian American Oil 
1 ^ 
Company (Aramco). At that time Saudi Aramco i.e. Saudi Arabian Oil 
Company was formed to manage the assets of Aramco. Later in 1944 
Esso (which has become Exxon and mobil were brought in with the 
revised ownership distribution being 30 percent each for Standard Oil of 
California, Texaco and Exxon and 10 percent for Mobil.''^ SOCAL was 
also invited as partners as it was also primarily a production company. 
The foreign corporate ownership structure was to remain in force until 
the time of the Arab-Israel conflict of 1973, unlike Iraq and Iran whose 
oil industry has been nationalised. In Iran's case as early as 1951 by 
then Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh.'^ Arguably this has the 
advantage of giving the Iranian government control of production levels, 
but in practice as the major oil company boycotted Iranian oil in 
retaliation there was no market for oil, the Iranian economy detoriated 
12 . FOUD AL-FARSY, Modernity & Tradition, 1990, Kegan Paul International Ltd., 
London. 
13 . Nazar, Hisham M, The Economic Development and Oil Policy of Saudi Arabia, Middle 
East Economic Survey, Vol. 54, No.32, 13 May 1991, pp. L4-L5. 
14 . Opcit, 6, pp.96-98. 
15 . Ministry of Petroleum and Oil Resources, OPEC 
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and Mossadegh was overthrown two years later. Saudi Arabia profited 
from these developments in Iran as the chief middle eastern producer at 
that time virtually eliminated from the market. ARAMCO's western 
partner took initiative in increasing investment in Saudi oil, given the 
lower level of perceived country risk. Although the Saudi Arabian 
authority did not control the level of oil production, they had secured a 
profit sharing agreement with ARAMCO which entitled them to half of 
all revenues from oil sales. 
In 1973, the Saudi Arabian government acquired a 25% share in 
Aramco, increased this to 60% by 1974 and finally acquired full control 
of Aramco by 1980. In November 1988, the company changed its name 
from Arabian American Oil Company to Saudi Arabian Oil Company 
(Saudi Aramco). Its headquarter is located in Dhahran on the shores of 
Arabian Penisula. Saudi Aramco manages virtually all of Saudi Arabia's 
enormous hydrocarbon enterprises. Saudi Aramco is positioned to 
continue to play its leading role in meeting the world demand for oil. 
Saudi Aramco is responsible for 99% of kingdom's proven oil reserves 
of 259,200 million barrels, about a quarter of the world's total. That is 
more than double the total of Iraq, the country with the world's second 
largest reserves and nearly twelve times the reserves of United States. ^ ^ 
Saudi Aramco produces and exports more crude oil than any other 
16. Opcit, 6, pp. 102-103 
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company. Recent production had averaged some 8 million barrels per 
day. That is more than twice of output of the next highest producer and 
nearly five times greater than the largest U.S. oil company. 
Saudi Aramco maintains a maximum substantial crude production 
capacity of 8.5 million per day. Saudi Aramco also ranks among the top 
ten companies in gas production world wide. The company is also leader 
in both the production and export of natural gas liquids (NGL) and 
major producer of refined products. The company produces natural gas 
in association with crude oil and non-associated gas from deep, 
independent gas fields. This gas is used as fuel and feed stock for the 
kingdom's backbone industries and utilities, and for export and domestic 
consumption as NGL (Natural Gas Liquids). A strong programme is 
currently under way to expand gas production and processing 
capabilities to meet increasing demand for gas at home to power the 
kingdom's invigorating domestic economic growth. 
To develop entire natural resources sector and harness it to the 
service of over all development, the Saudi government established 
petromin as the state petroleum company in 1962. The role of petromin 
is to maximize the usefulness of the kingdom's oil, gas and minerals."* 
From 1975-80 petromin's activity were governed by Saudi Arabia's five 
years plan. Petromin gave priority to projects which were expected to 
17 . Oil and Gas Journal OPEC, Various issues 
18 . SAMA Annual Report, Research and Statistics Development Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
rious issues 
55 
provide opportunities for private Saudi investment, and resulted in the 
expansion of job opportunities in Saudi Arabia. 
Under the first five year Saudi plan (1975-80) petromin listed five 
areas of activity i.e. the exploitation of gas, the diversification of 
industries within the field of fossil fuels and minerals and developing 
the refining sector. It also included production of benzene and xylene 
for kingdom's fast developing petro chemical plants. The marketing and 
transportation at home and abroad of Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) 
and the speeding up of the production of minerals industries and 
development of precious metal resources were also under the priorities 
of petromin. Petromin formed petrolube, a company jointly owned with 
Mobil in 1988, for the production and marketing of the Kingdom's lube 
oil. Petrolube has blending plants in Jeddah, Jubail and Riyadh. 
After that Saudi Arabia established the Saudi Arabic Marketing 
and Refining Company (SAMARIC). SAMARIC was to be responsible 
for refining and domestic marketing operations. SAMARIC was to take 
over three domestic refineries at Yanbu (170,000 barrels a day), Jeddah 
(90000 barrels a day) and Riyadh (134,000 barrels a day). The new 
company was to hold a 50% share in the two joint venture export 
refineries at Yanbu (with Mobil) and at Jubail (with Shell). SAMARIC 
was also to take responsibilities for the marketing of the Kingdom's oil 
products both at home and abroad. In this context, it is claimed that in 
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1988 the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia took a major step towards its 
objective of expansion of "down stream" in the oil sectors by purchasing 
a 50% stake in Texaco's Petrol Refining and retailing business in 23 
eastern and southern states of the U.S. Petromin was to become 
primarily a state holding company with shares in the newly formed 
specialized oil subsidiaries. 
As far as oil is concerned, Saudi Aramco is the largest oil 
producer in the Kingdom. Saudi Aramco's oil operations encompass the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, including its territorial water in the Persian 
Gulf and the Red Sea totalling more than 1.5 million square kilometer. 
This area is larger than the combined area of Texas, California, 
Oklahoma and Utah, or of France, Spain and Germany. Most production 
comes from plants which are located in the coastal belts of eastern 
province in an area extending 300 km north and south of Dhahran. In 
May 2005 Saudi Aramco Vice President announced Aramco's plan to 
built projects worth about 478.5 billion Saudi Riyals in the next five 
years. Due to the unprecedented global demand for oil, Aramco 
announced that the production of its oil doubled by the end of 2006. The 
company expects expansion in all supporting fields also for years to 
come as demand increases. 
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Oil Production : 
Saudi Arabia has the world's largest reserves of oil deposits. 
Further it has been the largest producer of oil also for various years. 
However, there had been some fluctuations in the size of oil production. 
Given its relatively high production level, accounting for nearly 13% of 
world output and 35% of total OPEC output in 1991, and more 
significantly, its small domestic needs, the Kingdom's dominance of 
international crude oil markets remains unchanged. Although reluctant 
to play the role, Saudi Arabia has become the "swing producer" 
balancing international oil demand and supply. Therefore, within limits 
Saudi oil production policies can have a profound impact on 
international prices. Since the early 1970s the Kingdom has occasionally 
used this dominance to influence oil prices, usually to further its 
objectives of sustaining long term oil consumption and ensuring 
economic stability in the industrialized world. 
Oil wealth has made possible rapid economic development which 
began in the 1960's and accelerated spectacularly in the 1970's. 
Following table shows the massive fluctuation in oil production levels. 
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Table-1 
Saudi Oil Production 
Year 
1970 
1975 
1980 
1985 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
Total Production 
(Million Barrel) 
1386.67 
2582.53 
3623.80 
1158.80 
2340.50 
2963.00 
3049.40 
2937.40 
2937.90 
2928.54 
2965.45 
2924.28 
3022.27 
2761.10 
2962.60 
2879.00 
2588.98 
3069.74 
3256.30 
3413.94 
3360.90 
3217.77 
% Change 
-
18.13 
86.23 
40.32 
-68.02 
101.00 
26.59 
2.91 
-3.67 
0.017 
-0.3199 
1.26 
-1.38 
3.35 
-8.64 
7.29 
-7.29 
0.33 
18.56 
06.07 
04.84 
-1.55 
-4.25 
Daily Average 
(Million Barrel) 
3.80 
7.08 
9.90 
3.17 
6.14 
8.12 
8.33 
8.05 
8.05 
8.02 
8.10 
8.01 
8.28 
7.56 
8.09 
7.89 
7.09 
8.41 
8.90 
9.35 
9.21 
8.82 
Source: SAMA Annual Report 2008, Research & Statistical 
of Saudi Arabia. 
Department, Kingdom 
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Saudi Oil Production 
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The data about Saudi Arabia's oil production and annual change 
since 1970s is provided in Table-1. Table provides information 
regarding changes in oil production in terms of million barrels per day, 
and percentage change is estimated by comparing to preceding year's 
production levels. 
From Table-1 oil production has increased continuously from 
1970 to 1980 and afterward decreases substantially in another five years 
to 1985. It had been mainly due to the cut in Saudi oil production in mid 
1980's due to glut in international oil market. The production of oil 
more or less increased during 1990-92, after that and more or less 
remained constant upto 1997. After 1997 production level has fluctuated 
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up and down slightly upto 2005. In 2006-07 production level decreased 
and shows negative percentage change during 2006-07. 
Oil Export : 
Alongwith the production and export of oil in Saudi Arabia since 
1970, the role of oil in domestic economy and polity has also been 
increasing. The Kingdom's dependence on oil export and its importance 
is particularly visible from early seventies. Saudi exports consist of 
almost exclusively crude and refined oil export. Saudi Arabia has been 
described as the world "mother lode" of oil and gas reserves. Therefore, 
it would be appropriate to study the trends in the Saudi oil exports. The 
relationship between oil production and export is shown in Table-2. 
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Table-2 
Saudi Arabia : Oil Production and Export (million barrel) 
Year 
1970 
1975 
1980 
1985 
1990 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
Source; Central 
Arabia, 
Total 
Production 
1386.67 
2582.53 
3623.80 
1158.80 
2340.50 
2928.54 
2965.45 
2924.28 
2332.48 
2087.68 
2282.38 
2203.10 
1928.89 
2380.85 
3256.30 
3413.94 
3360.90 
3217.77 
Department of 
various years. 
Export 
1174.17 
2409.39 
3375.69 
780.72 
1642.42 
2296.13 
2236.01 
2257.33 
2232.48 
2087.68 
2282.38 
2203.10 
1928.89 
2380.85 
2486.77 
2631.24 
2565.72 
2441.16 
Statistic, Ministi 
% Share of 
oil export in 
total 
production 
84.67 
93.29 
93.15 
67.37 
70.17 
78.40 
75.40 
77.19 
77.17 
75.61 
77.03 
76.51 
74.50 
77.55 
76.36 
77.07 
76.34 
75.84 
ry of Planning, 
% change in 
share of total 
oil export in 
total 
production 
— 
10.18 
-0.15 
-27.67 
4.15 
11.72 
-3.82 
2.37 
-0.02 
-2.02 
1.42 
-0.52 
-2.01 
3.50 
-1.19 
0.71 
-0.73 
-0.5 
Govt, of Saudi 
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Saudi Arabia : Oil Production and Export (million 
barrel) 
H Yean 970 
• Total Production 
1386.67 
D Export 1174.17 
D % Share of oil export in 
total production 84.67 
• % change in share of 
total oil export in total 
production — 
The above table provides information about the total production 
of oil and its export by Saudi Arabia. In 1970 the total production of oil 
was 1386.67 million barrels. Out of this total oil production, Saudi 
Arabia exported 1174.17 million barrels and thereby Saudi Arabia 
exported 84.67% of the total oil production. In 1975 the total production 
increased to 2,582.53 million barrels and the total export was 2,409.39 
million barrels. In this way the total export was 93.29 percent of the 
total oil production. There had been a percentage change of 10.18% in 
the share of oil export to the total production over the period of 1970 to 
1975. In the year 1980 production of oil had significantly increased and 
reached at 3,623.80 million barrels. Out of this total production of oil 
Saudi Arabia exported 93.15 percent which was equal to 3,375.69 
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million barrels. Over the period of 1975 to 1980 there had been a 
decline in the percentage share of oil export to the total production to 
the level of -0.15 percent. 
In 1985, the total production of oil was 1,158.80 million barrels. 
Out of the total production of oil, Saudi Arabia exported 780.72 million 
barrels and therefore the share of oil export in the total production came 
down to 67.37 percent and registered a negative growth in share of total 
oil export. In 1990 there has been an increment in the share of oil export 
in total production which is equal to 70.17 percent. During the period of 
1985-90 there was a positive growth in the share of oil export to the 
total production i.e. equal to 4.15 percent. This trend gets improved in 
1995 when Saudi Arabia exported 78.4 percent of the total oil 
production and registered the highest growth rate of 11.72 percent in the 
share of oil export in total production. In 1995-96 though the total 
output has increased from 2,928.54 million barrels to 2,965.45 million 
barrels but the share of export declined when Saudi Arabia exported 
2,236.01 million barrels. For this period there has been negative growth 
in the share of oil export to the total production which is -3.82 percent. 
In the next year the total production of oil has declined but the export of 
oil has increased and Saudi Arabia exported 77.19 percent of total oil 
production and realized a positive growth in the share of export to the 
total production. In 1998 the total production approached to 3,022.27 
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million barrels and out of this the total export was 2,332.48 million 
barrels and therefore, the share remained more or less same. After 1998 
there has been a decline in the total oil production as well as export of 
oil. The total oil production declined to 2,761.10 million barrels and 
therefore a negative growth rate has been found in the share of oil 
export to the total production. In 2000 though the production increased 
to 2,962.60 million barrels but it remained less than the total oil 
production of 1998. For this year total export of oil was 77.03 percent of 
the total production and positive growth rate could be witnessed in the 
share of export to the total production in comparison to the previous 
year. Since 2000 there had been a continuous decline in the production 
as well as the percent of oil export, but in 2003 once again the total 
production of oil increased to 3,064.74 million barrels. The share of oil 
export in the total production also increased and reached to 77.55 
percent and thereby registered a growth rate of 4.09 percent over the 
previous year. Since 2003 and till 2007 the production level has varied 
slightly up and down, but the percentage share of oil exports declined 
marginally. 
From the above information we can divide the whole period of 
analysis into two parts. From 1970 to 1980 when there had been an 
increment in total production of oil and export of oil. The period of 1980 
to 2007 can be regarded as the period when there has been an average 
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decline in share of oil export in the total production of oil. Despite all 
odds oil export has more or less maintained its position of 2/3 of total 
output being exported by Saudi Arabia. 
Oil Revenues : 
As far as revenues are concerned, Saudi Arabia has received huge 
revenues from petroleum exports. Particularly since the dramatic 
increase in the international petroleum prices in 1973-74. Revenue 
which came from oil was used in part to finance an ambitious 
programme of infrastructural development and modernization. This led 
to various welfare programmes for health, education and social 
purposes. Substantial budgetary allocation were made to the country's 
armed forces and to the purchase of sophisticated weaponry from 
abroad. Due to increase of revenue, public sector employment expanded 
quickly and heavy consumer and producer subsidies introduced. 
The importance of oil revenue in Saudi Arabia could be 
ascertained by looking at the proportion of oil revenues to the total 
revenues. Trend of total revenue and oil revenue is shown through 
following. 
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T a b l e - 3 
Trend of Total Revenue and Oil Revenue (Million Riyals) 
Year 
1976 
1980 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
Total Revenue 
(Million Riyals) 
135,957 
348,100 
316,639 
146,500 
258,065 
228,159 
213,000 
293,000 
392,291 
564,335 
673,682 
642,800 
Oil Revenue 
(Million Riyals) 
121,191 
319,305 
246,297 
105,728 
214,424 
183,915 
166,100 
231,000 
330,000 
504,540 
604,470 
562,186 
% Share 
89.1 
91.7 
77.8 
72.2 
83.1 
80.6 
78.0 
78.8 
84.12 
89.40 
89.72 
87.45 
Source : SAMA Annual Report 2008, Research & Statistical Department, Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia. 
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Trend of Total Revenue and Oil Revenue (Million 
Riyals) 
800000 
700000 
600000 
500000 
400000 
300000 
200000 
100000 
0 
• Year 
• Total Revenue (Million 
Riyals) 
• Oil Revenue Annount 
• % Share 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
This table shows that total revenue of Saudi Arabia increased 
considerably from 1976 to 1990, but percentage of oil revenue in total 
revenue decreased in 1990. Oil revenue has decreased close to the 
previous level of that in 1976. After that revenue has increased 
considerably upto 2006 and slightly declined in 2007. The percentage 
share of oil revenue in total revenue in the period 1995-2006 increased 
initially and then decreased in the later period i.e. 2007. 
Oil Policy : 
Oil policy in Saudi Arabia is determined at the highest level of 
government body i.e. The King and the crown prince (Deputy Prime 
Minister) who take decision about Saudi Arabia's oil policy. During the 
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1970's an image of Saudi Arabia as an oil producer emerged that still 
exercised significant influence on perceptions of Saudi government. In 
the light of small Saudi population and economy's limited absorption 
capacity oil revenues generally surpassed the domestic requirements of 
development and a welfare state. Hence surpluses were invested abroad 
and this led to some analyst conclude that Saudi could be best persuaded 
to keep a high level of production if high yield investment are offered to 
them.'^ It was believed in 1970s that given the nature of the oil market, 
lower levels of Saudi production could probably push prices higher. So 
that Saudi Arabia could meet its revenue needs either by high output 
with moderate prices or lower output with higher prices. Saudi Arabia 
followed over production and under pricing policy. It could only be the 
result of political consideration. Saudi officials not surprisingly tried to 
take credit in the west for their altruism.'^ Economist however argued 
that Saudi Arabia lacking natural resources other than the oil, has a long 
term interest in keeping the demand for oil at high level well into the 
next century. 
Thus, exclusively high prices could hurt Saudi Arabia by 
stimulating the search for all alternative sources of energy and 
19 . Central Department of Statistics, Ministry of Economy & Planning, Government of 
Saudi Arabia, 2000 
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encouraging greater efficiency in the use of oil, thereby suppressing 
demands.^ *"' 
In the past the decision of Saudi Arabia relating^ to oil production 
can provide some evidence in the debate over the mixture of economic 
and political consideration that may be taken into account by 
government of Saudi Arabia. Demand for oil increased rapidly during 
1972 and early 1974 and exerted upward pressure on prices. The 
production of oil in Saudi Arabia increased rapidly to meet demand for 
oil and increase the revenues. However, actual production decision were 
still primarily being made by the American companies that constituted 
the Arabia America Oil Company (ARAMCO). Upward pressure on 
prices and expanding Saudi oil output in early 1973 coincided with the 
Arab-Israel war which broke out on October 6, 1973. Subsequently, at 
OPEC meeting in Kuwait on October 16, Saudi Arabia along with other 
members announced a six percent cut in oil production but increased 
prices to maintain the level of oil revenues. Then on October 20, Saudi 
Arabia along with other members of OPEC declared an embargo on 
shipments of oil to the United States and other countries helping Israel. 
During the seventies, Saudi oil policies has gone through three 
important phases. The period of first phase is October 1973 to 
September 1974. In this period Saudi Arabia imposed an oil embargo on 
20 . SAMA Annual Report 2003, Research & Statistical Department, Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia 
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the United States and cut oil production by upto 25 percent. Due to this 
cut in oil production prices increased sharply. 
Second phase started from September to December 1978. In this 
period Saudi Arabia adjusted its oil production to meet market demand 
fighting OPEC at time in its efforts to minimize changes in the nominal 
prices of oil. In phase III (December 1978 - July 1979) disruption of the 
oil production of Iran and two surprise production cuts by Saudi Arabia 
precipitated the second oil crisis. Prices especially on the spot market 
again skyrocketed, and oil marketing arrangements were so disrupted 
that contract prices also continued to rise for eighteen months, even 
after Saudi production increased. 
The real price of oil did not rise between 1974 and 1978. In fact it 
declined when measured in constant dollar. During this period, the Saudi 
generally kept production at levels necessary to defend the OPEC price. 
In late 1978, the production of Iran began to fall rapidly resulting in an 
increase in the spot market prices from U.S. dollar 13 per barrel to 
nearly US dollar 19. Saudi Arabia expressed concern that oil prices 
would go out of hand and began to raise production to the maximum 
sustainable level of over 10 million barrels per day. From 1979 to early 
1982, Saudi Arabia did not fall in line with OPEC marker-crude 
21 . Douglas R. Bohi and Milton Russel, US Energy Policy: Alternatives for Security, John 
Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1975, pp. 112-121 
22 . Quandt, William B. Saudi Arabia Oil Policy, The Brookings Institutes, Washington, 
1982, p.7 
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reference price in its sale. The result was a two tier pricing system. By 
selling it substantially at less than a market clearing price and by 
increasing its production and exports the Kingdom sought to moderate 
what it considered runaway pricing that would accelerate inter fuel 
substitution and conservation. 
During 1980-82 Saudi production was kept close to maximum 
capacity averaging between 9 million barrels per day, but even then 
prices in 1980 increased from $ 26 per barrel to $ 32 and then remained 
steady until the decision of December 1981 to increase it to $ 34 per 
barrel. During this period Saudi Arabia argued with other members of 
OPEC for a price strategy agreed upon in 1979. It is important to note 
that since early 1980s overall demand for OPEC oil was declining, yet 
Saudi output remained considerably high. The Iran - Iraq war erupted in 
September 1980 and Saudi Arabia at the outbreak of war started 
production of about 10 million barrels per day to prevent further 
increase in oil prices. But in November 1980 oil prices rose to US$ 40 
per barrel which then slowly began to decline by mid 1981 and reached 
to $ 32 per barrel. 
In 1983 demand for oil was declining and OPEC marker-crude 
price of $ 34 per barrel was unrealistically high when compared to spot 
market prices for non-OPEC oil. At this juncture Saudi Arabia pressed 
23. Ibid 
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the need to keep oil prices competitive if a down trend was to be 
stopped. For convincing other OPEC members it agreed to take a 
"swing" position in the international oil market if OPEC would 
officially cut its marker-crude price for the first time and establish 
production quotas for all other members of the organization.^'* In the late 
1985 Saudi Arabia publicly announced a change in it oil policy. Instead 
of trying to increase world prices by producing and exporting less, Saudi 
Arabia argued that they and other OPEC members should concentrate on 
to recover market share which they have steadily lost to non-OPEC 
producers. To implement this new policy Saudi Arabia began to enter 
into a series of netback arrangements, with refineries all over the world. 
Netback arrangement in Saudi view permitted oil pricing to be 
immediately responsive to market conditions. With this Saudi Arabia 
sought to recover lost market share as well as increase its volume. In the 
short run Saudi Arabia expected a sustainable increase in revenue 
generation as its production grew more rapidly than the decline in 
prices. In the long run the kingdom expected to regain market share 
which it abandoned by its swing producer's role. Throughout the late 
eighties because of the recession in industrial countries, coupled with 
the oil conservation policies, the demand for OPEC oil and role of 
OPEC in regulating the international oil market had been diminishing. 
24.0pcit. 22, pp. 15-21 
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Once the hostilities between Iran and Iraq ended in 1988, the OPEC 
producers started producing more and more oil and several of its 
members were not following their quota limit. Thrs associated with 
other factors led the oil prices crash to the level of $ 13 per barrel in 
1989 and early 1990. When Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990 
Saudi Arabia was producing around 5.5 millions of barrel per day. The 
U.N. Security Council immediately imposed sanction on Iraqi and 
Kuwaiti oil. In order to fill this gap and to prevent oil prices to rise 
steeply Saudi Arabia unilaterally announced its plan of increasing its oil 
production and produced more than 8 million barrels of oil per day in 
1991. Since 1991 and till now Saudi Arabia followed an aggressive oil 
production policy and it maintained the production at about 8 million 
barrel per day. It is important to mention here that the oil prices during 
1990-92 ranged in between $ 18 and $ 21 per barrel.^^ But the Saudi 
Arabia government today faces the new challenges as well as new world 
energy balance. Its domestic requirement as well as its burden sharing 
role in the gulf war of 1991 have compelled her to take a leading role in 
the world energy market. 
Saudi Arabia's aim at the February 1992 OPEC meeting was to 
eradicate the last vestiges of the 1990 agreements and its quota shares, 
specially the Kingdom's share of about 25 percent. But OPEC members 
25 . Gloub, David B. When Oil and Politics Mix: Saudi Oil Policy 1973-85, Havard Middle 
East Paper, Cambridge, No. 4, 1985, p.3 
26 . Ibid. 
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refused to accede to Saudi pressure at the February 1992 meeting. Iran 
particularly was willing to risk the improved relations it had forged with 
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Saudi Arabia and absorb the oil price cut. Saudi Arabia's income 
requirement in the wake of gulf war would, Tehran suspected, keep the 
Saudi from forcing other OPEC members in to accepting its objectives 
as it did in 1986. The final agreement reached was essentially what the 
Saudi wanted in the short run : a total production ceiling of almost 23 
million barrels per day and a temporarj'^  quota of 35 percent of the 
ceiling and the maintenance of price stability. They did not achieve their 
long term objective : unanimous OPEC recognition of a 35 percent 
market share of all future OPEC output ceilings. 
Long term Saudi policy imperatives for the 1990s were shaped by 
structural factors within OPEC and within the international oil market. 
Highest on the priority list was the decision to push domestic oil 
capacity to more than 105 million barrels per day sustainable capacity 
with a further 1.5 million to 2 million barrels per day surge capacity in 
times of emergency. Three factors prompted these expansion plans. 
Growth in world demand for oil over the preceding several years, 
combined with the Persian Gulf war, had pushed the Kingdom and other 
OPEC countries to their production capacities. Expecting that demand 
would continue to grow and that most other exporters were constrained 
27. Opcit. 25 
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by diminishing oil reserves or financing problems, a rapid rise in 
capacity could capture any increase in demand that may occur. Second 
in light of the post 1986 intra-OPEC market share competition, oil 
capacity expansions have a direct impact on the ability of individual 
member to jockey for quota increase. Third the ability to raise output at 
will in the event of an unforeseen price decline, helped stabilize total oil 
revenues, which constituted the bulk of domestic budgetary income. 
Saudi Arabia's interest in moving downstream has also been a 
part of its oil policy. The drive to obtain overseas refining and storage 
facilities is designed to further two objectives related to security of 
supply. First the Kingdom wanted to obtain captive buyers of its crude, 
assuring stable prices and terms. Saudi Arabia would thus be more 
receptive to market condition in consuming countries and avoid being 
phased out of certain countries. Gaining further profits from refining the 
crude was an associated reason for moving to the downstream overseas. 
Second, the Kingdom sought to provide consuming countries with 
"reciprocal security measures", Under this it was to undertake supply 
guarantee - through capacity addition or stocking arrangements abroad 
in return for consumer country's, decision to avoid taxes and import 
restrictions on oil. Few consuming countries, however, responded 
favourably to such arrangements. 
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However, beginning in late 1997, Saudi Arabia again faced the 
low oil prices. Due to a combination of factors - the east Asian 
economic crisis, a warm winter in the west caused by El. Nino and an 
increase in non-OPEC oil production, demand for oil slowed and pulled 
oil prices down by more than one third. Saudi Arabia was a key player 
in coordinating the successful 1999 campaign of OPEC and other oil 
producing countries to raise the prices of oil to its highest level since the 
Gulf war by managing production and supply of petroleum. That same 
year Saudi Arabia established the supreme economic council to 
formulate and better coordination of economic development policies in 
order to accelerate institutional and industrial reform. Therefore, Saudi 
oil policies depend upon several factors such as its domestic 
requirements, world energy balances, regional consideration, political 
climate and its perceptions of 2V^ century oil market scenario. A 
combination of these factors determine Saudi oil policy. 
28 . United Nations, Year Book of World Energy Statistics, New York, 1981 
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Table - 4 
Structure of GDP 
(Share of oil sector and non-oil sector in Million Riyals) 
Year GDP GDP from 
oil sector 
GDP from 
non oil 
sector 
Share of 
oil sector 
in GDP 
Share of 
non oil 
sector in 
GDP 
1970 
1975 
1980 
1985 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
22,279 
163,156 
544,069 
372,408 
430,334 
526,003 
697,007 
679,164 
699,689 
795,787 
930,753 
1172,399 
1324,556 
1418,746 
10,390 11,889 
104,876 58,280 
341,641 
104,451 
158,693 
187,718 
289,165 
255,510 
263,511 
377,586 
435,330 
681,291 
720,664 
778,353 
202,428 
267,957 
271,641 
338,285 
407,842 
423,654 
436,169 
458,201 
495,423 
554,108 
603,892 
6040,393 
46.63 
64.27 
62.79 
28.04 
36.87 
35.68 
41.48 
37.62 
37.66 
42.42 
46.77 
55.14 
54.40 
54.86 
53.36 
35.72 
37.20 
71.41 
63.12 
64.31 
58.51 
62.37 
62.33 
57.57 
53.22 
44.85 
45.59 
45.13 
Source: 1. Ministry of Planning, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia-Achievement of 
the development plans 
2. SAMA Annual Report 2008, Research & Statistical Department, 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
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Table-4 shows the structure of GDP from 1970 onwards with 
interval of five years, upto 2000 and later on for every year. This has 
been taken for the analysis of the structure of GDP. GDP figure is made 
up of two constituents namely GDP from oil sector and GDP from non 
oil sector. Further we have also taicen the share of oil sector and non-oil 
sector in GDP. In the year 1970 the total GDP from oil sector was 
10,390 whereas share of non-oil sector was 11,889. The percentage 
share of oil sector is 46.63 percent and that of non-oil sector is 53.36 
percent. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) figure in 1975 increased to 
163,156 million Riyals. The share of oil sector also increased to 104,876 
million Reyals and that from non-oil sector increased to 58,280 million 
Riyals. If we look at the percentage share of oil sector in GDP, it 
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increased to 64.27 percent but that of non-oil sector decreased to 35.72 
percent. In the year 1980 GDP further increased to 544,069 million 
Riyals, out of this the share of oil sector was 341,641 million Riyals and 
non-oil sector was 202,428 million Riyals. Percentage share of oil sector 
decreased to 62.79 percent but that of non-oil sector increased to 37.20 
percent. In the year 1985 GDP further increased to 372,408 million 
Riyals out of which the GDP from oil sector was 104,451 million Riyals 
and GDP from non-oil sector was 267,957 million Riyals. So, the 
percentage share of oil sector was 28.04 percent and that of non-oil 
sector was 71.41 percent. Therefore, we observe that in 1985 the reverse 
in trend. Since the year 1990 the trend continued as before i.e. GDP 
figure increased to 430,334 million Riyals in which the share of oil 
sector was 158,693 million Riyals and non-oil sector 271,641 million 
Riyals. The share of oil sector increased to 36.87 percent but it remained 
less than the percentage share of non-oil sector which came down to 
63.12 percent. So from the year 1985 and onwards percentage share of 
oil sector in GDP is less than that of non-oil sector in GDP and before 
the year 1985 it was just reverse. So we can say that the year 1985 is a 
turning point and the importance of non-oil sector is increasing from 
this period. In the year 1995 GDP further increased to 526,003 million 
Riyals out of which GDP from oil sector was 187,718 million Riyals and 
GDP from non-oil sector was 338,285 million Riyals. In percentage 
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terms it was 35.68% for oil sector and 64.31 percent for non-oil sector. 
In the year 2000 GDP was 697,007 million Riyals. The share of oil 
sector was 289,165 million Riyals and non-oil sector was 407,842 
million Riyals. The percentage share of oil sector increased slightly to 
41.48 percent and that of non-oil sector decreased to 58.57 percent. In 
the year 2001 GDP decreased for the first time to 679,164 million Riyals 
of which the share of oil sector was 255,510 million Riyals and non-oil 
sector was 423,654 million Riyals. The percentage share of oil sector 
decreased to 37.62 percent and non-oil sector increased to 62.37 percent. 
In the year 2002 the GDP growth trend continued and it amounted to 
699,680 million Riyals. The share of oil sector in this was 263,511 
million Riyals and non-oil sector was 436,169 million Riyals. The 
percentage share of both sectors remained more or less same. In the year 
2003 Saudi GDP increased to 795,787 million Riyals out of which the 
share of oil sector increased to 42.42 percent and non-oil sector 
decreased to 57.57 percent. In the year 2004 there has been a large 
increase in GDP which equaled to 930,753 million Riyals. Out of which 
share of oil sector is 435,330 million Riyals and that of non-oil sector is 
495,423 million Riyals. In this way percentage of oil sector increased to 
46.7 percent and that of non-oil sector decreased to 53.22 percent. So 
this table shows that the GDP has increased throughout from beginning 
to the last, but its composition from oil sector and non-oil sector has 
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been varying since the year 1985. The year 1985 shows beginning of the 
reverse trend of the composition of GDP. Before 1985 oil sectors 
contribution was greater in GDP where as since 1985 the non-oil sector 
has greater percentage. But in recent period such as year 2004 both 
sector is competing each other and there is no much gap between their 
percentage share. But after 2004 till 2007 both the share of oil sector 
and non-oil sector in GDP has increased. 
In the long term Saudi Arabia is likely to consume an increasing 
proportion of its own oil, although it is difficult to envisage export being 
less dominant for several decades. Oil still accounted for 70 percent of 
government income, 85 percent of export and 37 percent of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) in 2001. It is the share of oil in GDP that 
declined in last two decades, indicating a considerable degree of 
economic diversification even if the non oil sector remained largely 
dependent on oil development. In Saudi Arabia there has been a 
consistent tendency to treat oil as a given parameter somewhat detached 
from the rest of the national economy. In other words, once a level of 
production deemed likely to be acceptable to other OPEC members is 
set, the oil price is determined in international market. The de-linkage of 
oil and development spending was less critical in 1970's and early 
1980's as oil revenues accruing to government reserves which acted as 
a buffer between revenue and expenditure. The problem by the late 
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1980's and 1990's, however, was that with sustained lower oil prices the 
government financial reserves disappeared and the state became a 
substantial net borrower from its own bank, and indeed this grew during 
the 1990's- but they were privately owned, by businesses. 
In reality the Saudi Arabian economy retains a high degree of 
responsiveness to oil market development and it has not proved possible 
to break. With production level fairly constant. Gross Domestic Product 
still rises and falls in line with oil prices changes. In the absence of the 
significant cushion of reserves and government debt exceeding 90 
percent of GDP, the lag between the oil prices fall and the 
corresponding expenditure cuts is less than one year. For example, the 
oil revenue shortfall of 1998 when at one point prices fell to 10 Dollar 
per barrel resulting in a two billion dollar cut in spending the following 
year. This would have been even greater without the price recovery. 
When oil prices fall it tends to be investment expenditure rather 
than government spending on salavies that is effected the most. It is the 
investment in diversification and in achieving self sustained, non-oil 
dependent development that suffers, while what can be classified as 
consumption through public sector wages is maintained. 
The contribution of oil to development will inevitably be 
diminished even further as oil production level remain within the 7.5 to 
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8.5 million barrel per day band rather than there being any attempt to 
ratchet up level and face criticism of other OPEC members. 
Strategy of Reduction on Oil Dependence: 
Despite the improvement that accompanied the rebounding of oil 
prices, the Saudi economy still suffers from major structural problems. 
The massive subsidies, inefficient industries and lack of fully developed 
free market system hampers the ability of the Saudi economy to pull 
itself away from dependence on oil. As the then Crown Prince Abdullah 
said in a widely noted 1996 speech that the era of oil boom was over. 
The Saudi leadership was becoming increasingly worried of relying on a 
single commodity for the government's income and wished to stimulate 
a diversification of the economy. The budget problems and desire for 
diversification work together to make strengthen the private sector an 
appealing policy. So for reducing oil dependency the government of 
Saudi Arabia has been encouraging private sector to contribute in 
reducing the Kingdom's dependence on oil as a part of its efforts to 
attract foreign investment and diversify the economy. Few in Saudi 
Arabia see the same urgency for privatization as do foreign economists. 
Most Saudi policy makers support privatization. Saudi Arabia acceded 
to the WTO in 2005 after many years of negotiation with high oil 
revenues enabling the government to post large budget surpluses. 
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Reyadh has been able to substantially boost spending on job training and 
education infrastructure development and government salaries. Indeed 
privatization has been discussed in the Kingdom since the fourth 
development plan of 1985-90. The Kingdom telephone system is being 
"corporatized" to prepare it to be the first privatization of a government 
utility. A step motivated by strains on the telecommunication network 
requiring investment that the government is ill placed to make. The 
power sector perhaps is the most important part of the economy, that 
government intends at privatizing. But full privatization of power 
companies would force the government to implement some difficult 
policies. Subsidy must ultimately be removed. 
The oil sector illustrated trends through out Saudi oil policy. The 
Crown Prince and the senior Saudi leadership have adopted an 
increasingly professional approach to policy making for reducing oil 
dependency. They are open to a large role for foreign investment and 
toward structural economic reform. They are also taking more assertive 
stand in regional and international policies. In short Saudi policy is 
becoming more professional and more assertive. For reducing oil 
dependency in Saudi Arabia emphasis has been placed, under recent 
development plans, on the promotion of 'downstream' oil industries, 
such as refining and petroleum derivatives, and progress has also been 
made in developing the country's non-oil industries. And the importance 
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of non-oil economic activities has grown steadily, reflecting Saudi 
Arabia's efforts at economic diversification. The progress has been 
achieved with an open exchange and trade system and liberal capital 
flows as well as foreign labours. Saudi Arabia has become an important 
center for regional economic growth. 
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The Policy of Diversification 
After discussing the economic structure of Saudi economy, and 
the role and implication of a large oil sector in Chapter-2, a study is 
undertaken about Saudi Arabia's general economic policy. Since Saudi 
Arabia's oil reserves are the largest components of the wealth or assets, 
hence sound oil policy is of prime importance. The essential feature of a 
rational oil policy would have as its prime objectives, maximization of 
oil revenues. For this the Saudi government has to evolve strategies. It 
was also advised that Saudi Arabia should invest a large portion of its 
current NNP or oil revenues in areas yielding a high real return to 
compensate for depletion of oil.' The real return does not mean an 
artificial return and does not incorporate explicit and implicit subsidies 
like low energy prices, over valued exchange rate and tariffs. For 
compensating depletion of oil it is not necessary that investment should 
be domestic only. In Saudi Arabia oil revenues accrue to the 
government. It places more responsibility on the government to pursue 
sound economic and investment policies. The long term official 
1 . Hossein Askari, Saudi Arabia's Economy: Oil and the search for Economic Development, 
Department of Business Administration, George Washington University, p.25 
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objectives of Saudi Arabian government policy since the 1970's have 
been to diversify the economy. And to reduce the kingdom's dependence 
on oil revenues, development of infrastructure, maintaining stable prices 
and promoting sufficient economic growth to ensure the satisfactory 
employment opportunities for all.^ 
Since the 1970's there were major changes in the economy, 
including some degree of diversification, the economic situation 
changed dramatically and oil exports expanded substantially. Royal 
payment and taxes on foreign oil companies increased sharply. Oil 
exporting countries including the kingdom of Saudi Arabia began setting 
and raising oil export prices. Saudi Arabia's revenues per barrel of oil 
quadrupled from US$ 0.22 in 1948 to US$ 0.98 in 1970.^ By 1973, the 
price had reached US$ 1.56 and soared to US$ 10 and further higher in 
1974, following the Arab oil embargo introduced to pressurise the 
Western Backers of Israel during the October 1973 war. 
In 1982 the average export prices per barrel of oil reached well 
above US$ 30.'* Between 1970 and 1980, Saudi oil revenues jumped 
from US$ 4.3 billion to US$ 101.8 billion. The higher oil revenue 
inflow provided Saudi authorities the leverage to make the major 
structural changes in the economy. High growth in oil revenues inflow 
2 . Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Thirty Seventh Annual Report, Riyadh, 2001, 
pp.363-364 
3 . Faud al Farsy, "Saudi Arabia: A Case Study in Development", Middle East Journal, 
London, Stacy International, Vol. 33, No. 3, 1979, pp. 515-516 
4. Ibid. 
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was utilized to build impressive infrastructure with good highways, 
ports and airports and considerable investments in telecommunication, 
electricity industries or urban services.^ Within Saudi Arabia, there has 
been a section apprehensive about the rapid economic transformation. 
While some others mainly from the technocratic elite, were concerned 
about the economic consequences of such a rapid expansion in 
expenditure. One choice facing policy makers in the early 1970's was 
whether to restrict oil production to a level that was adequate to finance 
limited economic and social development. The other choice was to allow 
production at a level that would meet world demand for crude oil.^ 
Choosing a relatively high production level would force a decision on 
whether to use resulting revenues for rapid domestic economic and 
social development or long term investment abroad. There were other 
policy choices. An alternative strategy to keep oil in the ground, except 
for the needed for limited development v*^ as advanced strongly. It was 
argued that this policy would best preserve the countries resources for 
future generations. But decision making process was not always 
transparent. Only one policy seemed to be adopted. That the domestic 
economic policy did not drive oil production and export policies. Faisal 
Ibn Abd Al-Aziz Al-Saud promised to keep oil flowing at moderate 
prices (reasonable), commensurate (corresponding or proportion) with 
5 . Rodney Wilson, The Economic Development in Saudi Arabia, Routledge Curzon, Taylor 
and Francis Group, 2004, p.20 
6. http.7/www.countrystudies.us/Saudi-Arabia/36,html 
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world demand, arguing that the kingdom was dependent on the stability 
and prosperity of consuming nations. As those nations were dependent 
on Saudi oil. Moreover, moderate prices were essential if Saudi Arabia 
wanted to ensure that oil would remain the energy source of choice. 
By the mid 1970's the Saudi government had decided to use most 
of the growing oil revenues for massive development effort. 
Industrialization has been the important part of this effort. It was done 
largely by investing in processing plants that used the countrie's 
hydrocarbon resources. This policy meant at least a decade of very large 
investment to build the plants and the necessary infrastructure.^ It meant 
financing and building the gas-gathering system, the pipe line for gas 
and crude oil to bring the raw material to the two main industrial sites 
i.e. Jubail & Yanbu. The development efforts also included many other 
projects such as the huge and costly airports at Riyadh and Jeddah, 
hospitals, schools, industries and plants, roads and ports. By the mid 
1980's the total massive expenditure on the infrastructure was US$ 500 
billion.' 
The Saudi Arabia's decision to utilize the country's oil and gas 
revenues develop downstream sectors like refineries and petrochemicals 
plants was logical considering the countries' resource endowment. 
There were three factors which motivated such a strategy. 
7 . Business and Economic Development in Saudi Arabia (Washington DC), Saudi Arabia 
Culture Mission, 1996, pp. 183-196. 
8. SAMA Annual Report, 1981. 
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1. Down stream investments were capital intensive which fitted 
Saudi Arabia's small population and large oil revenues. 
2. More value-added income would be extracted and retained, 
thereby maximizing Saudi revenues through the export of more 
refined products instead of crude oil. Thus the natural gas that had 
been largely wasted before the 1980's was to be processed and 
used. 
3. Some Saudi planners saw industrialization as another opportunity 
to widen the sphere of economic activity for foreign and domestic 
private firms. Saudi Arabia invited so many industrial oil 
companies to invest in joint venture in new export refineries built 
in the kingdom during the late 1970's and early 1980's.^ At that 
time there was very urgent need for technology. So, participation 
of international oil companies was considered necessary. Because 
international companies were having more advanced and state of 
the art technologies than Saudi company. ^ ° 
To promote private sector's investment and to support future 
consumption large funds were spent on development program in Saudi 
Arabia. Starting in the mid 1970's the government of Saudi Arabia 
decided that an adequate infrastructure was essential for future 
developmient. This infrastructure included the renovation and building of 
9. http://wvvw.anieinfo.com/165774.html 
10 . SAPIA Annual Report, 1975 
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electricity, water, sewerage, and telecommunication systems. In terms of 
generating and distributing electric power, the government of Saudi 
Arabia assisted private companies building and operating its electricity 
network through concessionary capital loans and continuing operating 
subsidies. Under king Faisal Ibn Abd Al Aziz Al Saud (1964-75) there 
was massive increase in government's spending on education to an 
annual level of about 10 percent of the budget.'' The Saudi planners also 
realized the need for a subsidy programme to supplement direct 
government outlays. The major reason was income distribution. Waiting 
for the oil expenditure to reach these economic and social objectives 
might have generated social tension. Therefore, the government adopted 
a widespread subsidy programme for utilities, fuels, agriculture, social 
services (both private and public), the industrial sector and several 
other areas. Beyond income distribution, the rational of subsidy 
programme was the need to promote non-oil development through cheap 
loans, technical assistance, industrial and agriculture initiatives, and 
preferential buying of domestic product by the government.''^ 
Thus it seems that the strategies from the period of rapid 
development of the mid 1970's to the early 1980's stemmed from the 
11 . Donald M. Moliver and Paul J. Abbondante, The Economy of Saudi Arabia, New York, 
Praeger (CI980) 
12 . Wright, J.W. ed., "Business and Economic Development in Saudi Arabia; Essay with 
Saudi Scholars, Washington D.C., Saudi Arabia Cultural Mission, 1996, p.207 
13 . Middle East Economic Survey, 40(42); 20 Oct, 97, D.1-D.6 
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government willingness to subsidize production, consumption and 
investment. The objectives for subsidization were three fold. 
1. Encouraging non-oil economic activity. 
2. Meeting social goals. 
3. Distributing income. 
Economic Diversification Policy After the 1986 Oil Price Crash: 
The general thrust of Saudi economic policy underwent a 
fundamental change after the oil price crash of 1986. The serious 
depletion of foreign assets, combined with the extensive decline in oil 
revenues, necessiated a revised economic policy. The depreciation of the 
United States dollar in international financial markets also hurt Saudi 
purchasing power abroad. Reappraisal of the development programme 
became necessary. The most urgent task was shoring up government 
finances. Domestic constraint allowed only a few options, especially in 
terms of raising non-oil revenue. 
The Saudi high dependency on oil export as a major source of 
income and exchange earning resulted in a series of external shocks 
during the mid 1980's, when the price of oil fell below ten dollars per 
barrel in 1985.''* This caused the country to experience a severe 
reduction of foreign exchange reserves on which infrastructural 
14. www.Saudiembassy.net 
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development and production depended. As a result the growth rate of the 
economy slowed down since then the chief concern among the Saudi 
Arabia plarmers and policy makers has been : 'what will happen when 
the oil runs out or the world no longer requires it'? Therefore, recent 
development plans have focused on economic diversification as a 
strategy to increase the production capability of non-oil sectors. 
Direction of Major Economic Policies: 
1. Underpinned by the world's largest crude oil reserves 
(accounting for 25% of world's total reserves), Saudi Arabia 
has not only pursued a stable long term economic growth, but 
also implemented policy of diversification into non-oil sectors, 
privatization programme, building Saudi human resource base 
and efforts at attraction of foreign investment. 
2. With an aim to prepare for the era of depleted petroleum 
resources and to transform the economic structure which 
depends on the fluctuating international oil price, Saudi Arabia 
has been strongly pushing ahead with the industrial 
diversification policy. 
3. For some periods Saudi Arabia had been able to reduce the 
share of oil revenue in the nation's Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) by actively nurturing the petrochemical industry and 
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non-oil sectors such as agriculture, manufacturing and 
merchandising. 
Policy of Economic Diversification in 1990's: 
The government's attempt to deal with chronic (record) budget 
deficits, largely through expenditure retrenchment (reduced cost), 
depletion of foreign assets and the sale of development bonds generally 
helped stabilize its financial position by the late 1980's/^ During 1989 
and 1990, economic planners had renewed optimism. New plans were 
made to put the oil and non-oil sectors of the economy on fast track. The 
perceived recovery in international oil consumption and prices provided 
regional policy makers the opportunity to resume spending and promote 
economic growth. As a result, two major initiatives became the basis of 
Saudi economic policy.'^ 
1. Saudi Arabia unveiled plan to raise crude oil production 
capacity to between 10.5 million and 11 million bpd by 1995. 
The restructuring of the General Petroleum and Mineral 
Organisation (Petromin), gave it control over various 
Kingdom's oil refineries. This had been a comprehensive effort 
to promote investment in oil sector. Yet another indication of 
Riyadh's intentions came in 1989, when Saudi Aramco 
15 . Ibid. 
16, http://www.albawaba.com/en/countries/UAE/233866 
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purchased 50% of Star Enterprises in the United States. A joint 
venture with Texaco that indicated Saudi Arabia's pursuit of 
geographically diversified downstream projects. 
2. The government was not eager to continue its increase in fiscal 
expenditures, despite moderately higher oil prices. Military 
outlays, oil capacity, expansion plans, and current expenditure 
accounted for the bulk of total spending and did not permit a 
fiscal boost. However, the non-oil private sector remained 
fully dependent on government spending. The sharp cutbacks 
in capital outlays hindered economic diversification. In light of 
this failure government of Saudi Arabia adopted the above two 
policies to reorient and revive the private sector. 
Oil continued to dominate the Saudi economy accounting for 
three quarters for government revenues, and 90% of export earnings. 
This forced the government to focus almost exclusively upon the 
hydrocarbon sector, to the deterrent of the rest of the economy.' 
Moreover, the government and investment culture favoured the activities 
of huge corporation, rather than encouraging the growth of enterprise 
within the country. Despite this, the government forecasted that the 
budget deficit was to double from $6 billion in 2001 to $12 billion in 
17. Ibid. 
18 . Hossein Askari, Saudi Arabia's Economy: Oil and the search for Economic 
Development, Department of Business Administration, George Washington University, 
1990, p.27 
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2002, with expenditure set at 202 billion riyals and revenues estimated 
at 157 billion riyals. This would match the 1998 deficit when the oil 
prices averaged just over $12 a barrel.'^ This indicates that a growing 
budget deficit has been a catalyst in forcing the government to pursue its 
diversification policies. The chief economist at the National Commercial 
Bank, Said Al Shaikh said "I believe that pressure on reforms will build 
Of) 
up, and the pace of privatization will be faster." The Saudi economy 
continued to make notable progress during 2002. The Gross Domestic 
Product maintained its uptrend. The current account of balance of 
payment v^ as in surplus for the fourth consecutive year. The domestic 
price situation continued to be characterized by market stability. Money 
supply expanded at an accelerated rate along with a high growth rate in 
the non-oil private sector. The banking sector witnessed continuous 
progress and maintaining high efficiency rates in international standard. 
Therefore, the privatization process and economic restructuring of 
several areas of economic and social activities continued during the 
01 
above period. Since the 1970's Saudi Arabia's economy has observed 
notable changes through diversification policy. The government in Saudi 
Arabia, has been successful in maintaining the stable macro economic 
conditions. Which is regarded by many as crucial for any take off into 
19 . SAMA Annual Report, 1999, p.42 
20 . Pike, David, MEED. Special Report, Saudi Arabia, 22 March 1991, pp.16 & 17 
21 . Saudi Arabia: Seventh Five Year Plan (2000-2005), MEES, 43(41), 9 Oct 2000, pp. 
D.1-D.7 
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self sustaining development. The price stability has been prime 
objective of government economic policy. The average rate of inflation 
over the period 1990-96 was only 2.1% annually. Since then there has 
been price stability with falls of 0.6% in 1998 and 1.3%. in 1999, and a 
rise of 1.2% in 2000, and 3.5% in 2003.^^ 
But it would be naive to conclude that government policy has 
failed because Saudi Arabia's economy has not diversified sufficiently 
away from oil dependence or achieved self-sustaining growth. 
Significant achievement has taken place during the period covering the 
seven five years plans introduced and implemented since 1970, most 
notably the provision of infrastructure and urban growth. Macro 
economic activity has been largely achieved with low inflation. 
Government finance has been less satisfactory, and working of the real 
economy have proved disappointing with unimpressive private sector 
performance. Nevertheless, the Kingdom's economy has been 
modernized and the quality of some services such as banking and 
finance has become as good as in many western countries. Although 
provisions for educational facilities could be improved, but has still 
been reasonably good by regional standard. Despite these achievements, 
government policy has failed to ensure that the supply side of the 
domestic economy responds adequately to the demand for an ever 
22 . SAMA Annual Report, Reyadh, 2001, p. 146 
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increasing population. The demographic pressure in the market can turn 
to advantage if domestic market expansion becomes the major engine of 
growth as apposed to simply oil. There are two aspects which indicate 
that objective of diversification was not fully realized. Both of these 
relate to the need to make provision for the period when oil production 
would begin to decline. 
1. The country requires substantial holding of foreign assets to 
provide a long term investment income constituting a buffer 
for the period when income from oil production declines. The 
reserves held at the end of 2004 were lower than they were in 
the second half of the 1970's and through the 1980's. They 
reached the peak of $120 billion in the earlier period, declining 
substantially during the first Gulf War, and standing in 2004 at 
approximately $68 billion. Although the latter figure is 
substantially greater than the $30 billion to which reserves 
sank in the mid 1990's. There has been no sustained efforts 
towards developing a "fund for future generation" capable of 
supporting development in the post oil era. At the end of 2004, 
it was estimated that private Saudi sources held at least $650 
billion in investment outside of the country.^ "^  
23 . TIM-NIBLOCK, Saudi Arabia: Power, Legitimacy and Survival, Routledge Taylor & 
Francis Group London and New York, 2006, pp. 121-122 
24. Ibid. ^ 
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2. Despite governmental attempts to diversify the economy, 
progress made has been inadequate. The oil sector remains 
dominant, just as it was in the mid 1970's. Oil and oil 
derivatives account for 90-95 percent of export earnings and 
constitutes 75 percent of budget revenues, 35-40 percent of 
Grross Domestic Product (GDP). One effect of this had been a 
decline in per capita income, the expansion of GDP did not 
keep pace with population growth. Per capita income reached a 
peak of $ 28,600 in 1981, but in 2004 stood at about $ 9,000.^^ 
The centrality of hydrocarbon based exports, besides putting in 
doubt the economy's long-term viability implies a lack of 
employment opportunities as it is capital intensive. A 
significant part of oil revenues is being used to employ Saudis 
in the public sector. Diversification of the economy would also 
help to limit the economic downturn in times of weak global 
oil prices. 
However, to further understand the policy of diversification in Saudi 
Arabia economy, it would be useful to study the structural dependency 
of Saudi Arabia economy. This is performed by analyzing the structure 
of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for a few selected years. 
25 . SAMA Annual Report, 2005, p.56 
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Table 1 gives the data about Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at 
constant prices by various sectors, whereas Table 2 shows percentage 
share of different sectors i.e. Primary Sector, Secondary Sector and 
Tertiary Sector in Gross Domestic Products of Saudi Arabia. For this 
selected years of the period of 1971 to 2006 has been taken. In the 
initial period the primary sector had the largest share in the Gro 
Domestic Product and the secondary sector had the least share in the 
GDP. The tertiary sector was second most important contributor to the 
GDP in terms of percentage share. The share of primary sector, 
secondary sector and Tertiary sector to the Gross Domestic Product were 
64.95 percent, 11.81 percent and 23.24 percent respectively in 1971. 
The importance of primary sector in terms of percentage in Gross 
Domestic Product declined continuously during 1971 to 2006. The share 
of primary sector in Gross Domestic Product was 64.95% in 1971 which 
declined to 33.03 percent in 2006. The share of secondary sector has 
marginally increased from 11.81 percent in 1971 to 20 percent in 2006. 
Throughout the period from 1971 to 2006 the share of secondary sector 
in the Gross Domestic Product was the least. The tertiary sector has 
increasingly become important contributor to the Gross Domestic 
Product. Its share rose sharply during the one and half decades between 
1971 and 1986. Its share in Gross Domestic Product was only 23.24 
percent in 1971 which rose to 51.71 percent in 1986. 
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The share of tertiary sector has more than doubled during the 
period 1971-1986. But its share in Gross Domestic Product exhibited a 
declining trend since 1991 to 2006. The share of tertiary sector was 
51.71 percent in 1986 which decreased to 46.95 percent in 2006. But 
tertiary sector is still the largest contributor to Gross Domestic Product. 
The tertiary sector has emerged the largest sector to contribute to Saudi 
GDP. 
From table 3 share of oil in total trade and Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) of Saudi Arabia is found. It shows that the total trade of 
Saudi Arabia in 1970 was 14,104 million Riyals, the share of oil in this 
trade was 50.4963 percent. The contribution of oil in total DGP was 
46.63% and the share of trade in total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
was 63.3 percent. In the year 1975 the total trade of Saudi Arabia has 
increased to 119,235 million Riyals, the share of oil in total trade was 
78.40 percent. The share of oil in total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
was 64.27 percent and the contribution of trade in Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) was 73.09 percent in that year. The total trade has 
increased to 463,235 million Riyals in the year 1980. The share of oil in 
total trade was 68.94 percent and the share of oil in Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) was 62.79 percent and the share of trade in Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) was 85.14 percent in that year. The total trade 
had decreased to 185,100 million Riyals in the year 1985. The share of 
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oil in total trade was 47.77 percent & the share of oil in Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) was 28.64 percent and the trade contributed to the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) equal to 49.7 percent in that year. The total 
trade has again increased in the year 1990 amounting to 256,621 million 
Riyals in which the share of oil was 49.97 percent and the share of oil in 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was 36.87 percent and the contribution 
of trade in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was 59.63 percent. The total 
trade has slightly increased amounting to 292,590 million Riyals in the 
year 1995 in which the share of oil was 36.13 percent. The share of oil 
in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was 35.68 percent and the 
contribution of trade in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was 55.62 
percent. The total trade has again increased to 403,793 million Riyals in 
the year 2000. The share of oil in it was 53.10 percent. The share of oil 
in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was 41.48 percent & contribution of 
trade in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was 57.93 percent. The total 
trade slightly decreased to 371,829 million Riyals in the year 2001 in 
which the share of oil was 49.46 percent. The total share of oil in Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) was 37.62 percent & contribution of trade in 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was 54.74 percent. The total trade again 
slightly increased to 392,829 million Riyals in 2002 in which the share 
of oil was 42.28 percent & the share of oil in Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) was 37.66 percent and the share of trade in Gross Domestic 
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Product (GDP) was 56.14 percent. The total trade has increased to 
488,099 million Riyals in 2003 in which the share of oil was 47.32 
percent and the share of oil in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was 41.47 
percent and the share of trade in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was 
61.27 percent. The total trade increased to 640,284 million Riyals in 
2004 in which the share of oil was 51.53 percent and the share of oil in 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was 45.60 percent and the share of trade 
in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was 68.85 percent. The total trade has 
increased to 900,129 million Riyals in 2005 in which the share of oil 
was 56.05 percent, the share of oil in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
was 52.73 percent and the share of trade in Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) was 76.77 percent. The total trade further increased to 1,035,045 
million Riyals in 2006 in which the share of oil was 58.40 percent and 
the share of oil in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was 54.58 percent and 
the share of trade in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was 79.83 percent. 
It shows that the share of oil in total trade and the share of oil in Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) has been more or less stable in this period but 
when we see the share of trade in Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the 
trade has higher share in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the initial 
year upto 1980, after that its share has declined and in the later years 
specially after 2003 the share of trade in GDP has risen again. 
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It is found that total trade of oil has increased in the period from 
1970 to 2006. The share of oil in total trade in the period has been 
fluctuating around 50 percent. The share of oil in Gross Domestic 
Product has been more around 50 percent in the initial period and in the 
last period. This share has been low in the middle period at around 35 
percent. In the same way the share of trade in GDP has been high in the 
initial and last periods, about 60 to 70 percent and it has been low in the 
middle period at about 55 percent. We observe that in the year 1970 the 
trade was 14,104 million Riyals. It increased to 119,235 million Riyals 
in 1975. It has further increased to 463,235 million Riyals in 1980. 
However, it decreased in 1995 and 2001 also. But after that increasing 
continuously reached to 1035045 million Riyals in 2006. 
Economic Diversification in Five Year Plans: 
By the 1960s, Saudi Arabia had made major advances in many 
areas. Road were established, a modern education system introduced, 
health care improved, agriculture expanded and factories built. Although 
the economy largely depended on oil revenues, Saudi authorities 
resolved to bring about basic improvement in the country's economic 
structure. The objective was to diversify the economy away from oil into 
other fields. Achievement of such an economic transformation required 
deliberate planning and careful implementation of a development 
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program with clearly defined objectives. In spite of the oil boom of 1973 
and formation of Central Planning Organization (C.P.O.) in 1965, Saudi 
Arabia follows economic development plans in order to achieve 
diversification and growth. The first development plant was introduced 
in 1970. Thus began a series of five year plans that continues till today. 
This planning process has proved to be crucial in Saudi Arabia's rapid 
and ongoing economic development. 
First Five Year Plan 
The first five year development plan (1970-74) was introduced in 
1970. The first phase of this process involved establishing an 
infrastructure that could support a modern economic base. It included 
the guidelines for systematic action in every field of the Saudi economy. 
Being planned in a time of financial shortage, the plan could not predict 
the revolution in the oil market, which was to take place since 1973. The 
price of light oil jumped from $1.80 per barrel in 1969 to $12.38 in 
1973-74. In the first five year plan 41.2 billion Saudi Riyals were 
granted for expenditure.^^ whereas real spending on various development 
projects reached 34.1 billion Saudi Riyals or US$ 9.1 billion.^^ The 
general objectives of first five year plan according to a report prepared 
by central planning organization were, to institute an economic and 
26 . SAMA Annual Report, 1975, pp. 12-13 
27 Wilson, Flodney; Economic Development in Saudi Arabia, Routledge Curzon, London, 
2004, p,2:i 
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social development policy for Saudi society, in which Islamic and 
religious virtues could be maintained, a rise in the living standards and 
welfare of the people achieved, and which would provide for material, 
economic and social stability. The next stage had been to develop the 
human resources necessary to implement the economic transformation. 
Those objectives were to be achieved by increasing GDP by 10 percent 
per year; developing human resources so that the Saudis would be able 
to replace the foreign skilled manpower required in the initial stages of 
development; diversifying sources of national income and reducing 
dependence on oil, and bringing scientific rationality in the public sector 
programs and integrating activities to ensure coordination. 
During the first three years of implementation of V\ plan, 60 
percent of the funds were spent. The government then realized lacunae 
in the way the funds were allocated. It realized that diversifying the 
sources of national income and the reduction of dependence on oil 
could not be achieved by a 3.6 percent allocation to agriculture, and a 
2.7 percent allocation to industry. As a result a public investment fund 
was established during the 1971-72 fiscal year with an initial budget of 
Saudi Riyals 350 million, with further addition of Saudi Riyals 250 
million in 1972-73 and Saudi Riyals 600 million in 1973-74. The funds 
were planned to be increased every fiscal year until they reached Saudi 
Riyals 2000 million. The basic intention behind the establishment of this 
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fund was to provide financial inducement with government backing in a 
capitalist economy in order to encourage the unwillingness of the 
private sector to invest in industrial and agricultural projects required 
for development. Financial inducement and the backing of the 
government did have an impact on the private sector, but not in the 
direction intended by the plan. 
During the period of the ^^ plan, the agricultural labour force had 
been decreasing by 1 percent per year. This was the result of the 
inflation which caused poverty among the farmers, and the demand for 
labour in the new construction activities. According to the Central 
Planning Organisation (CPO) which probably over stated the actual rate 
of grov/th, agricultural production increased by 3.6 percent, which was 
less than what the plan had aimed for. In the industrial field investment 
by the private sector followed the same course they would have taken if 
the five year plan and the inducement policy had not existed. Only short 
term investments were made, such as real estate, construction and trade 
activities such as exports. Thus the five year plan produced only a group 
of wealthy merchants who were dependent on government expenditure 
for their continuing prosperity. The first five year plan also created a 
boom in the construction sector. Cities and towns witnessed a 
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phenomenal growth in size and density. The decline in rural 
employment forced Saudi's to move to the cities. This, in addition to the 
massive importation of foreign skilled manpower, created a market for 
housing. 
In the era of transportation, the plan's target was largely met 
ahead of the schedule. This was due to the nature of business involved. 
At the same time, transportation expenditures gave more work to 
contractors. Over 500 kilometers of main and secondary roads were 
completed in 1971 and an equivalent, number in 1972. The port of 
Jeddah was finished in 1972. Airports were completed in Medina, Taif, 
Tabuk and Khomus Mouslouf. With respect to the objectives of the first 
five year plan, it is safe to say that by the end of 1974 the plan has 
raised the standard of living and welfare of urban people by providing 
material security, creating new jobs and maintaining economic and 
social stability. But these objectives were not achieved by the means the 
plan had hoped for, diversifying the sources of national income and 
reducing dependence on oil. 
In brief, the first five year plan by the manner in which it was 
implemented, indirectly accelerated the growth of urban areas, creating 
a massive concentration of population in less than ten big cities. At the 
28 . Michael G. Nchme; "Saudi Development Plan between Capitalist & Islamic 
Wa\ue"Middle Eastern Studies, 30(3), July 1994, pp.636-637 
29 . United Nations, ''Survey of Economic & Social Development in the ESCWA Region', 
opcit, p.53 
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same time, it enlarged the size of the middle class and created a new 
type of lower class. By the end of 1975, Saudi's social structure was 
remarkably changed. It was easy to distinguish classes according to their 
social status, profession and the way they earned their living. Finally the 
focus shifted to economic diversification, including the expansion of the 
industrial and agricultural sector. 
The Second Five Year Plan : 
The second five year plan covers the period 1975-80. In the 
second five year plan, the government having increased wealth from 
higher oil revenues, permitted the plan to make a much strong approach. 
At that time there were reasonable doubts as to whether a substantial 
proportion of the $142 billion allocated in the plan would ever be spent. 
Economist expressed concern about the absorptive capacity of the Saudi 
economy." But actual spendings were only $92.6 billion or 347.2 billion 
Saudi Riyals about 10 folds the resources spent during the first five year 
plan.^' 
The second five year plan was more successful than the first plan. 
However, the goals set up in the second plan were not fulllly achieved. 
The $142 billion was over spent in current value terms. The 15 percent 
annual inflation rate anticipated in the second plan was an under 
30. Optic. 28, p.640 
31.0pcit. 27, p.24 
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estimate, since according to Saudi official figure, the rate of inflation 
has exceeded 30 percent since 1977, while in actuality the rate of 
inflation was well in excess of 45 percent. That factor of domestic 
inflation, when combined with the effect of international inflation, gives 
us a clear picture of the difficulties that the second five year plan 
guidelines were facing. The most important characteristics about the 
second plan was the introduction of a framework of ten years and twenty 
years planning to provide a long range perspective for the five year plan. 
This approach was considered by economists as a more appropriate 
method than the first five year plan. The government decided to increase 
its reliance on free enterprise even though the private sector had failed 
to achieve the goals set out in the first five year plan. In the second five 
year plan the Central Planning Organisation (CPO) perceived that OPEC 
was gaining the upper hand, imposing its prices in the oil market. Saudi 
Arabia, being the most powerful in OPEC, with one fourth of the 
world's proven oil resources, made the CPO secure enough to its plan 
for industrial diversification. Saudi Arabia adopted a strategy of 
specialization in resource development designed to maximize natural 
resources in oil and minerals. 
The second plan, covering the period 1975-80 was designed and 
implemented in much more favorable circumstances than its predecessor 
32.0pcit. 21p.D6 
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as a result of the quadrupling of oil revenues between 1973-74. The 
issue was less of one of resource constraint than of the country's ability 
to absorb this new revenue in production investment. The emphasis on 
education and training continued, but ambitions could be scaled up, 
although it was recognized that a doubling of the foreign workers, 
including teachers, would be required. The cornerstone of the plan, 
however, was the creation of two new industrial cities at Jubail and 
Yanbu, where major world class petro-chemicals, steel and aluminium, 
refining and desalinization plants were to be located. 
Awareness of the fact that the government surplus would exceed 
the absorptive capacity of the Saudi economy, led to two decisions: 
1. To limit oil production 
2. To invest enough of the surplus abroad. This was to ensure that 
income from these investments would support the Saudi 
economic growth after the revenues from oil declined. 
The most important feature of the second plan was its emphasis on 
the development of a modern petro-chemical sector based on the 
construction of two huge industrial states, one at Jubail near Dhahran, 
the other at Yanbu on the red sea, complete with water, electricity, 
houses, hospitals and modern ports, and provided with both feedstock 
and energy by twin oil and gas pipelines completed in 1981. These were 
33 . Middle East Economic Digest, July 1985, p. 16 
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then used as a base for a member of enterprises founded and funded by a 
new state organization, Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC, 
founded in 1976). The period of the second plan also saw important 
initiatives which had a more immediate effect on output. It was also the 
use of yet another new organization, The Saudi Industrial Fund (SIDF), 
to encourage the development of private industrial sector through the 
provisions of expertise and long term credit. The second initiative of the 
second plan was the subsidies given to local agricultures to encourage 
the production of wheat and other cereals with the aim of achieving food 
security. These were very effective in the sense that they caused the 
wheat harvest increase fourfold during the 1970s. 
Contrary to what was expected of the first and second 
development plans, the government of Saudi Arabia proved to be a 
dominant moving force in the whole process. The private sector became 
more dependent than ever on government spending, both directly 
through expenditure allocated for infrastructure and industrial projects, 
and indirectly through loan and subsidies. Revenue from crude oil 
export were still what held the state economy and policy together. This 
means that the implementation of the first & second five year plans 
brought Saudi Arabia to the point where any reduction in the country's 
oil production meant a disaster for the Saudi economy and government. 
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The Third Five Year Plan : 
The third five year development plan covers the period 1980-85. 
The aim of the third plan was to promote the role of individual 
initiatives throughout the society, and particularly in the economic life 
of the nation. The plan ever linked the promotion of social values to free 
enterprise and private ownership. 
The objectives of the third plan were as follows. 
1. The government would uphold Islam and will maintain its 
associated cultural value, by applying, propagating and 
fostering God's Sharia. 
2. The defence of the religion and the country should be assured 
as well as the internal security and the social stability of the 
Saudi Arabia. 
3. Government support for free enterprise should continue. 
4. Economic growth should be balanced by developing the 
country's resources, by increasing the income from oil over the 
long term and by conserving depletable resources. 
5. The social well-being of all citizens should be improved and 
economic strength to attain all the other fundamental goals of 
development should be provided. 
6. Dependence on the production of crude oil as the primary 
source of national income should be reduced. 
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7. Human resources through education training and the health 
standards should be developed. 
8. The basic infrastructure required for the attainment of those 
other goals should be completed.^ '* 
The third five year plan was published in the midst of the oil price 
explosion in 1980. Here some of their stated aims were rapidly 
overtaken by events for instance that of preventing the further expansion 
of the foreign labour force. But others such as diversification of the 
economy and the encouragement of the private sector, proceeded more 
or less as planned, althoug'ti at the expense of drawing down reserves 
and a growing budget deficit towards the end of the decades. It is 
difficult to evaluate the total impact of all these new initiatives during 
1980s. Clearly, the expenditure of very large sums of money had created 
the beginning of the state industrial sector, together with an associated 
private sector, heavily dependent upon the state for credit and contracts. 
But as both remained highly subsidized, as well as highly protected from 
competition, there was no way how their products would have fared if 
o r 
sold for profits in the world market. 
Through the third plan, the Saudi government had an over all 
goal, which was to consolidate rather than expand the foreign labour 
force. This was to be achieved by emphasizing capital intensive 
34 . Opcit; 5, p.25 
35 . Faud Al-Farsy, "Modernity and Tradition" Kegan Paul International London and New 
York, 1990, pp. 158-159 
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development in hydrocarbon and other manufacturing industries, in 
agriculture and in mining. The government, under severe pressure from 
the traditionalists decided that its growth targets in the third plan were 
to be constrained by a policy requiring new employment to correspond 
as closely as possible to the domestic availability of new Saudi 
manpower. To be consistent with the general plan of development, the 
third plan included an increased level of expenditure on human resource 
development 
Considering the rate of growth projected in the third plan, the 
employment estimates were inadequate for three reasons. 
1. The projected rate of productivity were extremely high, taking 
into consideration the limited man power provided, especially 
in agriculture, utilities and commerce. 
2. The growth of construction, considering the funds allocated to 
this sector, was unrealistically low. 
3. The Saudi labour force has been only educated and trained. 
This means that it lacks experience. Labour in Saudi Arabia is 
not homogeneous, because of cultural and historical 
constraints. Business international conducted its own research 
and came up with the conclusion that the foreign workforce 
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rose to over 1.2 million in 1985, an annual growth of 3.8 
percent, which is higher than the growth of Saudi population.^^ 
The goals were easy to be achieved, but as the civil service and 
the state sector became ever more obliged to absorb Saudi Arabian 
graduates to create employment, this conflicted with the goal of 
administrative efficiency. Substantial investment in education 
continued, but issues such as the quality of provision were not 
addressed." Under the third plan, manpower development was given the 
highest national priority. Education at the primary, intermediate, 
secondary and university levels was geared to the needs of the society. 
Above, intermediate level, there was to be streaming of the students to 
ensure that sufficient students remained in formal education and that the 
kingdom's requirement for skilled technicians were taken into account. 
The private sector was encouraged to expand training programs and 
government loans were to be made dependent upon the provision of full 
training scheme for Saudi citizens in the project. At the same time, 
Saudi citizens were encouraged, through incentives, to enroll in training 
courses for technical and skilled jobs. Surplus manpower, currently 
employed in areas with limited economic potential, was encouraged to 
move to work in high grov/th sectors of the economy. A special effort 
36, Ibid p.160 
37. Ibid pp.163-164 
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was made, through government sponsored research, to devise plans for 
the most effective use of manpower in general. 
Both the policy of requiring the Saudi private sector to play a 
crucial role in diversifying the Saudi economy and the emphasis on the 
training and use of Saudi manpower indicated the government's 
awareness of the need to involve Saudi citizens as much as possible in 
the future development of their own society. 
Fourth Development Flan : 
The fourth five year development plan covered the period 1985-
90, which also includes the international oil price collapse in 1986. The 
fourth plan was mostly continuation of the principles and policies of the 
third plan. There were four broad themes which characterized and 
differentiated it from third development plan. These were — 
1. A greater concern with the efficiency of operations and uses of 
the Saudi Arabia's resources and facilities, with the discovery 
and development of renewable alternatives. 
2. A strong focus of the diversification strategy on development 
of the producing activities, particularly manufacturing, 
agriculture and finance. 
38. Ibid p.165 
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3. A commitment to reduce the number of foreign labour in Saudi 
Arabia by more than half a million. 
4. A clear cut emphasis on promoting the private sector's 
investment in economic development. 
Objectives of the Fourth Development Plan : 
There were ten objectives of the fourth development plan. These 
were as follows — 
1. To safeguard Islamic values, duly observing, disseminating 
and confirming Allah's Shari'ah. 
2. To defend the faith and the nation and to uphold the security 
and social stability of the country. 
3. To develop human resources thus ensuring a constant supply of 
manpower and upgrading and improving its efficiency to serve 
all sectors. 
4. To raise cultural standards to keep pace with the development 
of Saudi Arabia. 
5. To reduce dependence on the production and export of crude 
oil as the main source of national income. 
6. To continue with the real structural changes in the Saudi 
Arabia's economy through continuous transformation to 
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produce a diversified economic base, with due emphasis on 
industry and agriculture. 
7. To develop mineral resources and to encourage discovery and 
utilization thereof. 
8. To concentrate on qualitative development through improving 
and further developing the performance of the utilities and 
facilities already established during the three development plan 
periods. 
9. To complete the infrastructural projects necessary to achieve 
over all development. 
10. To achieve economic and social integration between the 
member countries of Gulf Cooperation Council. 
The total government expenditure in the fourth development plan 
was set at Saudi Riyal 1,000 billion. Of this Saudi Riyal 500 billion was 
to be devoted to development expenditure. The largest share of 
development expenditure, 27.1 percent, was allocated to human resource 
development, economic resources received 26.1 percent, health and 
social services 17.9 percent, transport and telecommunication 15.4 
percent and municipalities and housing 13.5 percent. The amount 
allocated for the economy and human resources and health and social 
services was more than the actual spending on these sectors during the 
third development plan. The percentage increase ranged between 28.9 
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percent for health and social services, and 8.6 percent for economic 
resources. However, the basic infrastructure allocation was lower. The 
reasons for these were— 
1. Confirmity with the strategic principle that emphasizes 
development of the producing sector. 
2. Most of the infrastructure project has already been completed. 
3. It was expected that project cost would be reduced through the 
implementation of programs concerned with the modification 
of construction specification, reducing the scope of projects 
and through higher competition in the market. 
The number of projects to be completed over the plan period 
totaled 3226 of which 1444 were new, and 1782 under construction and 
scheduled to be completed during the fourth development plan period. 
The budgetary sums envisaged for government expenditure in the 
fourth development plan were not realized. In the year 1985, oil 
production amounted to an average of only 3.565 million barrels of oil a 
day, compared with almost 10 million barrel a day in 1980-81. Revenues 
from oil had fallen from SR 361,000 million in the year 1980-81 to SR 
90,000 million in the year 1985-86. Despite budgetary restrictions, the 
fourth development plan provided firm guidelines for the 
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implementation of government policies in all areas of the Saudi Arabia 
economy.''^  
It is difficult to evaluate the total impact of all these new 
initiatives as of the year 1S'90. Clearly the expenditure of very large 
sums of money had created the beginning of a state industry sector 
together with an associated private sector heavily dependent upon it for 
credit and contracts. But as both remained highly subsidized, as well as 
highly protected from foreign competition, there is no way to assess 
how efficient they had been and how their products would have fared if 
sold for profits in the world market. 
During the period of the third and fourth development plans in the 
1980s the oil revenues position was much less satisfactory and funds to 
finance investment had to be cut and ambitions scaled down. Hence, 
there was more emphasis on consolidation and on completing existing 
projects rather than on new ventures. The theme of economic 
diversification and human resource development continued, but stress 
was laid on increased economic and administrative efficiency and the 
development of other minerals besides oil, although little progress was 
made on the latter. 
39 . Opcit. 27, pp.25-26 
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The Fifth Development Plan : 
The fifth five year plan covers the period 1990-95. The 
completion of the infrastructure and many industrial agricultural 
development projects, together with the downturn in oil revenues, 
having reinforced the shift in strategy had been clearly discernible in the 
fourth development plan. Apart from the preservation of Islam defense 
of the kingdom and education of the citizenry, the emphasis now was 
firmly on encouraging the private sector to build up on the economic 
foundation laid by government. 
The objectives of the fifth development plan in Saudi Arabia were 
defined as follows — 
1. To preserve Islamic value, duly observing, promulgating and 
confirming Allah's Shari'ah. 
2. To develop human resources, thus ensuring a constant supply 
of manpower, and upgrading and improving its efficiency to 
carry out the requirement of national economy. 
3. To raise cultural and informational standard to keep pace with 
Saudi Arabia's development. 
4. To reduce dependence on the production and export of crude 
oil as the main source of national income. 
5. To continue with real structural changes in the Saudi Arabia 
economy through continuous transformation to produce a 
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diversified economic base with due emphasis on industry and 
agriculture. 
6. To concentrate on qualitative development through improving 
and further developing the performance of the utilities and 
facilities. 
7. To continue with encouraging the private sector participation 
in social and economic development. 
8. To achieve balanced development between the different 
regions of Saudi Arabia. 
9. To complete the infrastructural projects necessary to achieve 
over all development. 
10. To achieve economic and social integration between the Arab 
Gulf Cooperation Council countries.'**^ 
In the fifth plan the emphasis was on continuation, but again the 
planners reiterated the familiar calls for greater economic diversity, an 
enhanced role for the private sector, investment in education and the 
creation of more employment for Saudis. Investment in education could 
have been increased if, say defense spending had been reduced, but the 
later was outside the kingdom of the plans even though it accounted for 
over one-third of the government spending. 
40 . Opcit. 29 pp.55-56 
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By the late 1990s it was apparent that the ministry of planning 
was becoming increasingly ineffective and that reform of economic 
management was needed to ensure at least a degree of coordination 
between spending ministries, if not their political control. Although it 
would have been a mistake to characterize the kingdom as experiencing 
an economic crisis, unemployment was rising, especially among the 
youth, an increasing amount of government revenues was simply being 
used to service debt, and the economy did not seem to be heading in any 
clear direction. The flight of capital continued, there was little foreign 
investment,, and the various joint venture arrangements dating from the 
1970s involving overseas involvement in the banking sector and SABIC 
seemed to be fossilized. 
There has been some economic vision back in the 1970's, with the 
planning of the new industrial cities in Jubail and Yanbu and the 
implementation of major infrastructure schemes, as well as the spread of 
schools and hospitals throughout Saudi Arabia. But by the late 1990's 
the government seemed to have stalled and there was drift in economic 
management, which subsequently led to the formation of Supreme 
Economic Council.'*^ 
41 . SAGIA - Economic Strategy and Plans, 2005 
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The Sixth Five Year Plan : 
The implementation of the country's sixth five year plan's (1995-
2000) emphasis had been placed on the expanding role of the private 
sector. At that time the emphasis on the role of the private sector can be 
explained by — 
(a) The need of economic diversification to lessen the 
current heav;/ dependency on the oil sector in economic 
development, 
(b) The need to reduce the vulnerability of the domestic 
economy to external economic shocks reflected in 
particular in the fluctuation in oil prices and revenues. 
(c) The need to increase gross domestic investment by 
fuelling additional private sector investment to the gross 
domestic investment including the foreign private sector 
investment. 
The Saudi economy taking into consideration the massive 
opportunities it provides, together with the application of conducive and 
stable macro-economic policy also provides stable institutional and 
regulatory frame work. There is at the same time a great potential for the 
expansion of the private sector investment, and hence, its role in the 
economy. The need for huge investment to expand the infrastructure 
sector and exploit the country's huge mineral reserves, provides both 
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incentive and encouragement for substantial increase in the role of the 
private sector in the economy. The adoption of new law and regulations, 
particularly the new investment law on the one hand, and the opening up 
of new economic sector to the participation of the private investment on 
the other hand would boost the share of the private sector in the 
economy. This share is already substantial in non-oil sector and with 
opening up of the energy and mineral sectors will boost this contribution 
in the economy as a whole. 
The private sector plays an important role in the non-oil economy 
which is also significant for employment generation in the kingdom. The 
share of private sector in the employment is even higher than its share in 
Gross Domestic Product. During 1995-2000 period its share in 
employment rose slightly from 88.1 percent to 88.3 percent. Further 
more the private sector accounted for 95 percent of employment 
generated during the period of 1995-2000. This high share stems from 
the fact that the non-oil sector, where the private sector has a major 
share, accounted for 99.2 percent of total employment in Saudi Arabia 
during the period 1995-2000. The share of oil related activities in total 
Saudi employment was less than one percent during the same period. 
The Supreme Economic Council was set up during the six plan 
period, largely because the oil prices falls of 1998 and their economic 
impact brought development issues higher up in the political agenda. 
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The remit of the Supreme Economic Council includes 
responsibility not only for development planning but also for fiscal and 
trade policy. This enables it to survey both short-term economic 
management and long-run strategy and also to focus on imbalances in 
both internal budgetary and external payments. The aim is also to design 
new policies, of which the most notable during its first two years of 
operation were the new law on foreign investment and the establishment 
of both the General Investment Authority and the Human Resource 
Development Fund. 
The Seventh Five Year Plan : 
The Supreme Economic Council also had some input into the final 
drafting of the seventh five year plan that covers the period 2000-2005, 
although a great deal of the content had been written before hand. 
Targets in the original drafts of the seventh plan were revised upwards 
as the planners became more confident, with oil revenues exceeding 62 
billion dollars in 2000, almost double of the 32 billion dollar original 
forecast, and with the surplus on the current account of the balance of 
payment rising to 21 billion dollars. The seventh plan provided a detail 
list of macro-economic objeotives and much information on goals set for 
each sector of the economy. 
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The seventh five year plan was approved by the Council of 
Ministers in September 2000. It was hoped that 817,000 additional jobs 
could be provided by 2005. Initially, with the budget in surplus, thanks 
to higher oil prices, the plan looked to have much more chances of 
success than either the fifth or sixth. The target in the seventh plan 
looked ambitious given the performance of the Saudi Arabian economy 
in 1990s, but by 2000 they seemed quite modest and conservative. The 
planned target was for real GDP growth to average 3.16 percent over the 
period 2000-2005; but the growth in 2000 exceeded 15 percent. With the 
higher prices of that year the ambitious investment target also seemed 
more attainable, as the plan envisaged an average investment growth of 
6.85% annually and the share of investment in GDP rise from 22.7 
percent to 25.4 percent. The petroleum revenue windfall of 1999-2000 
proved a mixed blessing as it reduced the pressures on the government 
for economic reform. Although there was much discussion of the new 
investment laws introduced in the 2000, permitting the foreign 
ownership of new industrial ventures in many fields. Reforms aimed at 
attracting external involvement can be no substitute for domestic 
reforms. The seventh plan discussed privatization policy, but in very 
general terms rather than providing a list of activities to be privatized. 
There was no discussion of how privatization was to be achieved. 
137 
Eight Five Year Plan : 
The eight five year plan covers the period 2005-09. This plan 
represents the major landmark in the social and economic development 
path of Saudi Arabia, as it is the first five year plan prepared in the 
context of a long-term development strategy with definite targets and 
objectives. The 8th development plan aims to support the efforts of the 
private sector and its contribution to diversification of the economic 
base as well as increasing the future role of this sector in the production 
activities through development of the institutional and organizational 
framework. The objectives of the 8^*^  five year plan are as follows— 
1. To safeguard Islamic teaching and values, enhance national 
unity, uphold the social stability. 
2. To continue improving the services provided to Hajj and 
Umrah performers so as to facilitate performance of religious 
rites with ease. 
3. To raise the standard of living, improve the quality of life and 
provide job opportunities to citizens by accelerating the 
development process, increasing the rate of economic growth 
along with ensuring enhancement in the quantity and quality of 
education, health and social services. 
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4. To develop human resources, upgrade their efficiency and 
increase the supply of manpower to meet the requirement of 
the national economy. 
5. To diversify the economic base with due emphasis on 
promising areas such as manufacturing industries, particularly 
energy and related derivatives, as well as mining, tourism and 
information technology industries. 
6. To enhance the private sector's participation in socio-
economic development. 
7. To develop the science and technology system, pay attention to 
information, support and encourage scientific research and 
technology development with a view to enhance the efficiency 
of the Saudi economy. 
8. To protect the environment and develop suitable system in the 
context of sustainable development requirement.^' 
The objectives of the 8 development plan of Saudi Arabia were 
based on the following strategy. These were — 
(a) Increase the share of Saudi manpower in total 
employment in various sectors and pay attention to 
upgrade their efficiency and productivity to the level of 
non-Saudi manpower. 
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(b) Expand the provision of healthcare and social welfare 
service to the entire population. 
(c) Develop all relevant aspects of education and training 
system. 
(d) Improve the quality of public services and increase their 
supply in line with the growing needs of the population. 
(e) Continue to pay attention to prepare a climate conducive 
to boost private sector participation in the socio-
economic development. 
(f) Adopt a population policy that takes into consideration 
the quantitative and qualitative aspects of the population 
and their geographical distribution, and enhance the 
correlation between population variables and direction 
of sustainable development. 
(g) Continue with the process of administrative development 
and creation of a regulatory environment conducive to 
economic development and efficiency. 
(h) Adopt fiscal and monetary policies that contribute to 
accelerating economic growth, realizing a higher 
employment level and enhancing economic stability. 
Finally the S^^ development plan strategy of Saudi Arabia was to 
promote integration among the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries and 
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strengthen the relation of Saudi Arabia with Arab, Islamic and friendly 
countries as well as international economic blocks. 
Over all development strategy stems from the recognition that 
sustainable long-term development requires a reduced dependence on 
the exploitation of depletable crude oil resources as the main source of 
national income. Thus each development plan put a high priority on 
establishing other strong economic sectors, and diversified income 
sources to meet the need of a rapidly growing population. 
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Petrochemical Industries: Problems & 
Prospects 
The term 'petrochemical' has been defined in many ways: Albert 
V. Hahn most appropriately defined petrochemicals as consisting of all 
those chemical products which are derived for petroleum factors and by 
products or for natural gas constituents.' A petrochemical industry 
accordingly is related to that segment of the chemical industry whose 
products are obtained from petroleum or natural gas hydrocarbons and 
utilized in chemical markets. It enjoys a dominant position in the 
chemical industry just for the reason that raw materials of high purity 
are abundantly available at low cost. The petrochemical industry 
produces chemical products that are derived mainly from petroleum or 
natural gas. Petrochemical are mainly organic in nature. They contain 
carbon compounds in combination with hydrocarbon, oxygen, nitrogen 
and other elements. These are differentiated from inorganic compounds 
or mineral organic which contain elemental carbon, its oxide, metal 
carbonates and sulphides. Organic chemicals are also derived, though in 
1 . Albert V. Hahn, The Petrochemical Industry: Market and Economics, (New York; 
McGrawHill 1970), p. 1 
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small quantities, from coal, synthetic fuels and biomass. The raw 
material from which petrochemicals are derived are called feed 
stock/hydrocarbons. 
In general primarily petrochemical (first derivatives materials 
produced directly from feed stock, which principally consist of various 
aromatic and olefin compounds and methanol, ammonia and carbon 
blacks) and intermediate petrochemicals (i.e. second derivatives 
materials which principally consist of various aromatic/cyclic and 
aliphatic/acyclic compounds) fall between petroleum or natural gas and 
finished products. The end products or finished products are the 
petrochemical products which are third or higher derivatives materials 
from which a great variety of products are made like plastic materials, 
synthetic rubber, synthetic fibres etc. 
Organic chemical as pointed out by Prof. Al-Wattari, dominate 
90 percent of total world out put produced from petroleum hydrocarbons 
(such as naphtha, refinery gases, natural gas, NGL and fuel oil). For 
specific reasons, petrochemical include few inorganic chemicals such as 
(ammonia 80% of world ammonia production is derived from petroleum 
sources mainly natural gas) sulphur and carbon blacks.^ 
Industrialization plays an important role in the development 
process of a country. For oil based economy, its significance became 
2 . Abdul Aziz- Al-WaUari, Oil Downstream: Opportunities, Limitations and Policies, 
(Safat: OAPEC, 1980), p.30 
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more pronounced in view of heavy dependence of these economies on a 
single resource i.e. oil which is also non-renewable in nature. The term 
oil based economy indicates those developing countries where the share 
of oil production in Gross Domestic Product and total export is very 
high. The growth of these economies has become so much dependent on 
the oil revenues that even a marginal reduction can cripple down their 
whole economic structure. Saudi Arabia embarked on a long term 
industrial planning to develop capital intensive hydrocarbon based 
industries, in which the country had potential comparative advantage. 
The industrial planning of Saudi Arabia considered petrochemical 
industry as a leading sector, Since the size of the domestic market was 
not sufficient enough, petrochemical industries was to be established 
mainly to carter to the export market. It was expected that the export 
oriented hydrocarbon-based petrochemical industries would diversify 
the economic structure and reduce the exclusive dependency of the 
country on oil exports. It was believed that the industrialization process 
would involve full utilization of indigenous productive resources and 
would generate forward and backward linkages. Through 
industrialization programme a multi-pronged strategy was adopted to 
overcome the shortcomings and optimally utilize the favourable factors 
to achieve its goal of structural transformation, from export of crude oil 
3 . Masood Rashid ''Industrialization in oil based Economy ABC Publication House, New 
Delhi, 1984, p.2 
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to petrochemical products. The aim of industrial planning policy to 
develop a diversified economic base is well reflected from the allocation 
pattern. The industrial sector is one T)f the most critical system in the 
third development plan of Saudi Arabia. The basic industries, especially 
in the field of petrochemicals, represents one of the most important 
cornerstones in the industrialization process and the economic structure 
of Saudi Arabia. 
The objectives of petrochemical industries in Saudi Arabia were 
the following -
(1) To increase the industrial sector's contribution to the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) and the diversification of national 
economy. 
(2) To promote industrialization base on locally available raw 
materials (oil & natural gas) and to diversify the industrial 
production, through more intensive development of upstream 
and downstream industries. 
(3) To develop economic linkages between the industrial sector 
and other producing sectors. 
(4) To add value to our abundant hydrocarbon resources. 
(5) To reduce the dependence of the economy on the oil sector. 
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(6) To support and promote transfer of modern technology in joint 
venture industrial projects through the foreign capital 
investment regulation. 
Saudi Planning for petrochemical industry was performed by -
(a) Saudi Aramco, who designed, built and operates the 
Kingdom's master gas system, which has the capacity 
to process nearly 130 million cubic meters per day of 
natural gas. 
(b) The establishment of Saudi Basic Industries 
Corporation in 1976 which has been a milestone in 
the kindom's development of a viable basic and 
downstream petrochemical and supporting industries 
which utilize the local resources of hydrocarbon and 
minerals, as a raw materials. 
(c) Construction of the twin industrial cities of Jubail 
and Yanbu, now strategic sites for hydrocarbon based 
and energy intensive industries, setting a production 
chain of secondary and downstream industries using 
their outputs as raw materials. 
(d) Construction of King Fahad Industrial Port at Jubail 
and Yanbu. 
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Characteristics of Saudi Arabia's petrochemical industries are as 
follows. 
(1) Use of local feed stocks especially natural gas. 
(2) Joint venture with major oil and chemical companies. 
(3) World scale plants utilizing latest technology. 
(4) Large scale production of upstream petrochemicals, mainly 
ethylene derivatives based on ethane crackers. 
In 1960 the Saudi government was already negotiating with 
foreign oil companies concerning the development of petrochemical 
industries. Since these companies showed little interest, other ways had 
to be found to attract investment. In 1962 the General Petroleum and 
Mineral Organization (Petromin) was established precisely to undertake 
hydrocarbon projects that did not attract private investors. Sate support 
for industrialization increased when Faisal Ibn Abd Al Aziz Al Saud 
ascended the throne in 1964.'* The desire of the government to press 
forward with the development of the petrochemical industries was 
underlined in 1976, when the Saudi Arabian Basic Industries 
Corporation (SABIC) was created with Dr. Ghazi A Algosaib (The 
minister of industry and electricity) as Chairman of the board, and 
Abdul Aziz A. Al-Zamil as Chief Executive Officer. The SABIC was 
established in September 1976 with an authorized capital of 10 million 
4 . EI Maliakh, Ragaei and EI Mallakh Dorothea (eds), Saudi Arabia: Energy 
Developmental Planning & Industrilization, Lexington, Lexington Books, 1982, p.204 
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Saudi Riyals, with the objective of implementing the basic industries in 
Saudi Arabia. The industrial project that SABIC has been implementing 
include petrochemical complexes, methanol «fe fertilizer plants and iron 
& steel mills. The feed stock and fuel for all the projects was to be 
supplied through an integrated gas supply system which would gather 
associated gas then being flared. The gas system, considered the 
backbone of the industrialization programme is being implemented by 
the Saudi Government in cooperation with Petromin and Aramco.^ A 
joint venture company was set up by SABIC and the foreign partner. 
Financing arrangement for the project were secured through the public 
investment fund of the Ministry of Finance and National Economy in 
Saudi Arabia. The ratio is that 60 percent comes from fund, 10 percent 
secured from commercial banks and remaining 30 percent comes from 
partner's equity. With such an arrangement, SABIC has the ability to 
implement and realize industrial projects costing several times its 
authorized capital. 
The criteria that a foreign partner had to meet included his ability 
to provide know-how in the related industry, a good record of operation, 
the ability and willingness to train Saudi Manpower, and the capability 
of handling and marketing products of the joint venture company. 
5 . Herman Franssen, " Energy Demand and Supply in 1980s" Journal of Energy and 
Development, Vol. 06, No. 2, Spring 1981, pp.217-218 
148 
The industrial projects were subjected to very severe scrutiny by 
SABIC and the Saudi government to ensure that such projects were 
economically viable. These projects provided the necessary requirement 
of industrialization in terms of creating value added to natural resources 
of the country. Saudi Arabia's strategy for industrialization has been 
built up on two important factors: The need to utilize the vast amount of 
gas which has been flared for many years and the need to lessen the 
impact on Saudi people when crude oil supply begins to decline. 
"Through integrated industrialization and with technical and managerial 
competence, we will provide our people with the tools to develop other 
resources in various economic sector". The interdependence of oil and 
petrochemical industries has been a natural phenomena especially in 
areas which possess abundant liquid and gaseous raw materials. The 
question may be asked why there has been a delay in the implementation 
of such industrial projects in Saudi Arabia. The explanation lies in a 
series of economic factors, which at first worked against any attempt to 
industrialize, but in time were either out weighted by other factors. In 
noting such factors, it should be kept in mind that the following are 
listed as a classification and by no means should be considered 
exhaustive. 
6 . Abdul Aziz Al-Zamil, "The Petrochemical Industry in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia", 
Journal of Energy and Development, Vol-16, No. 1-2, 1980-81, p.206 
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(a) The shortage of energy resources began in 1970's. 
The ensuing crude price increase boosted oil 
producer's revenues and enabled them to accumulate 
sufficient capital not previously available to 
undertake major investment. 
(b) Rising hydrocarbon prices had made it economical to 
recover large quantities of gas which were previously 
flared in the oil fields. 
(c) The demand for energy attracted oil companies to 
Saudi Arabia because of its abundant crude reserves. 
(d) The moderate policies of Saudi Arabia have proved 
to be attractive to the foreign investors. 
(e) With the needed funds available, the Saudi 
government has been able to plan and to develop the 
infrastructure needed for this industrialization. 
"Jubail and Yanbu, Avhere most of our projects will be located, are 
planned as to large and modern industrial cities. All the infrastructural 
support m terms of ports, extensive communication network, housing, 
hospitals, training facilities, recreational and other facilities to make the 
7 . Ibid. P..207 
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life of the inhabitants attractive and to maintain our historical and 
cultural values."^ 
Increasing difficulties faced by international chemical companies 
due to uncertain long term availability of feed stock and their ever 
increasing prices, coupled with the internal advantage in Saudi Arabia, 
the availability of reasonably priced gaseous raw materials have led to 
the decision to undertake these industrial projects. 
In implementing its industrialization programme, SABIC formed 
eight joint venture companies. Saudi Petrochemical Company (SADAF), 
a joint venture undertaken by SABIC and Pecten Arabia Limited (Saudi 
Arabian Company) to built a complex at Jubail to utilize two of the 
Kingdom's basic resources - gas and salt. This petrochemical facility 
includes vv^ orld scale plant for the manufacture of 656,000 metric tones 
per year of ethylene, 295,000 metric tones per year of styrene, 281,000 
metric tones per year of crude industrial ethanol, 454,000 metric tones 
per year of ethylene dichloride and355,000 metric tones per year of 
caustic soda. This complex came into production by early 1985.'° A 
portion of the ethylene product will be utilized by an adjacent 
petrochemical plant. 
A! Jubail Petrochemical Company (KEMYA), a joint venture 
company owned in equal shares by BASIC and Exxon Chemicals, built a 
8 . Ibid. pp.208-208 
9 . Ibid. p.209 
10 . Saudi Arabia .• Third Development Plan 1980-85, p.ll6 
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plant to produce 260,000 metric tones per year of linear low density 
polyethylene at Jubail. Ethylene as a primary feed stock was provided 
by an adjacent petrochemical complex. The production of this plant 
began in early 1985. Saudi Yanbu Petrochemical Company (YANPET) 
is a joint venture company owned equally by SABIC and Mobile Oil 
Company, located in Yanbu on the west coast of Saudi Arabia. This 
venture constructed a complex with an annual production capacity of 
450,000 metric tones per year of ethylene, 220,000 metric tones per year 
of ethylene glycol, 200,000 metric tones per year of linear low density 
polyethylene, and 90,000 metric tones per year of high density 
polyethylene. ^ 
Two joint venture companies to produce methanol in Jubail have 
been established. The Saudi Methanol Company is a venture between 
SABIC and Japanese Consortium, and National Methanol Company is a 
venture between SABIC and Celanese-Texas Eastern; the production 
capacity has been 600,000 metric tones per year and 650,000 metric 
tones per year per day of chemical grade methanol, respectively. 
Al Jubail Fertilizer Company (SAMAD) is a joint venture formed 
between SABIC and Taiwan Fertilizer Company, located in Jubail. 
Production had been started in 1983 with an annual capacity of 500,000 
metric tones of urea from methane gas. Also in Jubail the Arabian 
11 Saudi Arabia Third National Development Plan (1980-85), Hightlights released by the 
Ministry of Planning, Riyadh, Middle East Economic Digest (London) Vol-24 No 45 
7, Nov. 1980, p.8 , , . , 
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Petrochemical company (PETROKEMYA) is a joint venture between 
SABIC and Dow Chemical (German Company). This company produced 
500,000 metric tones per year of ethylene, 80,000 metric tones per year 
of linear low density polyethylene, and 70,000 metric tones per year of 
high density polyethelene. 
Eastern Petrochemical Company (SHARQ) is a joint venture 
between SABIC and the Japanese Consortium of SPDC Ltd. located in 
Jubail. This project produces annually 300,000 metric tones of ethylene 
glycol and 130,000 metric tones of linear low density polyethylene. The 
ethylene feed stock for SHARQ was supplied by PETROKEMYA. 
SABIC petrochemical products can be classified into five main 
group of products namely: basic chemicals, fertilizers, polymers, 
intermediate products, metals. SABIC has also its modern research and 
development complex. This complex has undertaken a broad range of 
research and development activities and technical services to maximise 
SABIC's technological capabilities in supporting customers. It also 
supports environmental and industrial health services. 
12 . Based on data in OPEC Annual Statistics Bulletin, Vienna, 2002, p. 114 
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Investment Opportunities in the Petrochemical Industries in 
Saudi Arabia 
The petrochemical industries in Saudi Arabia have been based on 
local feedstocks including ethylene, propylene, methanol, isobutylene. 
The projects on steam can be classified as follows -
(1) Projects based on ethylene : Alpha olefins, ethylene oxide, 
ethanolamines. 
(2) Projects based on Propylene : Propylene oxide, acrylonitrile 
(AN), phenol, acrylic fibres, actone. 
(3) Projects based on methanol : acetic acid, vinyl acetate. 
(4) Projects based on Benzene : Caprolactan, nylon. 
(5) Projects based on Isobutylene : Methyl, methacrylate, 
butylated hydroxyte luene, isoprene. 
(6) Projects based on orthoxylene : Phthalic anhydride 
The production of Phthalic anhydride and acetic acid is based on 
the availability of menthol. This acid can be used together with ethylene 
to produce vinyl acetate, which is utilized in household paints and 
adhesives. 
Petrochemical depending on iso-butene : As the Kingdom is one 
of the main exporting countries of liquified petroleum gas (LPG), it 
planned to utilize this resource to produce Methyl Tertiary Ether 
(MTBE). Since the intermediate material used for producing methyl 
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tertiary butyl is isobutene, it may also be used to produce several other 
petrochemical materials. 
All the SABIC petrochemical joint venture companies are owned 
equally by SABIC and the foreign partners. The Saudi Arabia's 
industrialization programme is based on a sound footing. Each partner 
had been carefully selected in each instance and thus the partner's 
history and past record as to proven technical achievements, marketing 
and sales strategy were very carefully reviewed. 
Virtually all petrochemical plants at the Saudi Industrial Cities of 
Jubail and Yanbu are raising capacity or having their production streams 
diversified. These plants are mostly joint venture between Saudi Arabia 
Basic Industries Corporation and foreign companies. By 2000 their total 
production capacity reached 3.0 million tones per year, from 2.37 
1 ^ 
million tones per year in 1997 and 2.2 million tones per year in 1995. 
New projects on stream beyond 2000 included three world-scale 
ethylene cracker units. 
SAE5IC has been expanding its capacity for more than two 
decades. Its further growth will reinforce the Saudi position as the 
biggest producer and exporter of petrochemical in the Middle East and 
as increasingly important player at the global level. SABIC accounts for 
over 7 percent of world petrochemical production. 
13 . SABIC, "Potential Realished SABIC", Riyadh, 2001, p.l 
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In early 1997, Saudi Arabia became the biggest exporter of 
oxygenates in the world, with its capacity to produce methyle tertiary, 
butyl ether rising to nearly 3.2 million tones per year from 2.5 million 
tones per year in 1996. When it accounted for 13 percent of the world 
output. Now its (methyl tertiary butyl ether) production is much higher. 
SABIC operates 17 plants producing more than 45 kinds of 
petrochemicals and other products. It is owned 70 percent by the state of 
Saudi Arabia, 20 percent by the Saudi private sector and 10 percent by 
The growth strategy of SABIC through the 1990's has focused on 
two basic aims -
(1) To raise capacity so that exports are increased while domestic 
demand is met. 
(2) To keep adding new petrochemicals to its production. A 
further strategic objective is to develop SABIC production 
capacity outside Saudi Arabia with Asia in priority. 
SABIC Expansion Plan 
China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation and Saudi Basic 
Industries Corporation signed an agreement towards forming a joint 
venture company. This 50-50 equal share joint venture company will 
14 . www.allbusiness.com/mining/oil/gas/petrochemical/saudi araia 
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invest in a 1 mtpa of ethylene derivatives complex (600,000 mta of 
• polyethylene and 400,000 mta of glycol) to be set up in Tianjin that will 
receive all its ethylene feed stock from an ethylene cracker owned by 
Tianjin Petroleum Company, a branch of Singapore Corporation. The 
total investment will be around IS$ 1.7 bn, with the complex scheduled 
to be completed by September 2009.'^ 
A joint venture between SABIC and Al-Kayan (Saudi Arabian 
Company), include a 2 mtpa ethane/butane crackers, including benzene 
extraction facilities, a 700,000 tpa polyethylene plant; a polypropylene 
plant with capacity of at least 350,000 tpa and a 530,000 tpa ethylene 
glycol unit.'^ 
SABIC and Exxon - Mobile announced recently that they have 
begun work on a feasibility study to define a potential project that would 
grow their two joint petrochemical ventures at Yanbu and Jubail. The 
project targeted domestic supply of carbon black and rubber and 
thermoplastic specially polymers to serve emerging local and 
international market. 
SABIC has indicated that it will invest US$ 5 bn in a new joint 
venture project in China. Investment might include setting up production 
units for ethylene, polyethylene and glycol at a cost ranging between 
US$ 3 bn & US$ 5 bn. 
15 . www.sabic.com/en/products/metals.htm 
16 . www.sabic.com/products/polymers.htm 
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Saudi Arabia Basic Industries Corporation has signed a contract 
with German contractor to built a high density polyethylene plant at its 
production site in Gelsenkirchen, Germany. The plant will have 
production capacity of 250 kt/year, replacing as existing 100 kt/year 
plant. 
Saudi European Petrochemical Company, a subsidiary of the 
SABIC avv'arded Samsung Engineering Company Ltd., South Korea, a 
contract for the construction of 500,000 tones per annum polypropylene 
plant. The Plant was erected at the IBN ZAHR Complex in Al-Jubail, 
Saudi Arabia. The Saudi Petrochemical Company (SADAF) already 
running the world's single largest conventional production site at Al-
Jubail, plans to build a third world scale plant, boosting styrene 
production by over 60% making it the world's largest single complex 
styrene. The Saudi Methanol Company (Al-RAZI) is part way through 
its fifth expansion project, Al-RAZI's offering an annual capacity of 1.7 
mt per annum of methanol. 
SAEUC has been on a major expansion drive. Its total capacity is 
stated to increase from 43 mt/a in 2004 to 64 mt/a by 2008. To reach 
these targets, SABIC has expanded aggressively both domestically and 
internationally. At present the sector is dominated by Saudi Basic 
Industries Corporation (SABIC) which accounts for 95 percent of the 
domestic petrochemical output. However, private investment in the 
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petrochemical sector has also been expanding. By 2010 SABIC's share 
of domestic petrochemical production is likely to decline to 75 percent. 
The private sectors investment in this sector is expected to increase to 
Saudi Riyal 154 bn during 2004-09. 
A big number of private petrochemical industries have emerged as 
satellites for the major plant of the state controlled Saudi Arabia Basic 
Industries Corporation. The plants producing basic petrochemicals has 
been joint ventures between SABIC and major foreign firms. The Saudi 
Venture Capital Group (SVCG) comprises 47 key Saudi businessmen. 
Saudi Venture Capital Group is a 50-50 venture with Chevron which has 
a world scale aromatic complex built in Jubail. It is the first big private 
Saudi venture in the aromatics business. It was completed for test 
operation in April 1999 and inaugurated m February 2000. It can turn 
480,000 tones per year of benzene, which is partly being used to 
produce 220,000 tones per year of cyctohexane a feed stock to make 
plastic and 70,000 tones per year of gasoline. 
Saudi Arabia, a significant global producer of commodity 
petrochemicals, increased its position in the global market due to five 
growth strategies.'^ 
(1) Diversifying the product portfolio, 
(2) Establishing more joint ventures with industry majors 
17 . Saudi Industry, " Special Repor", Middle East Economic Digest f, Nov. 1984, p.8 
18 . Oil and Gas Journal, Jan 2, 2001, p.36 
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(3) Placing great emphasis on research and development 
(4) Endorsing a large role for private sector 
(5) Diversifying in to downstream operations 
Investment in Saudi petrochemical industry have so far been 
heavily concentrated in the methanol and ethylene product chains. The 
primary reason is that petrochemical producers in Saudi Arabia have 
access to low cost feed stock (methane and ethane), which provides 
them with substantial cost advantage, this makes them highly 
competitive in export market. 
Although increased demand for methanol, ethylene, polyethylene 
and ethylene glycol continues unabated in Saudi Arabia. There is 
mounting pressure on petrochemical producers to consider new 
products. Before 1994 all the steam crackers in Saudi Arabia were fed 
with 100 % ethane. Thereafter and due to limited ethane availability, 
most cracker projects have been allocated mixed feed stock (ethane, 
propane, ethane-butane, and ethane-light condensates). A substantial 
volume of basic petrochemicals other than ethylene will become 
available in Saudi Arabia, resulting therefore in a more diversified set of 
chemical streamis that assist in developing the respective secondary 
derivatives. 
19 , Oil and Gas Journal, Jan 2, 2006, p.52 
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In conjunction with the processing of heavier feed stock the Saudi 
government has modified the feedstock allocation process to extend the 
petrochemical value chain further in secondary and tertiary products. 
This will increase the industry's cost competitiveness in the primary 
petrochemicals through back integration. This trend is creating a 
conversion industry and industrial clusters. This is bringing a radical 
transformation to the basic structure of the petrochemical industry in 
Saudi Arabia. 
This is evident by petrochemical projects under development, 
which would have been difficult to imagine in the last decade, primarily 
because they were more specialized. Some of these include -
• The Petro Rabigh (Saudi Aramco-Sumitomo Corporation Joint 
Venture, Japanese Company) project includes propylene 
production. The propylene will be used for producing 
polypropylene and propylene oxide. Propylene oxide is an 
intermediate product that is not currently among the industry's 
products. This could stimulate a set of downstream derivative 
including polyether polyol (precursor for polyurethane and 
propylene). 
• Two acetyls (acetic acid and vinyl acetate monomer) projects are 
being developed by Saudi International Petrochemical Company 
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(Sipchem) and Tansee Petrochemical Company (Saudi Arabian 
Company) for catering to the domestic and regional markets. 
Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) Alpha Olephins 
project is another milestone in the diversification drive. This company 
would use new polyethylene processes, which will result in products 
different from the gas phase unipol polyethylene grades currently used 
by all of SABIC's affiliates in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi-Chevron 
Petrochemical Joint Venture, in its planned olefin complex used the 
services of Chevron Phillips Chemical Corporation. As in the beginning, 
the petrochemical industry in Saudi Arabia sought business partners that 
could provide technology and a market for its products. 
The industry's adopted business model, therefore, entailed up 
joint ventures with leading global players. About 70 percent of the 
existing petrochemical projects in Saudi Arabia are joint ventures with 
industry majors including Exxon Mobile Corporation, Royal Dutch Shell 
PLC, Mitsubishi Corporation, Hoechst Celanese Corporation and 
Chevron Phillips;. 
Research and development is recognized as a source of 
competitiveness and key to maintaining future growth in the 
increasingly competitive environment of the petrochemical industries. A 
successful research and development programme is therefore crucial to a 
20 . Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Petroleum & Mineral Resources, Petroleum 
Bulletin, 1995, No. 12, p.23 
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successful business strategies. SABIC demonstrated this strategy in 
1991. It launched its state of the art research and development centre in 
Riyadh. More recently SABIC has opened four external- research & 
development centres in Jubail, Houston, India and the Netherlands to 
supplement the research activity of the Rij^adh Centre. 
This research and development efforts has currently led to the 
development and commercialization of several indigenous technologies 
including -
(1) SABIC technology for butane-1 production, developed jointly 
between SABIC and Institute Francis Du Petrole. It is licensed 
to more than 19 chemical companies in eleven countries. 
(2) Acetic acid technology is a locally developed route to acetic 
acid from direct oxidation of ethane, commercialized in 2005 
by SABIC affiliate Ibn Rushd. 
(3) Linear alpha olefin technology (a-Sabiine) developed jointly 
by SABIC and Linde AG. 
At Jubail United Petrochemical Co., a wholly owned affiliate of 
SABIC, is building a linear alpha olefin production facility . 
In support of the research and development efforts, SABIC has 
recently acquired Scientific Design Co. including in partnership with 
21 . Oil and Gas Journal, Aug. 16, 1999, p.65 
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Sud-Chemiic. Scientific Design Co. is a research company in the field of 
industrial catalyst. 
Primarily, due to lack- of expertise in developing large scale 
petrochemical projects, private sector petrochemical investment were 
previously concentrated in project's downstream of steam crackers. 
SABIC therefore, was the sole company in the upstream petrochemical 
sector until 1995, when the Cabinet liberalized the sector and invited 
local and foreign private investors to invest in the industry. This led to 
the start up in 1999, of the Saudi-Chevron Phillips plant in Al-Jubail, 
the first wholly owned private petrochemical venture in Saudi Arabia. 
Currently, the private investors involved in the Saudi 
petrochemical industries include Tasnee, Sipchem, Saudi Chevron, 
Sahara Petrochemical Co., Lujian Industrial Co., Kayan Petrochemical 
Co., National Polypropylene Co. and Saudi Formaldehyde Co. 
The private sector is actively developing large scale 
petrochemical products in Saudi Arabia. The share of private investment 
in the planned basic petrochemical is 51 percent of total capital 
investment planned for 2004-09.^^ 
Future development regarding the involvement of the private 
sector in the petrochemical industry may be in the form of -
22 . Oil and Gas Journal, Nov. 13, 2000, p.52 
23 . www.sabic/en/pioducts/metal.htra 
164 
An acceleration of the privatization process, resulting in the 
transfer of some of the state shares in SABIC to private sector. 
Partnering between the private companies in developing 
upstream/petrochemicals and refinery projects. This is 
exemplified by the Sahara Cracker Project owned by Sahara 
Sipchem, and Tasnee Petrochemicals. 
The formation of marketing alliances between petrochemical 
producers to increase market share and geographical spread. 
SAB;IC has signed an off-take agreement to market 50 percent of 
Lujian's polypropylene output. 
Downstream Expansion : 
Current investments in Saudi petrochemical industry are heavily 
concentrated in the upstream segment due to the fact that petrochemical 
producers at this level benefit from low cost feedstock which provide 
them with significant cost advantage at the primary and secondary level. 
These economic benefits are not currently shared with highly 
developed downstream industries, such as the plastic conversion plants; 
current transfer pricing for employer is set in accordance with global 
market prices. Conversely, however, the plastic conversion industry in 
Saudi Arabia has maintained steady growth during the past three 
decades. 
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This growth was achieved despite the fact that the plastic 
conversion industry is fragmented and caters mainly to local demand 
and export are limited amount to regional markets. The government is 
eager to develop the Saudi plastic conversion industries to compete 
globally. 
Saudi Arabia currently exports substantial quantities of 
polyethylene resins to china which are then proceeded into films, roll 
stock and plastic bags for export to US and Europian Union. It is logical 
that Saudi Arabia is exploring the prospects for serving the export 
markets directly from the country, thereby capturing more of the value 
chain. The target is to increase Saudi Arabia's share in the global plastic 
market to 15 percent by 2020 from 1 percent currently. 
The main challenges in achieving this objective is to establish a 
plastic conversion industry that derives its global competitiveness from 
a competitive resin's transfer pricing mechanism. This may happen as a 
result of the increasing number of local resin suppliers coupled with the 
traffic-reduction on imported resins, which is expected to derive a 
competition that will eventually drive resin price down. Regarding the 
petrochemical industry, Saudi Arabia offers the best current and future 
investment; its government actively endorses industrial expansion and 
investment inllows. This commitment includes maintaining a 
24 . MEES, 43(4), 27 October 2008, p. A7 
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competitive feedstock pricing formula and expanding the industrial 
infrastructure in the industrial cities of Jubail and Yanbu. This indicates 
the sizable expansion needed to meet the growth in the petrochemical 
industry. SABIC has advantage of abundant low cost gas feed stock. 
This makes the company highly competitive in the global market 
providing it profit despite a slump in the market and protective tariff on 
both sides. SABIC reported a 36% fall in net profit in the first half of 
1999 to SR 488 million, as low petrochemical prices continued to hit 
hard. Profit declined from SR 1,342 million in January - June 1998. By 
mid 1999 the fall had reached more than 85% since the record half 
yearly profit of SR 3,350 million reported in 1995. 
SABIC Vice President & Managing Director Mohammad Al Mady 
said the company performed better in the second quarter of 1999 due to 
a slight improvement in the prices of some commodities and additional 
cost saving measures. Production and sales in the first half of the 1999 
declined slightly because of maintenance v/ork.'^ ^ 
A minority shareholding was offered to private equity investors 
from the start, and when the stock market was established SABIC 
became the largest quoted company not only in the Kingdom but in the 
entire region, a prime position that was to last until the partial 
privatization of the Saudi Telecommunication Company in December 
25 . MEED, 38(2) 4-10 Aug. 2006, p.49 
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2002. SABIC is actually structured as a holding company, with a series 
of multinational joint venture partners involved in each particular 
project. These have included, Mobile, Shell, Dow Chemicals, Mitsubishi 
& The Taiwan Fertilizer Company. By the 1980s SABIC had increased 
its stake in the joint ventures. The role of the joint venture partners 
being downgraded to management, servicing and fee based contracts 
rather than their having a direct share in the equity and hence the profit. 
This suited the foreign partners, as they reduced their risk profile and 
were yet assured of continuing involvement. 
The challenges in the decade ahead will be to encourage more 
linkage and spin-offs from SABIC to downstream industries capable of 
employing greater numbers of Saudi population. The HADEED Steel 
Company was initially geared to producing reinforcing rods and girders 
for the construction industry after its establishment in 1983. By 1990, it 
was producing rolled steel for the local and GCC engineering and 
manufacturing industries. ' SABIC polymers are a major exporter of 
polyethylene including polypropylene and polystyrenes with a 
production capacity of almost four million tones annually. They have 
diversified downstream into polyester fibres and filaments, textile grade 
97 
chips and packaging resins, as well as melamine. 
26 . Oil & Gas Journal, Feb. 9, 2006, p.31 
27 . Ibid. 
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Given the Kingdom's abundance of feed stocks, the attractive 
financing, and above all the will and determination of Saudi Arabia to 
industrialize, there existed ample incentives to the various chemical and 
oil companies to participate in such programmes. The potential partners 
were selected and the negotiation started in 1970. Therefore, the joint 
venture companies, which SABIC has formed so far do represent the 
determination of both SABIC and selected partners to implement the 
project, which were identified in the Kingdom's industrialization plan. 
Here it may be helpful to mention briefly why the joint venture 
approach was adopted. The Kingdom lacks certain specific expertise in 
the operation of large petrochemical complexes and the marketing of 
petrochemical products v/orldwide. It was understood that for the 
Kingdom to built a viable petrochemical industry, the plants have to be 
large enough in order to offset any disadvantages that Saudi Arabia 
petrochemical plants may have in terms of remoteness from traditional 
petrochemical markets. Clearly SABIC also is very concerned about 
developing the domestic Saudi markets and thereby facilitating several 
downstream investment in the Kingdom and the adjacent markets in the 
Gulf.'' 
Out of the projected distribution of total production of SABIC's 
joint venture, United States will account for 20%, Europe 22%, Japan 
. EU Viewswire (2001), Trade Regulation, Country Background from Economist 
Intelligence Unit http://viewswire.com/index asp?/layout=display_articles & 
doc_id== 145403 
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20% and the rest of the world 38%. Such a strategy was consistent with 
the Kingdom's location with respect to the consumers and the need in 
certain areas for petrochemical products. 
In addition to the Saudi commitment to industrialization, it was 
also necessary to develop their manpower. SABIC has emphasized from 
the very beginning its investment in manpower development and its 
determination that at the time of start up of its industrial projects, most 
of the skilled and semi-skilled labour force would be Saudi nationals. 
That percentage will be gradually increased until the plants are entirely 
run by Saudis. The benefit from this strategy had to be tremendous to 
Saudi Arabia, enabling the people of Saudi Arabia to acquire, among 
other things, technical know-how. SABIC partners will benefit as well 
since the need for expatriate labour will be reduced and hence, operating 
cost decreased. By adopting carefully drawn manpower development 
plans, Saudi Arabian dependence on foreign labour will gradually 
decrease. 
However, so many problems cropped up in implementing the 
Saudi plan for industrialization. However, none of them has undermined 
the commitment to achieve the aim of industrialization. There should be 
no doubt that SABIC is determined to achieve its objectives laid down 
in Saudi Arabia industrialization programme. The evidence of 
determination and achievements by SABIC should make the skeptics 
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more objective in pointing out the accomplishments in various fields. 
The achievement has been considerable, indicating that the Kingdom is 
on the right path. SABIC has been confident that between its 
determination and its partner's dedication and commitment, the Saudi's 
aspiration to become an industrial country could prove true. 
In addition to SABIC's programs and the creation of downstream 
industrial projects, the Saudi private sector has been active in 
complimenting the activities of SABIC. The number of downstream 
plans has tripled in the past years. The majority of this plants depend on 
imported material for feed stocks. The Saudi businessmen value the 
importance of industry and therefore, willing to undertake an industrial 
project with more confidence. This has been attributed to a better 
understanding and ability to judge projects on their merits, coupled with 
the incentives given by the government. The undertakings by SABIC 
represents the achievements that would secure the proper utilization of 
the resources of Saudi Arabia and would guarantee the continued well 
being of future generation. In a nut shell, it is found that a small but 
dynamic group of technocrats from the Saudi Ministry of Industry and 
Electricity, SABIC, the Royal Commission for Jubail and Yanbu, and 
other entities as well as executives from Mitsubishi, Mobile, Shell, 
Exxon, Dow, Celanese and other corporation have, despite having 
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divergent interests, pooled their ability to create a great new industry in 
Saudi Arabia. 
Table-1 
Total Production of Refined Products and Their Exports* 
(Million Barrels) 
Year 
1970 
1975 
1980 
1985 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2005 
2005 
2006 
Total 
Production 
225.297 
210.835 
302.494 
415.255 
561.236 
529.211 
602.154 
597.455 
582.870 
642.621 
698.113 
720.642 
715.421 
Exports 
207.89 
175.26 
178.45 
196.90 
478.98 
482.38 
448.24 
395.13 
362.64 
411.94 
487.07 
505.67 
466.31 
% Share 
(Million Barrel) 
92.27 
83.12 
58.99 
47.41 
85.34 
91.15 
74.43 
66.13 
62.21 
64.10 
69.76 
70.16 
65.17 
* Including LP and Natural Gas 
Source : Ministry of Petroleum & Mineral Resources. 
> Total production includes : fuel oil, diesel oil, gasoline & naphtha 
LPG, jet fuel, kerosene, asphalt & others. 
> SoDirce : Oil & Gas Journal various issue. 
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Marketing / Export of Refined Products : 
The total production of refined products and their export is shown 
in Table 1. This table shows that total production of refined products has 
increased continuously from 1971 to 2006. The production was 225.297 
million barrels m 1970, which increased to 715.421 million barrel in 
2006. But the share of export in total production has decreased in the 
same period. It was 97.27 percent in 1970 while it came down to only 
65.17 percent ini 2006. The share of export in total production was the 
lowest in the year 1985, estimated to be only 47.41 percent. From the 
year 1970 to 1975, the production decreased from 225.297 million 
barrels to 210.835 million barrels while the percentage share of export 
in total production decreased from 92.27 percent to 83.12 percent. 
Production increased to 302.494 million barrels in 1980 with the 
percentage share of export in it decreasing to 58.99 percent. Production 
further increased to 415.255 million barrels in 1985 and the percentage 
share of export further decreased to 47.41 percent. Production again 
increased to 561.236 million barrels in 1990, while the percentage share 
of export increased tremendously to 85.34 percent. In the year 1995 
production decreased to 529.241 million barrels whereas the percentage 
share of export increased further to 91.15 percent. Production increased 
to 602.154 million barrel in 2000 with the share of export decreasing to 
597.45 million barrels in 2001, while the percentage share of export 
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decreasing to 66.13 percent. Production of the refined products 
increased to 642.621 million barrel in the year 2003 with the percentage 
share of export slightly increasing to 64.10 percent. Production of 
refined products further increased to 698.113 million barrels in the year 
2004, while the percentage share of export increased to 69.76 percent. 
Production of refined products increased further to 720.647 million 
barrels in 2005 while percentage of export slightly increased to 70.16 
percent. The production remained more or less at the same level of 
715.421 million barrels in 2006, and percentage share of export 
decreased to 65.17 percent. 
Table 2 gives data about the total export of refined products by 
destination from Saudi Arabia in different years from 1970 to 2006. 
Saudi Arabia made export of 207.89 million barrels out of which 
exported 0.08 million barrels to North America, 6.40 million barrels to 
South America, 6.71 million barrels to Western Europe, 1.67 million 
barrels to Middle East, 7.56 million barrels to Africa and 6.20 million 
barrels to Asia (fe Far East, 8.03 million barrels to Oceania. The lowest 
percentage of export has been destined for North America which is 
equivalent to 0.08 percent of total export. Export of refined products of 
Saudi Arabia decreased to 178.45 million barrels in the year 1980. Out 
of this It exported 4.53 million barrels to North America and 2.31 
million barrels to South America, 36.93 million barrels to Eastern 
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Europe, 1.88 million barrels to Middle East, 0.39 million barrels to 
Africa, 100.34 million barrels to Asia and Far East, 2.59 million barrels 
to Oceania. The percentage of export in this year was highest for Asia 
and Far East, equal to 56.22 percent and the lowest share of export was 
for Africa, which was equal to only 0.21 percent. The export of refined 
products of Saudi Arabia increased to 478.98 million barrels in the year 
1990, out of which the export to North America was 50.61 million 
barrels, 6.43 million barrels for South America, 80.67 million barrels for 
Western Europe, 34.64 million barrels to Middle East, 18.73 million 
barrels to Africa, 274.64 million barrels for Asia & The Far East, 10.87 
million barrels for Oceania. Among which the largest percentage of 
export was for Asia and Far East, which was equal to 57.33 percent. The 
export of refined oil production of Saudi Arabia was 448.24 million 
barrels in the year 2000, out of which 7.70 million barrels was exported 
to North America, 20.56 million barrels for South America, 28.48 
million barrels for Western Europe, 43.77 million barrels for Middle 
East, 39.65 million barrels for Africa, 292.83 million barrels to Asia and 
Far East, 15.24 million barrels to Oceania. The highest percentage share 
of export was for Asia and Far East, it was equal to 65.23 percent and 
the lowest of export was for North America, it was equal to only 1.71 
percent. The export of refined oil products increased to 505.67 million 
barrels in the year 2005. Out of which 18.55 million barrels was 
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exported to North America. 12.12 million barrels to South Africa, 55.57 
million barrels to Western Europe, 56.75 million barrels for Middle 
East, 41.40 million barrels for Africa, 317.22 million barrels for Asia 
and Far East, 4.06 million barrels for Oceania. Among these the highest 
share of export goes to Asia and Far East and lowest to Oceania. The 
total production of refined products of Saudi Arabia was 466.31 million 
barrels in 2006. It declined marginally as compared to the previous year. 
13.23 million barrels went to North America, 7.23 million barrels to 
South America, 49.64 million barrels to Western Europe, 72.01 million 
barrels to Middle East, 45.17 million barrels to Africa, 275.92 million 
barrels to Asia and Far East, 3.11 million barrels for Oceania. The 
highest percentage share of total refined products of Saudi Arabia went 
to Asia and Far East and the lowest to Oceania. 
Tariff Problem by European Union 
Restriction imposed on the free flow of trade are called trade 
barriers. Trade barriers can either be tariff barriers or non-tariff barriers. 
Tariff barriers are the levy of extra ordinary custom duties on the 
imports. Whereas non-tariff barriers are those which are concerned with 
other than custom duties. There are many kinds of non-tariff barriers. 
These are -
(1) Import policy barriers 
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(2) Standard, testing, labelling and certification requirements. 
(3) Anti dumping 
(4) Export subsidies and domestic support 
(5) Government procurement 
(6) Service barriers, etc. 
The European Union is the biggest trader of the world, accountmg 
for 20 percent of global imports and exports.^^ The European Union 
trade policy is closely linked to its development policy. The Union has 
granted duty free or cut rate preferential access to its market for most of 
the imports from developing countries. 
The European Union developed a new trade and development 
strategy with its 78 partners in the Asia Pacific - Caribbean group of 
countries aiming at integrating them in to the world economy. It also has 
a trade agreement with South Africa that will lead to free trade between 
two sides, and it is negotiating a free trade deal with the six members of 
Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) - Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. However, the European 
Union has specific trade agreement with its major trading partners 
among the developed countries like United States and Japan. Trade is 
handled through the WTO mechanism, although the European Union has 
many agreements in individual sectors with both countries. The WTO 
29 . Arab News, May 9, 2007, Riyadh, p. 16 
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agreement also applies to the European Union's trade with China, a 
country which greatly benefited from the WTO decision to remove 
restriction on textile trade from January 2005. Special agreements were 
negotiated between the two sides during the year to prevent the 
continuation of a surge in Chinese exports to the European Union which 
affected the European garments industry.' 
The WTO memberships calls for the lowering of tariffs and 
subsidies on a wide range of goods and services. A strengthening of the 
protection accorded to intellectual property rights; and measures for a 
speedier resolution for all trade grievances and disputes which would 
provide extra assurance to foreign investors in Saudi Arabia and lead to 
greater prospects for inward investment. The World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) provide a good platform for setting the cases of dumping 
petrochemicals in the Kingdom by producers in tariff - protected 
economies." 
It is believed that the Saudi accession to the WTO will further 
enhance the competitive advantage enjoyed by the Saudi petrochemicals 
industry and strengthen its position in the international market. Being 
export oriented, the Saudi petrochemical industry stands to gain from 
the WTO provisions, including its extension to services, particularly to 
finance, insurance and transportation. Whose prices, following this 
30 . MEES, 40:26, Vol. XL, No. 26, June 20, 1997, pp. B1-B2 
31 . MEES, 37:31, Vol. XXXVII, No. 31, May 2, 1994, pp.A4-A5 
180 
extension, may decrease significantly. These services are purchased in 
fairly large quantities by the Saudi petrochemical industry and the 
resulting cost reduction may further add to the competitive advantage of 
the industry. Over all adhesion to the WTO bestows benefits and poses 
potential challenges to Saudi Arabia's petrochemical products. 
On the benefit side the removal of trade barriers called for by 
WTO bylaws will allow Saudi petrochemical producers to offer lower 
prices to tariff protected raarkets such as the European Union, US and 
Japanese market. The tariff reduction in these economies may induce a 
sizeable increase in Saudi petrochemical export to those economies 
depending on the response of supply and demand to the lower prices 
resulting from tariff reduction." For instance, tariff on polymers 
(polyethylene, polystyrene, polypropylene) in the European Union are to 
be reduced by approximately half from 12.5 percent to 6.5 percent. As a 
result, it will be difficult for these high cost production economies to 
compete at the lower market prices, caused by the tariff reduction. In the 
short run, they may reduce their production levels and possibly sell at a 
lower profit margin. The petrochemical output in these economies may 
thus decline less proportionately than prices. In the long run the high 
cost producer will exit the industry and thereby reduce the number of 
32 . Ibid. 
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producers. Inversely, the increase in demand caused by the lower prices 
will benefit Saudi petrochemical export. 
The tariff reduction will benefit these export through a direct 
(price effect) and an indirect (income effect) impact. The lower prices, 
caused by the lower tariffs, will produce the direct (price) effect. The 
increased real income due to lower prices will induce an increase in 
demand, producing the indirect effect. 
In return, Saudi Arabia has to lower its own tariff and open its 
market to imported petrochemical products. The tariff on key secondary 
petrochemicals, such as polyethylene, polypropylene and polystyrene, 
are at present set at 12 percent with a provision that it would be reduced 
to 8 percent within an interim period ending in year 2008, followed by a 
second interim period ending in year 2010. By which time this tariff will 
drop to 6.5 percent. Though the volume of imported polymers is small, 
the tariff reduction may induce a strong competition among 
petrochemical producers as they seek to increase their share in the 
domestic market. 
This may result in a pricing ramification leading to narrow profit 
margins on local sales. The petrochemical producers may thus need to 
focus attention on regularly reducing their production cost and ensuring 
that their product qualities match or exceed the world standards. Given 
the strong competitive advantage enjoyed by the Saudi producers, it is 
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likely that they will meet the competitive challenges and retain their 
market share in the domestic market. 
The downstream petrochemical industries in the Kingdom stand to 
benefit from the expanded market caused by lower prices. However, the 
Kmgdom is committed to reduce the tariff on proceeds plastic imports, 
from 20 percent to 6.5 percent over an interim period ending m 2010. 
This may increase the import of finished plastic products from lower 
cost Asian producers, including China. However, the WTO provisions 
allow the developing countries to restrict their import in order to protect 
their infant industries in the situation that import from particular 
countries increase disproportionately. The downstream industries will 
need to be restrictive, with the small partners consolidating and merging 
to reach a critical mass, which is essential to competitiveness in 
domestic and global market alike. 
This accomplishment is by far more important to the 
petrochemical industry than the impact of tariff reduction in protected 
economies for two main reasons, namely that more than 50 percent of 
Saudi petrochemicals export are destined to non-tariff protected Asian 
markets and that the competitiveness of the Saudi petrochemicals 
industry depends primarily on competitive price feedstocks, which 
represent as much as 60 percent of the integrated cash cost in the 
33 . Arab News, MaY9, 2007, Riyadh, p. 16 
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industry. In turn this will expedite the pace of the on going shift in the 
centre of gravity of the global petrochemical industry towards the most 
cost efficient area with close proximity to markets. Saudi Arabia is 
rapidly emerging as a global petrochemicals hub and the premier 
location for future investment in the petrochemical industry. 
Moreover, the fragment of the economy into blocs such as the 
European Union, Mercosur, ASEAN and NAFTA, combined with the 
lamentably low level of inter-Arab trade provides a big incentives to 
governments in the region to do more to reduce barriers and help trade. 
To this end, the Foreign Minister of the countries of the Damascenes 
declaration - the GCC states together with Syria and Egypt - announced 
in a communique issued on 26 June that they were forming a committee 
to look into the creation of a free trade area in these eight countries. The 
committee, they said, would meet before the end of September 1997 in 
Saudi Arabia to look into the practicalities of the proposal. 
Dr. Majid Al-Moneef, advisor to the Saudi Minister of Petroleum, 
opines about the economic distortion that oil taxes and energy subsidies 
create in the market, and their impact on oil's market share. That 
"petroleum product taxation, especially gasoline, continued irrespective 
of crude oil prices, thus denying the consumer the benefits of lower 
prices and exacerbating the effect of higher crude prices," adding that 
any extra taxation on the already distorted prices would add to 
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inefficiency and would effect the consumption of different fuels 
disproportionately to their environmental impact. The Saudi economist 
illustrated this by saying that "the loss in oil share in fossil fuel 
consumption in the OECD between 1973 and 1990 was partly due to the 
taxes on petroleum and the subsidies to coal and nuclear energy. For 
example, oil share declined from 59 percent to 50 percent while coal's 
share increased from 20 percent to 25 percent and share of natural gas 
from 21 percent to 23 percent between the two years.^ "^  Apparently, the 
Saudi Arabia Petrochemical Policy has been able to reduce the degree of 
dependence of the economy on the oil sector and has pulled it towards 
the self reliance. A very solid foundation of an advanced industrial base 
has been laid. With the acquisition of required skills and upgradations of 
technological level, Saudi Arabia is likely to become one of the leading 
producer of petrochemicals. 
34 . Opcit. 30 
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Reforms and Diversification 
The meaning of word 'reform' means "to improve by alteration, 
correction of error, or removal of defects; put into a better form or 
condition; to abolish abuse or malpractice", as in reform the 
government". The word reform has almost invariably been used in its 
plural form and preceeded by the word 'economic'. Economic reforms 
and diversification in Saudi Arabia means reducing the heavy 
dependency on the oil sector by developing the non-oil sectors of the 
economy. It also implicitly includes reducing the direct role of public 
sector, while increasing private sector activity and hence, its size and 
role in the economy. Further more economic reforms and diversification 
for Saudi Arabia means increasing non-oil exports, non-oil revenues, 
and increased Saudi labour force participation in all economic activities. 
There are a number of indicators and measures in order to assess 
the progress of economic diversification efforts. These indicators 
include:— the contribution of oil verses non-oil revenues in total 
government revenues, the percentage of oil export verses non-oil exports 
in the total exports and composition of non-oil exports and imports. The 
1. The Asian Age, New Delhi, 17 January 2008, p.9 
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progress in total employment for Saudi verses non-Saudi by the various 
economic areas. Finally we can say that reforms and diversification of 
Saudi Arabia means the development in the relative importance of 
public versus private sector contribution to the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP). 
Oil continues to dominate the Saudi economy accounting for three 
quarter of the government revenues, and around 90 percent of exports 
earnings. Saudi Arabia focuses almost exclusively upon the hydrocarbon 
sector, to the detriment of the rest of the economy. The need for 
economic diversification was clear long ago, but little was achieved. For 
achieving this goal the government of Saudi Arabia established Supreme 
Economic Council. The Supreme Economic Council was established in 
1999 under the chairmanship of the then Crown Prince Abdullah. 
The Supreme Economic Council evaluates economic, industrial, 
agricultural, labour policies to assess effectiveness. It also studied the 
country's economy, annual budget, the current and future five year 
plans, economic reforms requirements such as privatisation and partial 
market deregulation. The Supreme Economic Council also started 
projects to diversify the economic, monetary and fiscal policies. It has 
some executive powers, but only in getting its decision to be approved 
and issued by the Council of Ministers. It issues a regular report to the 
Council of Ministers on the state of the economy. The Supreme 
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Economic Council has eleven members. Their direct influence on the 
interest of citizens and the need to involve a wide circle of contributors 
in economic policy making in the changing scenario has been crucial. 
This clears that the economic policy of the Saudi Arabia is based 
on the pillars of comprehensive social welfare, the concept of free 
economy, and a free market for capital goods, services and products in 
order to secure the following goals:— 
1. The welfare of society 
2. Provision of job and optimum use of man powers. 
3. Diversification of economic base and increase in the 
sources of public revenue. 
4. Development of saving and saving channels and framework 
for fresh investment. 
5. Increase of investment of domestic capital and saving in the 
national economy. 
6. Fair distribution of national income and opportunities for 
investment. 
7. Increase in the contribution of the private sector, expansion 
of its contribution in the national economy, and 
contribution to the government programme for 
privatization. 
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8. Enhancement of the ability of the national economy to cope 
efficiently with international economic changes. 
The other element of the reform strategy is to diversify the base of 
Saudi economy away from its sole dependence on oil. The government 
has encouraged the growth of value added industry in areas where the 
kingdom has comparative advantage. Saudi Arabia wants impressive 
growth in non-oil industry. The volume of export of these industries 
reached US $ 23 billion and has been achieving an average annual 
growth of 13 percent during past ten years.^ When Saudi Arabia became 
the member of WTO in December 2005, a substantial increase in the 
level of growth in the export of these industries was expected as has 
happened with the other newly acceding countries, to the WTO such as 
China, Jordan and Oman. Saudi Arabia is fully committed to increase 
private sector participation in economic growth. Privatization is a key 
element of Saudi Arabian economic liberalization and a host of sectors 
are being opened to the private sector. Telecommunication, electricity, 
mining, airlines, postal services, railways, port services and water 
utilities are some of the potential areas for investment. Privatization is 
an important issue that has been tackled by many researchers both in 
developed and developing countries. Literatures on privatization suggest 
2 . SAMA Annual Report 2005, Research & Statistics Department, Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia. 
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that it promotes economic growth, stimulates productive efficiency, 
expands the role of the private sector, reduces the size of the 
government sector, attracts foreign investment and helps in the 
development of capital market programmes specially in developing 
countries. 
The Supreme Economic Council af)proved privatization in Saudi 
Arabia, having eight main objectives and each objective requires number 
of policies. The objectives are focused on improving the capacity of 
national economy and enhancing its competitive ability to meet the 
challenges of regional and international competition. The strategy is also 
aimed at encouraging private sector investment and effective 
participation in the economy, based on commercial principles. 
Expanding the ownership of productive assets by Saudis, encouraging 
local investment of domestic and foreign capital, increasing employment 
opportunities and optimizing the use of the national workforce. 
PrivatizEition also ensures the continued equitable increase of individual 
income, providing services to citizens and investors in timely cost 
effective manner. Rationalizing public expenditure reduces the burden 
of the government budget. It gives the private sector opportunities to 
finance, increasing government revenues from: return on participation in 
activity to the transferred to the private sector as for example, from 
3 . Mohammad A. Bakr, " A Model in Privatization", The Middle East Journal Winter 2002, 
vfol. 56, N o - l ,p . 163-164. 
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granting concessions or the sale of government properties. The 
privatization strategy of Saudi Arabia defined a number of 
administrative and implimentational procedures. Whereby the economic 
council will be responsible for supervising privatization programmes 
and monitoring their implementation. The privatization strategy for 
Saudi Arabia was prepared to ensure a continued increase in the share of 
private sector and its expanded participation in the national economy. 
The best means for achieving this included transferring certain type of 
economic activity to private sector. Its aim has been expanding the 
participation of the private sector in economic development and 
enabling to it carry out its investing and financing role in accordance 
with the national development plan. It is reported that the privatization 
is the process of transforming the ownership or management of public 
establishment, projects and services from the government sector to the 
private sector. The government of Saudi Arabia defined the objective of 
privatization and policy needs to achieve these objectives, as described 
below:— 
1. Saudi Arabia's privatization relates to improving the 
capacity of national economy and enhancing its competitive 
ability to meet the challenges of regional and international 
competition. The capacity of the economy can be 
Ibid. 
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strengthened by subjecting projects to market forces. 
Enhancing competitiveness is closely linked to the general 
strategy of development of the private sector of Saudi 
Arabia. The developing of capital and labour markets will 
help achieve this objective. 
2. Encouraging private sector investment and effective 
participation in national economy. A developed and strong 
private sector is essential for Saudi Arabia, as the private 
sector is able to achieve a comparative advantage. It also 
provides a better opportunity for diversifying the economic 
base, and moving away from the dependence on oil. The 
private sector and direct capital investments towards the 
more fruitful and commercially sustainable sector. The 
privatization programme must also include simplification 
of procedures to encourage investment in the private sector, 
and ensure that privatized projects are able to achieve 
significant growth. Policies necessary to achieve these two 
objectives are— 
i. Privatization of public projects, enterprises and 
services that are appropriate for private sector 
participation and encouraging competition. 
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ii. To ensure that privatization results in increased 
direct investment that are self sustainable. 
3. The third objective gives emphasis on expanding the 
ownership of productive assets by Saudi citizens. For this 
encouraging the large number of citizens to participate in 
various types of activities transferred to the private sector 
by using the privatization method. 
4. The fourth objective of the privatization aims at 
encouraging local investment of domestic and foreign 
capital. Privatization reflects the government commitment 
to economic reform and projecting a positive image on 
attracting foreign investment. Privatization also helps to 
develop the capital market, create new mechanism for 
providing capital and attracting domestic capital. 
5. The fifth objective of privatization gives emphasis in 
increasing employment opportunities , optimizing the use 
of national workforce, and ensuring the continued equitable 
increase of individual income. Developing the nation's 
human resources is a basic element of national 
development. Therefore, the privatization programme 
attaches particular importance to it, including Saudization. 
By developing appropriate regulations and incentives to 
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encourage the private sector to hire Saudi citizens. The 
privatization of certain projects revealed that the number of 
employees were larger than actually required. The 
privatized enterprise could agree to keep their employees 
until they studied their future expanded requirements to 
meet increased demand for their services, which would 
reveal their actual requirement for their employee. 
6. The sixth objective of the privatization is stated to provide 
services to citizens and investors in a timely and cost 
efficient manner. However, privatization, particularly of 
projects that have monopoly concession rights, may lead to 
increase in prices and reduction in the quality of services. 
Because some enterprises received government subsidies 
prior to being privatized. 
7. The seventh objective of the privatization strategy 
rationalizes public expenditure and tries to reduce the 
burden of the government budget, by giving the private 
sector opportunities to finance, operate and maintain 
certain services that they are able to provide. The 
government budget is expected to benefit from reduced 
allocation for operating expenditure resulting from the 
privatization of public establishments. 
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8. The last objective of privatization policy gives emphasis on 
increasing government revenues from returns on 
participation in activities to be transferred to the private 
sector. For example, granting concession or sale of 
government properties. The government aims at achieving 
positive financial result from privatization. 
The Supreme Econoraic Council is responsible for supervising the 
privatization programme and monitoring its implication in coordination 
with the competent government agencies. 
The Saudi government is pursuing various procedures for 
privatizing enterprises owned by the government. The main objectives 
of these procedures are to promote more effective contribution by the 
private sector to the provision of different goods and services, reduced 
dependence of oil as main source of income and further increase private 
investment. 
Saudi Arabia General Investment Authority (SAGIA) 
This organization was set up in 2000, to further promote foreign 
investment and serve the business community. Prince Abdullah Ibn 
Faisal Ibn Turki, nephew of King Fahad, became its governor as well as 
Chairman of its thirteen member board. The other members were the 
deputy ministers of interior, foreign affairs, finance and economy, 
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petroleum and mineral resources, industry and electricity, planning 
commerce, agriculture and water, labour and social affair, as well as 
deputy governor of Saudi Arabia monetary agency and two 
representative from the private sector.^ The new laws for investment 
enacted in allows foreign companies to obtain 100 percent ownership of 
local ventures and related estate in a wide range of fields, including gas, 
pov/er generation and water desalination, petrochemical and oil 
refining.^ Foreign owned ventures now have access to loans from the 
Saudi Industrial Development Fund, which are almost interest free, and 
enjoy the same incentives and guarantees as the ones given to the 
nationals. With this having cleared the way for international oil 
companies to be attracted to the gas openings, planners hope the law and 
other reforms would attract into Saudi Arabia about $ 100 billion direct 
foreign investment. Saudi Arabia is a signatory to various regional 
agencies guaranteeing a level playing field to foreign investors. It is a 
member of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and 
WTO. Saudi Arabia, hence, has to ensure the same treatment, protection 
and incentives to foreign investment as accorded to the national capital. 
The pre-investment assistance provided by SAGIA and other 
government agencies includes helping foreign investors prepare 
5 . www. Sagia.gov.sa 
6. Ali-AI-Naimi, "The Oil Industry Economic Development and Private Sector", MEES, 
Vol XL, No. 3, 1997, P.D1-D5 
7 . Ali-Al-Naimi, •' The Oil Industry Economic Development and Private Sector", MEES, 
VoiXL, No. 5, 1997, p.3 
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feasibility studies for industrial projects. They also provide information 
and statistics for investment projects within the scope of Saudi Arabia 
development plans. Land for setting up industrial units are available 
throughout the kingdom in several industrial units. The kingdom 
proposes to invest $200 billion in the oil, gas, electricity and 
desalination and petrochemical industries. Global oil companies are also 
considering investing $ 100 billion over a period of 20 years in the 
production of natural gas. It is also expected that $ 6 billion worth of 
domestic capital will be invested in the tourism sector.^ The Supreme 
Commission for Tourism was established in April 2000 to help the 
tourism sector grow and coordinate with the private sector, for further 
investment. Each year more than two million Muslims from all over the 
world visit Saudi Arabia to perform the Hajj, and many more come to 
perform the Umrah. Further, the kingdom also hosts the non-religious 
tourism. Saudi Arabia is rich in history and culture and a variety of 
tourist attractions to offer, including archeological sites. Expansion of 
King Abdul Aziz International Airport in Jeddah was implemented in 
2003 at the cost of $ 1.5 billion to accommodate an additional 13 to 21 
million passengers per year. Because of the huge inflow of religious 
and other tourists Saudi government invests huge amount in real estate. 
Over the past five years, Saudi Arabia's private developers, buoyed by 
8 . Special Report, Oil and Gas, Middle East Economic Digest, April 11, 2000, p.12-16 
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high oil prices and a growing housing shortage, have launched a series 
of urban real estate projects targeting the kingdom's growing 
requirement for affordable accommodation. 
Following decisions by the municipalities of Riyadh and Jeddah 
to relax the height restriction on tall planning, the skyline of the 
kingdom's major cities is also set to change rapidly as towers of up to 
50 storeys replace traditional low-rise buildings. Taking advantage of 
the relaxation of Saudi Arabia building restrictions, local and 
international developers have launched a series of real estate 
developments. Emmar of economic city, a subsidiary of the UAE's 
Emmar Properties, is developing the $ 27 billion, 167 square kilo metre 
King Abdullah Economic City.^ 
This is the first of six such economic cities, which are designed to 
diversify the kingdoms oil dependent economy and provide for the next 
generation of the Saudi's. "Before the Saudi came up with the idea of 
the economic city, the real estate market was not exactly booming." 
Says Kennith Lim, Business Development Manager with Singapore 
based Jurong International, which master plans urban development in 
the kingdom. "But right now, because of the economic cities, it has 
pushed the market to be more vibrant."'*^ The tower will form part of a 
wider real estate project planned by kingdom holdings, covering 5.3 
9 . Christopher Sell, MEED, Vol. 52, No. 39, 26 September - 2 October, 2008, p. 17 
10 . Ibid. 
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square kilo metre. It will be split in to a residential area of 1.5 square 
kilo metre, a business zone of 800,000 square kilo metre and a 470,000 
square metre commercial area. There will also be an educational area of 
150,000 square metre, along with leisure and tourism facilities and 
hotels. Local developer Dar al Arkam has launched the $ 1.6 billion 
Shams al Riyadh project, a 10 square kilo metre development of 8,000 
residential units, which will be built to north of the city. 
The holy city of Mecca is also undergoing a massive 
transformation as developers capitalise on one of the world's most 
expensive location for real estate. Emmar Middle East, a property 
development company owned by Emmar Properties that focuses on 
projects solely in the middle east region, has two major developments 
targeting growth area in Saudi Arabia. All these activities taking place 
are bound to benefit the tourism sector in Saudi Arabia. Since the 
kingdom is the cradle of Islam and homeland of the two holy mosques, it 
occupied a special status in both the Arab & Muslim countries. Arabia 
has vast geographical area, diverse climate and natural resources and 
open economy. It also has advance infrastructure as well as the 
existence of an efficient system of tourism facilities. For developing the 
tourism industry Saudi Arabia established Supreme Commission for 
Tourism, which was later known as General Commission for Tourism 
and Antiquities. Tourism sector contributes to the diversification and 
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growth process of national economy. It also increases employment and 
investment opportunities for citizens, realizes balanced regional 
developments, enhances the balance of payments, enriches heritage and 
knowledge and binds the citizens with their societies. 
General Commission for Tourism and Antiquities prepared a three 
phased project for developing national tourism. The first phase has been 
to work out the general policy for developing and advancing national 
tourism over the next twenty years. The second phase has been to draw 
up implementation plans for the upcoming five years. And the last phase 
three is to set the detailed foundation for developing regional tourism 
and fulfilling the plans of promoting tourism location. The kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia has diverse natural and heritage resources, numerous 
tourism facilities and good infrastructure that can contribute to 
developing the tourism sector. According to the General Commission for 
Tourism and Antiquities, more than 12 thousand natural, historical and 
cultural sites have been located. Accordingly 40 tourism development 
areas have been identified, all of which can be developed in to an 
integrated tourism areas of the future. The General Commission for 
Tourism and Antiquities approved around 903 sites in 2002 as being 
feasible for tourism development.'' 
11 . Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency, 41th Annual Report 2005, Research & Statistics 
Department, Kingdom of SA. 
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According to the data of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 
the number of hotels of various classes operating in the kingdom at the 
end of 2007 stood at 1,209 with a room capacity estimated at 185 
thousands. The number of housing units licensed in the kingdom stood 
at 2,784 at the end of 2007. These units are spread over various cities in 
Saudi Arabia. Jeddah accounted for the largest number of such units, 
representing 22.4 percent (624 units) of the total followed by cities of 
the eastern region 14.4 percent (400 units), Riyadh 14.3 percent (398 
units), Abha 9.7 percent (270 units) and Makkah with 8 percent (224 
units).'^ The General Commission for Tourism & Antiquities estimates 
indicate a rise in the value added by the tourism sector to Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) during 2005-2007 from Reyals 36.5 billion to 
Reyals 37 billion while its ratios decline during the same period from 
3.1 percent to 2.6 percent mainly due to the high growth in GDP due to 
improved oil prices. And hence, the sheire of tourism sector in GDP 
declined lastly it can be stated that tourism industry plays an important 
role for the economic reform and diversification process in the economy. 
Private Sector in Economic Diversification 
The new policy centres on economic diversification and reform 
widening the role of the private sector. Unlike in previous booms, the 
12 . Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency, 41th Annual Report 2005, Research & Statistics 
Department, Kingdom of SA 
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government is driving a comprehensive strategy to move away from its 
hydrocarbon dominated economy of the past. The creation of Saudi 
Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA) was deemed to be 
important step in this regard. Set up to target foreign and private 
investors, it has grown in its sphere. The chairman of SAGIA Amr 
Dabbagh, is close to king Abdullah and considered a progressive 
thinker. It has set itself a target of placing the kingdom among the 
world's top ten competitive investment destination by 2010. Under 
SAGIA's auspices, the kingdom is pressing ahead will a bold initiative 
to create six economic cities as a means of beneficial foreign investment 
and repatriating Saudi money. In 2005-06, it launched four integrated 
cities:— 
1. King Abdullah Economic City (KAEC) bear Rabigh. 
2. Prince Abdul Aziz bin Mosaed Economic City (PABMEC) in 
Hail 
3. Jizan Economic City (JEC) 
4. Medina's Knowledge Economic City (KEC) 
A new one is proposed at Tabuk, while the sixth city was to be 
launched later on in the eastern province. The government was also 
considering a city in partnership with Yemen.''' Each city aims to 
develop a specific business sector. However industry will be focused in 
13 . John Irish, The Middle East, May 2007, Issue 378, p.3 8 
14 . Ibid. 
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Jizan. Recreation and tourism will be centred in Rabigh. Hail will enable 
logistic and agricultural, while Medina will develop knowledge-based 
industries. Saudi Arabia General Investment Authority estimates the 
entire programme's contribution to GDP to be about $ 150 billion by 
2020, raising the country's GDP per capita to $ 33,500 million from $ 
13,000 million.'^ "It was an extraordinary response in the first 12 
months." Said a senior SAGIA official. "As a result, we have received 
proposals from private developers so they can launch their own 
economic cities, but we have had to curb some of their enthusiasm." 
These cities are also to be the cornerstone of the government's efforts to 
resolve the kingdom's worsening unemployment problem, which stands 
at between 12-20 percent. According to Dabbagh, Chairman of SAGIA, 
the new development will provide job opportunities for 1.3 million 
people. "Jizan is one of the largest areas in the kingdom and is among 
the least developed", says Abdullah Basodah, Chairman of the Board of 
Western W^ ay for Industrial Development Company, which is building 
an aluminium smelter in Jizan Economic City (JEC). "It has the largest 
potential for Saudi people to gain employment so we can draw on that 
pool." 
Likewise, it is hoped that the cities will fill the demand for good 
quality and modern accommodation. The country's youthful population-
15 . John Irish, The Middle East, May 2007, Issue 378, p.38 
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60 percent are under the age of 20 and are increasingly demanding real 
estate development similar to the kingdom's neighbours. The Managing 
Director of Jeddah based development firm Tamlik, Zuhair Hamid Fayez 
says, "It is good way of putting things in motion." But while the 
rationale for the cities may be evident, it has not been plain sailing since 
King Abdullah Economic City was launched in 2005. Until now, very 
little construction has actually occurred. King Abdullah Economic City 
is the most advanced. However, other than ground leveling works, a sale 
centre and a few tenders for residential buildings, progress has been 
slow. Yet, the developer, Emaar Economic City, expanded the size of 
the development by nearly four times to cover over 168 million square 
kilo metre, making it the largest project ever undertaken in the Middle 
East. Despite initial enthusiasm, a growing number of private sector, 
businessmen are questioning whether the plans are realistic. Hashim 
Malaika, (jeneral Manager at Riyadh based Dar Al Riyadh says, "We 
have been hearing a lot about the economic cities."' But very little has 
happened. The opportunities for investment are huge, but the 
bureaucracy is so stifling that makes it difficult to take a step forward. 
There is still very little investment from overseas and Saudi investors 
would still rather invest abroad. This slow pace of reform is holding 
things back. Nowhere is this more evident than in issuing visas. In mid 
16. Opcit. 13, p.2 
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2006, it appeared that international tourist visas would be made 
available for the first time. 
These cities would also provide a platform for social 
development. The king Abdullah bin Abdulaziz foundation for the 
development of housing owns the land. Under its agreement with Seera, 
it will receive a portion of the city's returns, which will then be 
invested into providing housing across the kingdom. The economic 
cities are undoubtedly the boldest initiatives ever undertaken by Saudi 
Arabia. The authorities have made the promises. As of yet, quantifying 
success is too early. SAGIA has said that it is aiming to license 
investment projects of about $ 300 billion in 2009, of which it will hope 
a large portion enters the new cities. 
Saudi Arabia's privatization and economic diversification efforts 
have gained momentum since the creation of new Supreme Economic 
Council. The purpose behind the creation of the Supreme Economic 
Council has been to speed up economic reforms aimed at opening Saudi 
markets and ensure stability for investors. The Supreme Economic 
Council has been officially responsible for the kingdom's privatization 
efforts since early 2001. It plays a supervisory role in the formulation of 
economic policy, managing the budget and coordinating the 
implementation of policies between government department and 
agencies. The Supreme Economic Council evaluates economic, 
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industrial, agricultural and labour policies to assess their effectiveness 
and impact on the national economy, diversification of the country's 
economic base and the growth of its competitive economic strength. 
Capital Market 
Developing the financial markets is one of the most important 
objectives of rwforms. It would help to achieve various goals of 
privatization process. This includes expanding the scope for 
participation by Saudis in the ownership of productive assets. Public 
enterprises projects are encouraging local investment of domestic and 
foreign capital. There is strong connection between privatization and 
financial market. Because privatization leads to development of 
financial markets by encouraging investors and investment companies 
to diversify their portfolios by investing in companies that are well 
managed, and in diverse sectors such as communication, electricity, 
cement, banking and transportation. Small investors are also attracted, 
which lead to creation of investment tools of a joint nature and balance 
in the liquidity position between banks and financial markets. Its also 
provides opportunities to invest in the funds of social security and 
financial establishments. The existence of a developed financial market 
helps ensure the success of the privatization process, when certain 
enterprises are privatized through public subscription in the financial 
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market. Since the first big increases in oil prices in the 1970's, there 
has been three major phase for capital development in Saudi Arabia. 
The first was a period of massive capital expansion. Where nearly all of 
the modern infrastructure was planned and built; the roads, airports, 
electricity and water systems, universities and so on. During the decade 
from 1975 to 1985, Saudi government budgets provided more than $ 250 
billion in project spending with annual budget for project spending at 
times exceeding $40 billion. This was the time when ground work was 
laid for Saudi Industrial Development. From its own capital budgets, 
Aramco found resources to develop huge natural gas gathering and pipe 
line systems in order to meet the fuel and feed stock needs of the Saudi 
Basic Industries Corporation. The capital to built the SABIC Companies 
came through the public investment, as well as from more than a dozen 
joint venture partners. Some of the government's interest in the SABIC 
companies has been sold to the public. Public investment remained as 
the nominal shareholder for the portion that is retained by the 
government. Other than public investment funds were the Saudi 
Industrial Development Fund (SIDF), the funds for agriculture and real 
estates, and the Saudi Credit Bank. The Saudi Industrial Development 
Fund provided financing and advice to small and medium as well as 
17. Patrick, H.T., "Financial Development and Economic Growth in Under Developed 
Countries",Jl/££5 Vol. 14, No. 2,(1996), pp.174-177 
18. Kevin Taecker, "Saudi Capital Market in context-Retrospective and outlook", MEES 
Vol. XL No. 3, 13 Jan 1997, p.Dl 
19. Ibid. 
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large scale business, helping to meet up to 50 percent of the capital 
needs for activating. The funds for agricultural and real estates work 
with individuals, farmers and home-owners to help to meet capital needs 
in these areas. And the Saudi Credit Bank was structured to help meet 
the capital requirements of independent small business. Government's 
capital contribution in these funds exceeded $ 50 billion during the early 
period through 1984. With ongoing repayments of earlier loans, these 
funds have continued to provide new capital for economic development 
and growth. 
The post war phase of Saudi development, also saw a large 
expansion of the banking system. Between 1991 and 1995, the 
capitalization of Saudi banks doubled, from $ 4.5 billion to 9.0 billion.'^' 
The Saudi budget of 1997 highlighted that the budget deficits were 
narrowing and substantial progress was reported at bringing government 
payments current. Due to continued private sector expansion and higher 
oil prices, the country enjoyed the robust growth in 1996 nearly 9 
percent nominal terms, with the private sector holding its own at around 
4 percent. The local monetary system was increasingly developing as 
reflected in increased reliance on banks and banking services. Major 
progress was reported for needed expansion of the electricity and 
telephone systems. Capital Market Authority spokesman Abdul Aziz 
20. Kevin Taecker, " Saudi Capital Market in context-Retrospective and outlook", MEES 
Vol. XL No. 3, 13 Jan 1997, p.Dl 
21 . Ibid.. p.D2 
208 
said "They are licensed to do everything related to the stock market."^^ 
Capital Market Authority also granted more limited brokerage licenses 
to two other firms; i.e. a Saudi company and a joint venture between 
Saudi investors and credit issues. "This is a big development in the 
financial sector. We have never had new companies winning brokerage 
license", Al Zoom said.^ ^ Saudi Arabia's 11 domestic banks have so far 
a monopoly on brokerage activity on the Arab world's biggest bourse. 
Which has doubled in value this year and seen daily turnover hit nearly 
$7 billion on busy days. The gulf and western banks have won approval 
from the central bank to operate and some already have branches in the 
kingdom. Last month French bank BNP Paribas became the first 
European bank to open up in Riyadh.^ '* Saudi Arabia has established a 
sound regulatory and financial standards and payment system equivalent 
to those in the major industrial countries. This has resulted in a strong 
banking sector that benefits from management, expertise and the most 
sophisticated technologies. The sector offers diverse financial services 
to the growing commercial sector. The reliability of this financial 
infrastructure and the size of the Saudi market make Saudi Arabia an 
attractive investment destination. The Kingdom's financial sector 
22. Kevin Taecker, Saudi Capital Market in context-Retrospective and outlook', MEES 
Vol. XL No. 3, 13 Jan 1997, p.D4 
23 . The Economic limes, 21 November, 2005, p.8 
24. Ibid.... 
25 . Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Planning, Seventh Development Plan, Riyadh, 
2001, p.88 
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consists of the Central Bank (SAMA), the commercial banks, the 
specialized credit institutions and the stock market. Banking is regulated 
under the Banking Control Law issued by government of Saudi Arabia 
in 1986. The council of ministers issues license for the establishment of 
banks, based on recommendations from the ministry of finance and 
national economy after review by the central banks. The government 
stake in commercial banks is less than 10 percent. Sufficient liquidity 
enables financing at equitable rates. Foreigners can invest in the stock 
market through investment funds. The Saudi stock market has become 
the largest in the region. The Saudi Riyal has a strong record of stability 
and inflation rates in Saudi Arabia were very low. 
Foreign Direct Investment and trade are often seen as important 
catalyst for economic growth in the developing countries. Foreign Direct 
Investment is also an important means of technology transfer from 
developed countries to developing countries. Foreign Direct Investment 
also estimates domestic investments and facilitates improvements in 
human capital and institutions in the host countries. International trade 
is also known to be an instrument of economic growth. Trade facilities 
more efficient production of goods and services by shifting production 
to countries that have comparative advantage in producing goods and 
services. Foreign Direct Investment in Saudi Arabia mostly assumes one 
of the three forms; (1) Joint Ventures, (2) Green Field Investment, and 
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(3) investment related to the offset programs. Joint venture has been 
predominant from prior to the new investment law and involved 
ventures jointly with Saudi government, institutions or firms. Greenfield 
investment in Saudi Arabia production and distribution facilitates is 
relatively new being spurred by the new investment law. Joint venture, 
the predominant form could theoretically be either equity joint venture 
or contractual joint venture. Of these two forms equity joint ventures 
seems to be the predominant in Saudi Arabia's foreign direct 
investment, where the foreign side generally contributed equipment, 
industrial property rights, including technology and funds. While Saudi 
counterpart contributed land, plant, equipment and the local component 
of currency and funds. In addition to these forms, the kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia also instituted an offset program, with foreign partner. However, 
rather than merely reducing the cost of imports, Saudi Arabia evolved 
offset programs that focus more on developing and diversifying Saudi 
national economy to ensure long term growth. Foreign Direct 
Investment and trade has a positive impact on economic growth. The 
size of such impact may across countries depending up on the level of 
human capital, domestic investment, infrastructure, macro economic 
stability, and trade policies. Foreign Direct Investment plays an 
important role in economic growth of a country as well as the 
importance of economic and institutional development. It is clear that 
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Foreign Direct Investment, trade, human capital and domestic 
investment are imiportant sources of economic growth for developing 
countries. Saudi Arabia is a signatory to various regional agencies 
guaranteeing a level playing field to the foreign investors.^^ It is a 
member of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency. The kingdom, 
hence, ensures the foreign investors same treatment, protection and 
incentives as accorded to the national capital. The pre-investment 
assistance provided by Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority and 
other government agencies includes helping foreign investors prepare 
feasibility studies for industrial projects. They also provide information 
and statistic for investment projects, within the scope of Saudi Arabia's 
development plans. Land for setting up industrial units are available 
throughout the kingdom in several industrial cities. The government 
makes electricity, water and fuels available for industrial projects at low 
prices. Industrial parks have public utilities like roads, desalinated 
water, telephones and postal services. Commodities entering the 
kingdom as input for industrial production and some basic foods are 
exempted from custom duties. Saudi Industrial Development Fund gives 
soft, medium and long terra loans to industrial establishments for up to 
50 percent of the total cost of the project. 
26 . Opcit, 18, p.D5 
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Foreign Investment and Energy Sector 
Most of the crude oil producers have switched away from an 
exclusively state controlled energy sector to the gradual opening of 
foreign investment inflow. So, the Saudi move should be seen as part of 
a larger trend in the oil and gas industry. There are several reasons why 
government is reopening the door to foreign investment i.e. shortage of 
capital, modern and sophisticated technology and human resources. 
First the need for capital stems from many factors. The most 
significant of which is the period of low and stable oil prices from 1987 
to 1997, followed by a dramatic decline until early 1999." As a resuh 
many producing governments have found themselves without the 
necessary financial resources to maintain their current level of 
production. 
Second, technological advances have drastically changed the oil 
and gas industry. Most notably, successful exploration have increased, 
and the cost of production and development of oilfields have fallen. 
Technological advances have made it cheaper and easier to find and 
develop hydrocarbon resources. Multinational oil companies have more 
access to state of the art technology in the industry than most national 
oil companies. 
27 . Gawdat Bahgat, "Foreign Investment in Saudi Arabia's Energy Sector", MEES, Vol.47, 
No. 47, 23 August, 2004, p.l 
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Third, human resources include not only management personnel, 
geologists and engineers, but also professionals with expertise in 
applying new technology and new market techniques. 
In Saudi Arabia, these incentives apply only partially. Saudi 
Aramco, like other national and international oil companies, have few 
financial resources to expand its production capacity, when oil prices 
remain low. But since 1999 prices have recovered and stabilized at a 
high level than in 1990s.^ ^ This means that Saudi Aramco is under less 
restraint to finance its exploration and development operations. Also the 
Saudi take over of Aramco was friendlier and less confrontational than 
is the case with most of other oil producing countries. Furthermore, 
Saudi Arabia has never been subjected to international economic 
sanctions. As a result Saudi Aramco has always had access to advanced 
western technology and expertise. 
In short, Saudi Arabia has few incentives to invite foreign 
investment back to its upstream oil sector. Thus, despite some 
expectations, and hope and desire expressed by top executives of 
international oil companies, there has been no change in the kingdom's 
policy. FLather, the door has been open for foreign investment in the 
exploration and development of natural gas. 
28 . Gawdat Bahgat, " Foreign Investment in Saudi Arabia's Energy Sector", MEES, Vol.47, 
No. 47, 23 August, 2004, p.l 
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Saudi Arabia is one of the v/orld's richest countries in 
hydrocarbon resources. However, its efforts has been focused on 
developing the massive oil reserves, with little attention to natural gas. 
Indeed, until the early I980's gas was flared. In the last few decades this 
policy of minimum utilization of the country's gas resources has 
substantially changed. The creation of Master Gas System in the early 
1980s show growing official interest in utilizing largely unutilized 
hydrocarbon potential. During the last two decades Saudi Aramco 
efforts in gas exploration and development operations have been 
successful. The kingdom's proven reserves of natural gas have almost 
doubled. At the end of 1983 these were estimated at 3.5 trillion Cu ms 
and twenty years later (2003) they had risen to 6.68 trillion Cu ms. 
This expanding capacity was matched by rapid domestic gas 
consumption. During the same period (1983-2003) Saudi Arabia's gas 
consumption rose at a remarkable rate of 7.2 percent annually and was 
projected to grow on an average by 3.7 percent per year during 2005-06, 
T 1 
accordmg to a Saudi Arab official. Natural gas is largely used in power 
generation, water desalination and to satisfy an impressive growth in the 
petrochemical industry. The development of gas resources serves two 
other important social and economic purposes. The expansion of gas 
related industries helps in generating thousands of jobs. For several 
30 . British Petroleum, BP Statistical Review of World Energy, London, 2004, p.20 
31 . KhalicI A Al-Falih, "Saudi Arabia's Gas Sector: Its Role and Growth Opportunities", 
Oil and Gas Journal, Vol.102, 21 June 2004, pp.:i8-24. 
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years the Saudi government has sought to create employment for the 
growing number of indigenous job seekers. Using natural gas instead of 
oil domestically-will help free up additional crude for export. This has 
been particularly important given the relative high oil prices since the 
early 2000s.^ ^ 
Within this context the Saudi government since the late 1990s has 
engaged in intense negotiations with several international oil & gas 
companies to develop its gas resources. After meeting of Saudi king 
with top executives from US oil companies in 1998 preliminary 
negotiation were held. This led to the signing of an agreement in 2001 
between Saudi government and eight international companies, most of 
them US based. According to this agreement, the companies would 
invest approximately $ 25 billion in the Saudi gas sector, and develop 
three "core ventures". Core venture one is in South Ghawar, Core 
venture 2 is in Red Sea region, and core venture 3 is in the Empty 
Quarters (Rubi-al-Khali). The implementations of these agreements 
would have been the first major reopening of Saudi Arabia's upstream 
hydrocarbon sector to foreign investment since 1970s. However, the two 
sides failed to meet several deadlines and in June 2003 Saudi oil 
Minister Ali Naimi officially terminated the negotiation with the 
companies. A major reason for the failure was disagreement over the 
32 . Opcit. 27, p.4 
33 . Maureen Lorenzetti, "US Companies: Saudi Gas Negotiations at Critical State", Oil 
and Gas Journal, Vol. 100, No. 38, 16 September 2002, pp.26-28, p26 
216 
production (company wanted to significantly higher one than the Saudis 
were willing to accept).^' However, this collapse has not put on end to 
the kingdom's strategy of inviting foreign investment back to its gas 
sector. Saudi officials held a meeting in London in July 2003 with 
representatives of about 40 energy companies. Mr. Naimi confirmed his 
country's commitment to create an environment that would be attractive 
to private investment.^^ In line with this determination, Saudi Arabia 
reached a tentative agreement, which was officially signed in November 
2003, with Royal Dutch/Shell, the Anglo Dutch energy group, and total 
of France, to invest approximately $ 2 billion to develop non associated 
gas in the Empty Quarter region. 
The decision to invest in the Saudi Arabia's energy sector is made 
by both the Saudis and the international oil companies for different 
reasons. Saudis were interested in stimulating their economy, generating 
jobs, expanding their petrochemical industry, satisfying a growing 
domestic demand, and freeing additional oil for export. International oil 
companies, on the other hand, have been interested in maximizing their 
profit and establishing a base in Saudi Arabia with the expectation that 
the door will be opened for investment in country's lucrative oil sector. 
The course of foreign investment in the Saudi energy sector in the 
34 . Robin Allen, "Saudi Talks with Oil Groups Close to Collapse", Financial Times, 25 
July 2002, online at www.ft.com. 
35 . British Broadcasting Corporation, ""Saudi Woos Energy Firms'", 23 July 2003, online at 
www. Bbc.co.uk 
36 . Oil & Gas Journal, "Saudi Arabia", Vol. 102, No-5, 2 February, 2004, p.8 
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foreseeable future is likely to be determined by a combination of 
domestic, regional and international developments. Saudi Arabia invites 
foreign investment to the energy sector only as a part of a broader 
strategy of economic reform. The high level of economic growth since 
the early 2000s is due mainly to high oil prices. The Saudi economy is 
heavily dependent on oil and suffers from structural imbalances. Saudi 
leaders have acknowledged the need for economic reform and since the 
late 1990s have repeatedly re-affirmed their contention that privatization 
is a "strategic choice". In line with this connection the Saudi 
government has moved continuously and slowly towards subsidy cuts 
and tax increases. In 1999 The Supreme Economic Council was created 
and charged with boosting and promoting privatization. In January 2004, 
the Saudi cabinet approved a reduction in taxes on foreign investment to 
20 percent in most sectors and 30 percent in natural gas sector. These 
efforts were promoted by the International Monetary Fund, which 
commanded the Saudi government for speeding up the implementation 
of structural and institutional reforms needed for a sustained increase in 
private investment, including foreign direct investment. All these 
created an atmosphere of improved efficiency, greater transparency, 
reduced governmental regulations, more opportunities for foreign 
investment and significant emphasis on the highest ethical and business 
37 . Energy Information Administration, Country Profile: Saudi Arab June 2004, available 
online www. Eza.doe.gov 
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standards. This has resulted in major strides towards strong economic 
performance and enhanced ability to increase domestic and international 
38 
investment. 
The World Trade Organisation (WTO) gave approval on Friday 11 
November 2005, for Saudi Arabia to join global body as a full fledged 
member. The decision flowed from over a decade's structural economic 
reform in the kingdom. ^ ^ The kingdom attained full membership as 149^ "^  
member of GATT's successor WTO in December 2005."^ ^ It was a signal 
of radical change in market environment. Fawaz Al Alamy, Chief 
Technical Negotiator for WTO accession, said, "we have always 
believed in free trade, but we needed to open up further. We found out 
after previous boom and the last decline that oil is volatile commodity 
and we can not keep a country hostage to it.""*' Like other developing 
countries, Saudi Arabia too embarked on the economic reforms under 
fiscal stress. It is premised on neoliberal understanding of liberalization, 
privatization and globalization of the economy. The WTO membership 
implies that the future path of Saudi Arabian economy is going to be 
determined by the new set of parameters redefining the social contract. 
38 . Ali Naimi, "Saudi Arabia: Economic, Oil and Mineral Restructuring and reforms", 
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The state which has; been the prime mover on the strength of oil 
revenues is gradually recasting its place by working as facilitator in the 
reform process. It is opening up the economy for foreign direct 
investment, expanding the space for private initiatives. The Supreme 
Economic Council (1999) has been leading with the responsibility to 
drive the reform programme. According to the Saudi Commerce & 
Industry Minister, Hashim Yamani, "The access will further integrate 
Saudi economy into the world economy. It will also deepen the 
universality of the multilateral trading system. It will enhance the 
business environment in Saudi Arabia by adding more transparency and 
predictability. Thus we expect to lead to more investment and job 
creation." Opening of the closed economy under WTO meant reduction 
in tariff, access to service sector, greater foreign participation, 
transparency in trade issues and elimination of technical barriers to 
trade etc. 
According to the WTO sources among the leading commitments 
and the obligations that the state has to fulfill include the following.'*^ 
1. Elimination of export subsidies on agricultural products. 
2. At the end of the ten year implementation period, average 
bound tariff level will decrease to 12.4 and 10.5 percent for 
42 . Gulshari Dietl, Grijesh Pant, A.K. Pasha, P.C. Jain, Contemporary Saudi Arabia & the 
Emerging Indo-Saudi Relations, Shipra publications. New Delhi, 2007, p.52 
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agricultural and non-agricultural products respectively. The 
individual tariff rates for agricultural products will range from 
5 to 200 percent, with the highest rate being applied to tobacco 
products and dates. 
3. Foreign insurance company will be permitted to open and 
operate direct branches in Saudi Arabia. A three year transition 
period was to be given to existing foreign insurance providers 
to convert to either a Saudi cooperative insurance company or, 
to a direct branch of a foreign insurance company. 
4. Within three years from accession, Saudi Arabia's 
commitments would allow up to 70 percent foreign equity in 
the telecommunication sector. 
Saudi Arabia's acceptance by the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) has the potential to significantly increase commerce between 
Indian businesses and the gulf giant. "Saudi Arabia is a very important 
country, which has one fourth of the world's oil reserves", said Ujal 
Singh Bhatia, India's WTO Ambassador.'*'* This move may bring 
increased stability to the global energy market. India has been importing 
more than 18 million tones of crude oil annually from Saudi Arabia. 
India can look forward to better deals from Saudi Arabia, and expanding 
the presence of our labour forces across the kingdom. Analysts say, it 
44 . The Asian Age, 14 November 2005, p.31 
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could be boom for Indian businesses. "India's service industry 
especially related to IT sector, could have vast scope here", said K.S. 
Ramkum^r, a veteran Indian journalist based in Jeddah.''^ 
The world bank's 2007 doing business indicator ranked Saudi 
Arabia as 38 most competitive economy out of 175 - above such 
European Union economics, as Italy, Portugal and Spain. The Supreme 
Economic Council is obliged under the WTO guidelines to review 
sectors closed to FDI, including recruitment, employment and fisheries. 
But upstream oil sector will probably remain on the 'negative' list for 
the foreseeable future. Key to diversification efforts are an estimated $ I 
trillion worth of mega projects in the pipeline that requires public 
private partnership and massive increases in FDI. 
The kingdom's accession to the WTO has opened new markets for 
non-oil exports (notably petrochemicals). According to a Samba official, 
"The industry is a major beneficiary from the WTO entry, given that the 
kingdom made no commitment to change the pricing of feed stock an the 
chemical Tariff Harmonization Agreement substantially lowers tariffs 
globally on chemical imports, including all of the 64 chemical exported 
by Saudi Arabia Basic Industries Corporation.""^^ SABIC (70% state 
owned) has an ambition of becoming the world's third largest 
petrochemical manufacturers, with a capacity of 130 m tones/year by 
45 . The Asian Age, 14 November 2005, p.31 
46 . N. 40, p.55 
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2020. In other sector, the Saudi Iron & Steel Co. (Hadeed) is expanding 
its steel making to 10 m & 17 m tones/year by 2010 and 2020, compared 
to 5 m tones in 2006. To exploit substantial bauxite reserves and ample 
gas supplies, Maaden, in partnership with Canada's Alcan, is building a 
$ 7 billion facility to produce 2.1 m tones/year of primary aliminium. 
The Jizan Economic City will host an alumina refinery with a capacity 
of 1.2 m tones/year and 650,000 tones/year aluminium smelter. The gulf 
countries in general and Saudi Arabia in particular, are looking at ways 
of reinvesting petrodollars in growth - enhancing projects like 
"economic cities" and value added downstream industries, rather than 
simply recycling external surpluses through western capital market. 
Underlying aims are building a less oil - reliant future that depends on 
private sector investments (including DFI) and provides more diverse 
source of revenues, as well as creating productive jobs for future 
generation. 
To accelerate diversification successfully strategy must be based 
on both comparative and competitive advantages. Where comparative 
advantage is based on endowed factor resources, while competitive 
advantage has to be forged by increasing value added economic activity 
conducted within the kingdom's firms industries, sectors and regions. 
Diversification is also known to provide for positive spill overs between 
different types of economic activity in the form of economies of scale 
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and scope, added inter and intra-linkage in industry and trade, diffusion 
of technology and the attainment of organizational and managerial 
skills. It also leads to greater factor market flexibility for labour and 
capital. Diversification in an economy entails measures that firms and 
government consciously adopt to foster, maintain and increase 
productivity on a sustainable basis. It relates to continual upgrading of 
human and physical resources, and encouraging and strengthening inter-
and intra industry, sectoral, and international linkage. It requires 
inducing technological changes, innovation and open learning and 
knowledge sharing system, and change in the organizational structure 
and behaviours of firms, industry and government. Government has a 
principal role to play in facilitating this process by addressing systemic 
type of issues such as provision of efficient infrastructure, and other 
supportive business services. The measures undertaken to induce added 
diversification must be market oriented and aimed at various sectoral, 
regional and economy - wide levels. Competitive pressures in both 
domestic and international markets, play a critical role and at the same 
time cooperation between firms and industry should be encouraged to 
develop general purpose inputs, information, training programs etc. 
To forge a viable diversification and competitive enhancement 
programe and attractive climate for private investment must be created. 
To do that, it is necessary to adopt a liberalization and reform package 
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which would include measures to allow the market place to function 
more properly, established sectoral policy and strategy and introduce 
competitive and stable fiscal rules. The package should also lay down an 
acceptable legal framework, provide supporting regulations, 
administered by an impartial regulator, ensure transparency, avoid 
discrimination among investors. For the economy as a whole and its 
constituent sectors the vision should be an open with an enabling 
environment and a level playing field where the same rules apply for all 
i.e. public vs. private, local vs. foreign, corporate vs. individual. 
The global economy presents major opportunities in this regard 
for diversifying and upgrading the competitive position of firm and 
industries. Policies directed at deregulation, privatization, trade and 
investment liberalization are giving rise to increase FDI flows as more 
flexible production system, joint ventures, strategic alliances, and other 
cooperative arrangement in production and marketing. Mining is the 
great potential for Saudi Arabia economy. The vast country is home to 
the largest mineral resources in the gulf region, including precious and 
base minerals, as well as industrial minerals. Minerals discovered in the 
kingdom of Saudi Arabia include phosphate, bauxite, gold, magnesium, 
gypsum, marble, iron ore, bentonite, copper, garnet, granite, limestone, 
silver and others. 
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Saudi Arabia holds some of the largest phosphates deposit in the 
world. With private sector investment, Saudi Arabia can locally utilize 
the produced phosphates to consolidated its position as one of the 
leading exporters of fertilizers, where anticipations are that the country 
will capture 60 percent of the world phosphate market. The soil of Saudi 
Arabia is also rich in bauxite and has potential to supply the aluminium 
industry in the GCC region. Some estimates suggest that Saudi Arabia is 
home to 20 millions of tons of gold ore. The gold deposit have 
significantly contributed to meeting the needs of the thriving 2,000 ton 
domestic market, as well as that of foreign markets such as India, 
Europe and the US. Saudi Arabia has also several iron deposits. The 
holding reserves are 84 million tons at 42.5 percent iron, which are 
sufficient for 25 years of pellet production at 2.2 million tons per year. 
Saudi Arabia has the world's largest deposit of high grade magnesite . 
The soil of Saudi Arabia is also rich in gypsum and marble which have a 
growing domestic market owing, in part, to an active construction 
industry. 
The development of mining sector occupies a prominent position 
in Saudi Arabia's diversification program. Saudi Arabia's mining sector 
is seen to present a high growth potential and the government views 
private investment as the mining sector's engine of growth. An 
important catalyst for private investment in the mining sector was the 
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creation of the Saudi Arabian Mining Company (Maadan) in 1997 with 
an initial capital of more than $ 1 billion. Maadan is involved in the 
development of the mining se<:tor through sole and joint ventures, and 
through its contribution to the development of the infrastructure of the 
mining sites, including water, electricity and telecommunication. 
Incentive to the private sector have contributed to making investment in 
the mining sector highly profitable both for local investors and their 
international partners. 
The government of Saudi Arabia's medium and long term 
objectives for the sector include establishing industries for extracting 
and processing the minerals and making the country a leading exporter 
in that regard. Plans to develop integrated downstream cluster industries 
in the sector are starting to materialize. 
Challenges for the development of Saudi mining sector stem from 
the fact that the global mining industry has changed considerably in the 
1990s. The role of market and private sector has become the driving 
force whereas the role of the state has changed from owner and operator 
to regulator and administrator. Challenges facing the sector encompass 
reforms in public sector agencies and the establishment of an enabling 
environment for long term private sector participation in minerals. In 
terms of the public sector, the goal is to establish competent and 
responsive institutions which will serve to promote mineral investment 
227 
and coordinate inter ministerial linkages, provide reliable geological and 
technical information. For the mining sector as a whole the vision is an 
open one with a level playing field with easy access to exploration rights 
thus minimizing state mining reserves and eliminating discretion in 
granting license. So mining sector has been ahead in the race for 
diversification which implies placing a much heavier weight on the 
mining sector in achieving development objectives. 
Saudi Arabia's strategies for diversification and economic reforms 
does not mean that its petroleum sector will lose its importance, in near 
future. No matter, how successful economic, demographic and social 
reforms become, Saudi Arabia's strategic position, economy and ability 
to meet the expectations of its people will still remain dependent on the 
revenues provided by its petroleum sector. While Saudi energy export 
can not by themselves support the Saudi Arabia of the twenty first 
century. They will remain the most important source of the kingdom's 
income. Saudi Arabia will remain a petroleum sector driven economy, 
even if it is successful in both diversifying and expanding its private 
sector. In fact much of its diversification, and much growth of economy 
will consist of ventures that add value and labour intensity to the Saudi 
economy through the production of petroleum related products. 
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CONCLUSION 
Saudi Arabia is basically an oil based economy. It was a relatively 
poor country prior to the discovery of oil in 1938. After the first 
extraction of oil in 1938 and subsequent growth in export of oil, Saudi 
Arabia became a rich country due to high oil revenues. It has more than 
25 percent of the world proven oil reserves. It has been important 
member of OPEC, OAPEC and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). But 
Saudi Arabia can not afford to rely only on oil for its long term social 
and economic development. Because the employment opportunity is 
very limited in an economy which is based only on one sector namely 
the oil sector, as the extraction of crude oil and its further processing 
need large capital and high quality technique. So more unemployed 
persons can not be absorbed into this sector, most of whom are also 
unskilled. Therefore the need for diversification becomes urgent in case 
of Saudi Arabia. And Saudi Arabia did begin to make an attempt in this 
direction in the form of setting up of some manufacturing industries 
other than oil. The diversification is also necessary for a country 
dependent on a single natural resource like oil or gas, because that 
country can encounter the Dutch disease. This concept had arised in case 
of Netherlands where its value of exchange increased due to high 
revenue earned by the export of its newly found gas. High revenue and 
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increased value of exchange affected its manufacturing sector adversely. 
The country became dependent only on its export of natural resource. 
Though, this condition has never occurred in Saudi Arabia, because no 
manufacturing industries has ever existed prior to the export of its oil. 
Saudi Arabia had made its first attempt in the direction of 
diversification by establishing the Saudi Basic Industries Corporation in 
1976. Which is Saudi Arabia's main non-oil industrial enterprise. Apart 
from this Saudi Arabia is now establishing its own refineries through the 
joint ventures and increasing its stake in their establishment. It is also 
importing the technical know-how from foreign countries and 
institutions. It is bringing the highly vocational subjects for the study in 
their college and universities in order to equip their own population to 
deliver in the modern enterprises. It is also sending its students and 
researchers to high-tech institutions in developed countries for the same 
purpose. It has also now started the processing of the by-products of oil 
industry like polythene etc. 
Before the oil was discovered, the Saudi economy was a primitive 
economy. The main economic activity prevalent at that time was the 
raising of livestock by Bedouins, primitive agriculture and production of 
simple tools by craftsmen. The production of food and other materials 
was on the subsistence level only. The major revenue for kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia came from the annual pilgrimage of Hajj. But this was also 
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not an assured source of revenue and income due to security reason and 
inhospitable weather. The concern regarding the revenue has increased 
especially in 1930s, where the arrival of pilgrims fell drastically due to 
worldwide recession. Hence, there was an urgent need for some other 
source of revenue which came in the form of discovery of oil in 1938, in 
Dhahran. In the Arab World the first indication of presence of oil in Iraq 
came with a report from a mission of Geneva export in 1871. A 
businessman, Charles R Crane was invited by king Abdul Aziz to Saudi 
Arabia to look for oil reserves. He brought an engineer named Karl 
Tunichell who in his report, indicated the presence of oil in the eastern 
province around Dhahran. To extract the oil from that region, an 
American company, the Standard Oil Company of California (SOCAL) 
was signed in for concession. This company further passed on its job to 
its subsidiary named California Arabian Standard Oil Company. The oil 
was first found in Dammam located north of Dhahran in 1938 at the 
seventh drill. In Saudi Arabia first oil well was drilled in Dhahran and 
oil in commercial quantities were discovered. And after that the 
commercial production of oil in Saudi Arabia was started by this 
company. The company's name was changed to Arabian American Oil 
Company in 1944. And the name was further changed to Saudi Aramco. 
A major step was taken by Saudi government in this regard was the 
nationalization of this largest oil company which was a joint venture of 
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American Companies. It occurred in a phased manner. First in 1973, the 
government took 25 percent stake in it, then in 1974 this share was 
increased to 60 percent and lastly in 1980 it became the totally owned 
enterprise of Saudi government. Saudi Aramco is the largest oil 
company in OPEC with its headquarter in Dhahran on the shores of 
Arabian Peninsula. 
Saudi Arabia maintained the policy of keeping its output of oil at 
high level and its price at low in the global market. Because Saudi 
Arabia always considered its long term interest, not harming harshly the 
consumers of its oil so that flow of its oil revenue remained 
uninterrupted. And that the consumer countries did no have any 
incentive to find alternate source of energy because of high oil prices in 
the global market. 
Therefore, the main concern of Saudi government, has been the 
diversification of its single commodity based economy. For this purpose 
the government has been promoting the "downstream" industry in the 
country. Establishing "Petromin" a petroleum company in 1962 and 
SAMARIC (Saudi Arabia Marketing and Refining Company) had been a 
remarkable achievement in this direction. Production of oil had been 
constantly increased over the years since 1970s, the production is 
increased from 1386.67 million barrel in 1970 to 3217.70 million barrel 
in 2007. Like the output the amount of oil exported has also shown the 
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overall increasing trend. Its export of oil stood at 1174.17 million barrel 
in 2007. The percentage of exported oil in its total production has not 
shown much variation, it remained hovering around 75 percent to 80 
percent. The revenue earned from the export of oil has, however, jumped 
up many fold. It was 135,957 million Riyals in 1976, which increased to 
642,800 million Riyals in 2007. It was an around five fold increase in 
oil revenues. The government of Saudi Arabia is in pursuit of 
diversification of its oil based economy and has taken several steps and 
initiated several projects in this direction. Nevertheless, oil still 
accounted for 87 percent of government's income, 85 percent of export 
and 54 percent of GDP in 2007. 
Saudii government is trying to develop its downstream activities 
such as refining, petrochemical and non-oil industries, such as 
automobile. The Saudi government has been able to substantially boost 
the spending on job training and education, infrastructure development. 
Apart from this the government has also been promoting the 
privatization and first of all the telecommunication department was 
privatized. The scope of privatization in other sector is being explored 
continuously. 
Since Saudi Arabia's oil reserves are the largest component of her 
wealth, the Saudi government has to evolve strategy for the optimal 
utilization of oil revenues. For this Saudi Arabia should invest a large 
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portion of its current oil revenues in areas yielding a high real return to 
compensate for depletion of oil. Saudi Arabia's revenues from oil had 
been rising constantly due to ever increasing export and high price of oil 
in the international market. In 1982 the average export prices per barrel 
of oil reached above US $ 30. The Saudi government made the use of 
high income in building its infrastructure like good highways, ports, 
airports, telecommunication, electricity industries and various other 
urban services, like establishment of schools, colleges and hospitals. 
Saudi government also spent a large amount in building the gas 
gathering system and the pipe line for gas and crude oil to bring the raw 
material to the two main industrial sites i.e. Jubail and Yanbu. It invited 
multinational foreign companies for developing the downstream sectors 
like refineries and petrochemicals. It also earned revenues from foreign 
companies by increasing royalty and slapping taxes on them. Saudi 
government has also distributed its oil revenues among people through a 
wide spread subsidiary programme for utilities, fuels, agriculture and 
social services in the industrial sector and several other areas. The 
pressing need for diversification came after a series of external shocks 
during the mid 1980's. For example, the price of oil fell below ten 
Dollar per barrel in 1985. Apart from this, the Dollar also faced the 
depreciation in international market. These events led to the drastic fall 
in the revenue and exchange reserves of Saudi Arabia. Consequently, the 
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Saudi planners gave a thought towards the possible avenues for 
diversification. This diversification was basically aimed at the 
petrochemical industries and various non-oil sectors such as agriculture, 
manufacturing etc. The initial step which Saudi government took in the 
process of diversification was to restructure the Petromin for promoting 
investment in oil sector, purchase of 50 percent equity of star enterprises 
in Saudi Arabia by Saudi y\.ramco and joint venture with Texaco. 
Despite these attempts made by Saudi Government, the objective of 
diversification had not been satisfactory during 90s. Since 75 percent of 
government revenues and 90 percent of export earnings still came from 
oil. There had not been the powerful growth of enterprise within the 
country. The country faced with large budget deficits during that period. 
The foreign exchange resources has also depleted, which were lower 
than in 1970s and 1980s. The per capita income also declined in this 
period. 
The employment opportunities had also been decreasing during 
90s. To understand the diversification it is essential to study the 
structural composition of Gross Domestic Product of Saudi Arabia. To 
see the pace and direction of diversification the plan wise study was 
considered to be useful. Saudi government, in order to develop its 
economy, started a five year developmental programme. For this 
purpose, the Central Planning Organization (CPO) was established in 
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1965. First five year plan (1970-74) was started in 1970. The foremost 
objective of first plan was to establish an infrastructure that could 
support a modern economic base. Other objectives were to institute an 
economic and social development policy and to develop the human 
resources, necessary to implement the economic transformation. In 
pursuits of these objectives, the roads, big ports and airports were built 
all over the country and major cities and towns. The construction sector 
saw the boom in this plan. Big cities and towns were developed in this 
period with sizeable population. 
The second plan extended from 197.5 to 1980. Government was 
more stronger economically in this period than the first plan. The target 
was to absorb the increased wealth in the development of economy. In 
the second plan, a framework of ten years and twenty years planning 
was introduced to provide a long range perspective. The important 
milestone achieved in this plan, was the creation of two industrial cities 
at Jubail and Yanbu, complete with water, electricity, houses, hospitals 
and modem ports etc. Other achievements were establishment of SABIC 
in 1976 and SIDF, and expansion of subsidies given to local agriculture. 
The third plan covered the period 1980-85. The main focus of this 
plan was to develop its human resource and involve more and more of 
its Saudi citizens in the nation building. Government encouraged the 
private sector to expand training programmes for Saudi citizens, and 
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gave them loans for this purpose. The fourth five year plan covered the 
period 1985-90. The objectives of this plan were the continuation of 
those set in the previous plan. In this plan also the greater emphasis was 
given to the human resource development and reduce the dependency on 
single commodity oil. The plan was also made to cut the Expatriate 
workers by half a million approximately. The fifth plan covers the 
period 1990-95. The objective of this plan was more or less same as of 
previous plan like promotion of private sector in non-oil and oil related 
activities, development of human resource and creation of job 
opportunities for Saudis. The sixth plan started in 1995 and ended in 
2000. In this plan, the role of private sector was further enhanced. The 
energy and mineral sectors besides the non-oil sectors were made open 
to the private sector participation. Which helped to generate 
employment in the kingdom in a big way. The private sector accounted 
for about 99 percent increase of total employment in the country, and 
the share of oil related activities in total employment was less than I 
percent in this period. Seventh plan covers the period 2000-2005. The 
Supreme Economic Council was established in 2000 to over see the 
planning activity. This plan had been very much favourable for the 
kingdom as the country was enjoying with high revenue due to high 
price of oil in the global market. The foreign ownership of new 
industrial ventures were allowed in this plan to promote the private 
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sector by introducing the new investment laws in 2000. The eight five 
year plan covers the period 2005-2009 which has been prepared in the 
context of long-term development strategy with definite targets and 
objectives. The objectives of plan are the increasing participation of 
private sector, enhancing the skill of Saudi citizens as per with non-
Saudi population and increasing the standard of living of the population 
of the country. The common objective of all the planning is to preserve 
the Islamic values and uphold the tradition and culture of Saudi Arabia. 
The petrochemical industry produces chemical products that are 
derived mainly from petroleum or natural gas. Petrochemical contains 
carbon compounds in combination with hydrocarbon, oxygen, nitrogen 
and other elements. The raw material from which petrochemicals are 
derived are called feedstock/hydrocarbon. A variety of products like 
plastic materials, synthetic rubber, synthetic fibres etc. are made from 
petrochemical products. About 90 percent of world output of organic 
chemicals are produced from petroleum hydrocarbons. Petrochemical 
also include few inorganic chemicals such as ammonia, sulphur and 
carbon blocks. It was expected that the export - oriented hydrocarbon 
based petrochemical industries would diversify the economic structure 
and reduce the exclusive dependency of the country on oil exports. The 
foundation stone of Saudi petrochemicals were laid by the establishment 
of General Petroleum and Mineral Organization in 1962, Saudi Basic 
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Industries Corporation in 1976 and the Industrial cities of Jubail and 
Yanbu. The financial arrangements for their various projects were 
secured through the public investment funds of the Ministry of Finance 
and national economy in Saudi Arabia. Industrialization process in 
Saudi Arabia underlines the need to utilize the vast amount of gas 
present in the country and need to lessen the impact on Saudi people, 
when crude oil supply begins to decline. In implementing the 
industrialization programme, SABIC has so far formed eight joint 
venture companies — 
(1) Saudi Petrochemical Company (SADAF) (2) Al-Jubail 
Petrochemical Company (KIMYA) (3) Saudi Yanbu Petrochemical 
Company (YANPET) (4) Saudi Methanol Company (5) National 
Methanol Company (6) Al-Jubail Fertilizer Company (7) Arabian 
Petrochemical Company and (8) Eastern Petrochemical Company 
(SHARQ). Various petrochemical products like basic chemicals, 
fertilizers, polymers and metals are produced at those complexes. 
SABIC has also its modern research and development complex. These 
plants are owned equally by SABIC and the foreign partners. SABIC 
accounts for over 7 percent of world petrochemical production. SABIC 
has also expanded its programme outside the country. Among them has 
been the agreement towards the formation of a joint venture company 
between SABIC and China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation, and 
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signing a contract between SABIC and German contractor to built a 
polythene plant in Gelsenkirchen, Germany. Apart from this all the joint 
ventures of plants of SABIC are constantly on the expansion path in 
Saudi Arabia and diversifying its products. Further, the private sector 
has been increasing it share in the petrochemical industry in Saudi 
Arabia. Saudi Venture capital Group (SVCG) comprising Saudi key 
businessmen, made a venture with Chevron to build world class 
aromatic plant in Jubail. It was the first wholly owned private 
petrochemical venture in Saudi Arabia. Other private investors in this 
field are TASNEE, SIPCHEM, SAHARA Petrochemical Company, 
Lujian Industrial Co. etc. About 70 percent of the existing petrochemical 
projects in Saudi Arabia are joint ventures with industry majors 
including Exxon Mobile Corporation and Chevrron Philips. SABIC has 
state of art research center in Jubail, Houston, India and Netherlands. 
Saudi Arabia is also looking for downstream expansion in its 
petrochemical industry i.e. to develop plastic conversion plants. So that 
it can serve the export markets directly from the country, thereby 
capturing more of the value chain. The target has been to increase Saudi 
Arabia's share in the global plastic market to 15 percent by 2020 from 1 
percent currently. The diversification efforts also led to the 
establishment of HADEED Steel Company in 1983. In all its 
industrialization programme SABIC has been equally concerned about 
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the development of Saudi manpower. So it invested equally in 
manpower development so that most of the skilled and semi-skilled 
labour force would be Saudi nationals in future. Their percentage should 
be gradually increased until the plants are entirely run by Saudis. Lastly, 
it can be said that Saudi industrial policy has been able to reduce the 
degree of dependence of the economy on the oil sector. 
The privatization policy has contributed significantly to the 
process of diversification of the Saudi economy. A host of sectors are 
being opened to the private sector. Telecommunication, electricity, 
mining, airlines, postal services, railways, port services and water 
utilities are some of the potential areas for investment. To further 
promote foreign investment and serve the business community SAGIA 
was setup in 2000. Saudi Arabia promulgated the new investment laws 
under which the foreign companies can acquire the 100 percent 
ownership of local ventures in Saudi Arabia. They can have access to 
interest free loans from Saudi Industrial Development Fund. The 
Supreme Commission for Tourism was established in 2000 to help the 
tourism sector to grow and coordinate with the private sector, for further 
investment. For this purpose Saudi Arabia invests huge amounts in real 
estate. A number of economic cities had been developed in Saudi 
Arabia. King Abdullah economic city is one of six economic cities being 
developed by "Emmar Properties", a UAE based company. Smce 
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kingdom of Saudi Arabia has diverse natural and heritage resources, 
numerous tourist facilities and infrastructure has been developed by 
Supreme Commission of Tourism, later known as General Commission 
for Tourism and Antiquities. It has increased employment and 
investment opportunities for citizens. Privatization leads to development 
of financial markets by encouraging investors and investment companies 
to diversify their portfolios by investment in companies. Financing 
activities are being accomplished by public investment fund, Saudi 
Industrial Development Fund (SIDF), the funds for agriculture and real 
estate and the Saudi Credit Bank. Saudi Arabia has 11 domestic banks 
and their capitalization has doubled between 1991 and 1995. The local 
monetary system was increasingly developing which is reflected in 
increased reliance on banks and banking services. Now the state 
controlled energy sector of Saudi Arabia is opening to the foreign 
investment inflow in a considerable way. The government is reopening 
the door to foreign investment due to shortage of capital and modern 
sophisticated technology and skilled human resources. For a long time 
the efforts had been to focus on developing the massive oil revenues, 
with little attention to natural gas. But the creation of master gas system 
in the early 1980s reflects growing interest in this unused hydrocarbon. 
During the last two decades Saudi Aramco efforts in this direction has 
been successful. Natural gas is largely used in power generation, water 
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desalination and 1;o satisfying an impressive growth in petrochemical 
industry. It also helps in creating the jobs. There has been reforms in the 
financial regime in order to increase FDl in Saudi Arabia. The country 
attamed full membership of WTO as 149*'' member in December 2005. 
Opening of the Saudi economy to the world economy under WTO has 
meant reduction in tariff, access to service sector, greater foreign 
participation, transparency in trade issues and elimination of technical 
barriers to trade etc. Development of mining sector occupies a 
prominent position in Saudi Arabia's diversification programme. The 
government views the private investment in the mining sector as the 
engine of growth. An important catalyst for private investment in the 
mining sector was creation of Saudi Arabia's mining company 
"Maadan" in 1997. Saudi Arabia's objective for the mining sector 
include establishing industries for extracting and processing the 
minerals and making the country a leading exporter in that regard. 
Although, Saudi Arabia has put in substantial efforts in the 
diversification process and acquired a significant progress in achieving 
its goals of diversification. But the importance of oil revenue in the 
nation building remains paramount. 
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